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Abstract
This dissertation is comprised of three essays, which study the impact of student assignment
policies. The first two papers investigate the impacts of the removal of school desegregation
plans on school racial segregation and on ninth grade repetition rates in the U.S. The third paper
examines the impact of the school choice policy in Seoul, Korea on school segregation by
academic performance levels.

Over the last two decades, half of school districts that were subject to court desegregation orders
in the U.S. were released from those court orders. In response, many school districts modified
student assignment plans that had been adopted to integrate public schools. Chapter 1 documents
the changes in school desegregation plans and examines the effect of the changes on racial
school segregation in approximately 100 school districts. Analysis of student enrollment data
from 1988 to 2012 suggests that recent changes in student assignment plans caused a moderate
increase in school racial segregation. The results of additional analysis of the types of policy
changes suggest that the overall effect on school segregation is driven by the school districts that
replaced school desegregation plans with neighborhood-based assignment plans. Districts that
replaced race considerations with socioeconomic factors and that expanded school choice
options did not experience an increase in school segregation.

Chapter 2 examines the impact of the changes in school desegregation plans documented in the
Chapter 1 on ninth grade repetition rates in the same districts. Analysis of data from 1988 to
2012 suggests that the removal of school desegregation plans caused a statistically significant
increase in the ninth grade repetition rates of about 0.2 standard deviations. I also find that the

impact on the ninth grade repetition rates is driven by the school districts where school
segregation was substantially increased due to the changes in desegregation policies. The impact
on the ninth grade repetition rate is driven by the school districts where school segregation was
substantially increased by the changes in desegregation policies. In addition, I find no evidence
that the desegregation policy changes affect student movements from other districts or private
schools.

Chapter 3 examines the impact of school choice policy in Seoul, Korea on school segregation by
student performance levels. Seoul, Korea replaced random assignment of schools with school
choice in 2010. By exploiting the policy change, this paper examines the effect of school choice
on student sorting by ability. I find that schools became segregated by student performance
levels following the implementation of the school choice policy in Seoul. The results of this
paper suggest that school choice increases school segregation by academic performance levels
even in a racially homogenous country.
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Chapter 1. The end of school desegregation plans: Policy changes and school segregation

1.1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, half of the school districts that were ever under court
desegregation orders have been released from their obligation to maintain desegregated schools
(Reardon, Grewal, Kalogrides, & Greenberg, 2012).1 A number of studies have found racial
segregation across schools within a district tends to increase following the district’s release from
desegregation court orders (Clotfelter, Vigdor, & Ladd, 2006; Lutz, 2011; Orfield & Eaton, 1996;
Reardon et al., 2012). A small number of studies have also examined the effect of these changes
on residential location patterns (Billings, Deming, & Rockoff, 2014; Liebowitz & Page, 2014;
Lutz, 2011; Weinstein, 2013). No studies find any impact of these changes on residential
segregation, but Lutz (2011) and Liebowitz and Page (2014) find residential movements of
whites into the districts that removed desegregation plans and into whiter school attendance
zones within the same district, respectively.
In addition to the impact on segregation, studies have found that the recent changes in
school desegregation plans negatively affect student outcomes. Billings et al. (2014) find that
the end of race-based busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina negatively affects high
school test scores for both white and minority students, high school graduation and four-year
college attendance for whites, and crime rates for minority males in majority-minority schools.
Using approximately 100 school districts, Lutz (2011) also finds that dismissal of a court order
leads to small increases in black dropout rates in non-Southern districts. Oh (2015) finds that the

1

According to Reardon et al. (2012), 754 districts with enrollments greater than 2,000 were subject to court
desegregation orders. Among these districts, 372 were released from the orders. Four school districts that were
identified as being under court orders as of early 2009 by Reardon et al. (2012) were released from the orders later
(Tucson, AZ in 2011; Orange, FL in 2010; Chicago, IL in 2009; Philadelphia, PA in 2009; and Ector, TX in 2010).
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recent changes in school desegregation increase the ninth grade repetition rate which is closely
related to high school dropout rates.
Previous studies that examined a large number of districts focus solely on court rulings
that release districts from desegregation requirements, so they may provide a limited view of the
effects of changes in school desegregation plans. First, the changes in school desegregation
plans associated with court rulings have been quite varied, and subsequent effects on segregation
are likely to depend on the nature of these changes. Examining the average effect of being
released from school desegregation orders ignores the differences in student assignment plans
adopted by school districts, so focusing on the average effect may miss important policy
implications. Second, because the timing of court rulings is often not contemporaneous with
changes in school desegregation plans, focusing on court rulings can provide misleading
estimates of the effects of these changes. There can be a substantial time gap between the year
of the court decision and the changes in school desegregation plans. Initial desegregation plans
were often implemented closely after desegregation court orders. Nonetheless, most studies use
variation in the years that major school desegregation plans were implemented rather than the
years of initial desegregation orders in order to identify the effect of school desegregation
(Baum-Snow & Lutz, 2011; Guryan, 2004; Reber, 2005; Weiner, Lutz, & Ludwig, 2009).
However, despite a much weaker connection between the timing of court decisions that release a
district from school desegregation obligations and the removal of desegregation plans, studies
that examined re-segregation have relied solely on variation in the year of the court decision to
identify policy effects (Clotfelter et al., 2006; Lutz, 2011; Reardon et al., 2012).
This paper extends previous studies examining the effects of ending court desegregation
orders on school segregation in two ways. First, based on in-depth archival research of roughly
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100 school districts, I document the year of the major changes in school desegregation plans and
classify the types of the policy changes that occurred following release from court-ordered
desegregation plans or under continuing desegregation obligations. Second, I examine how
ending school desegregation plans has affected school segregation, and whether these effects
depend on the type of school assignment policies adopted.
In the sample districts examined here, the most common change to student assignment
policies is that school districts ended cross-town busing plans and started assigning students to
neighborhood schools. A second, smaller set of school districts have replaced student
assignment plans designed to promote racial balance across schools with the plans designed to
promote balance on socioeconomic (SES) factors. A third set of districts have responded to
being released from desegregation obligations by expanding parent’s opportunities to choose the
public school their child attends (e.g., open enrollment plans, interdistrict transfers, and
specialized magnet schools).
Existing research does not tell us how these various types of changes in student
assignment policies are likely to influence racial segregation across schools. Many have feared
that a return to neighborhood assignment policies would lead to the re-segregation of schools by
race (Orfield & Eaton, 1996). Studies, however, have tended not to clearly distinguish
neighborhood assignment policies from other types of policy changes. In addition, the impact of
the SES balancing plans is unknown. Chaplin (2002) and Kahlenberg (2001) argue that student
assignment policies designed to promote balance on SES factors will maintain school racial
integration. Using simulations, however, Reardon, Yun, and Kurlaender (2006) find that income
integration is no guarantee of racial integration and that the extent of racial integration produced
by an income-integration policy will depend on the size of racial income disparities and the
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specifics of an income-integration policy. Neither of the studies test these predictions using
actual cases, so the impact of using SES factors is not clear. Finally, several studies have found
that many programs which expand parental choice of schools increase school segregation
(Bifulco, Ladd, & Ross, 2006; Cullen, Jacob, & Levitt, 2005; Hastings, Kain, & Staiger, 2005),
but these empirical studies did not specifically examine the effect of replacing school
desegregation plans with the policies that expand school choice options.
Based on econometric models that use variation in the timing of the changes in school
assignment policies and control for district-specific trends in outcomes, I find that changes in the
assignment policies associated with being released from desegregation obligations increase
school racial segregation and that the effect is driven by the districts that adopted neighborhood
assignments. The districts that adopted socioeconomic balancing plans and expanded school
choice plans did not experience an increase in school segregation. These differential effects on
school segregation imply that districts’ choice of student assignment policies is important in
maintaining school integration in the post desegregation era.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides background on the end of school
desegregation. Section 1.3 details the changes in school desegregation plans. Section 1.4
describes the data. Section 1.5 explains the empirical strategy, Section 1.6 presents results, and
Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2. Background
The history of school desegregation is well-documented (see, among others, Armor, 1995;
Clotfelter, 2004). The monumental Brown v. Board of Education2 decision in 1954 established
the principal that “[separate] educational facilities are inherently unequal (347 U.S. at 494-495).”
In the first decade following the Brown (1954) decision, however, little progress was made
2

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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toward reducing segregation. The second Brown3 decision in 1955 delegated direction and
oversight of desegregation efforts to federal district courts. While whites in many school
districts across the South actively resisted desegregation, many lower courts placed minimal
requirements on desegregation plans and often granted district officials delays in implementing
those plans. In 1964, only 1.2 percent of black public school students in the eleven exConfederate states attended schools that had any white pupils (Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 1997).
The first important landmark on the path to meaningful desegregation after the Brown
(1954) decision was the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Act authorized the
Department of Justice to initiate and join in class-action lawsuits, and empowered the secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to deny federal funding to any school district that it
found to be operating segregated schools. When combined with the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965, which promised substantial federal funding to many school districts, the
later provision of the Civil Rights Act provided many school districts a financial incentive to
desegregate their schools. In addition, the Act prompted HEW to disseminate guidelines on
desegregation, which required more significant segregation remedies than many federal district
courts had, and which districts were required to satisfy to avoid the threat of losing federal
funding.
Next, a series of U.S. Supreme Court rulings starting with the case of Green v. New Kent
County (1968)4 established several important legal principles, which effectively required massive
desegregation efforts, first across the South and later in other regions. The three most significant
principles established in Green (1968) were: (1) school districts found to be operating statecompelled dual systems had “the affirmative duty” to convert to a school system “in which racial

3
4

349 U.S. 294 (1955).
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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discrimination would be eliminated root and branch”; (2) delays in converting school systems
were no longer tolerable; and (3) eliminating racial discrimination required establishing a system
“without a ‘white’ school and a ‘Negro’ school, but just schools.” The last principle established
the requirement that districts eliminate racially identifiable schools. In addition, the Supreme
Court recognized the “inextricable connection” between schools and housing and sanctioned the
use of transportation as a remedial tool in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
(1971).5
In the years immediately following these decisions, school districts across the South
adopted desegregation plans which were often designed to achieve explicit racial balance targets.
Racial balance targets could be specified either in terms of the number of predominantly onerace schools, or more frequently, in terms of maximum and/or minimum proportions of black or
white students for each school in the district. In small districts, such targets could often be
achieved by drawing sufficiently tailored geographic attendance zones (Armor, 1995)—a
technique labelled by Welch and Light (1987) as “rezoning.” In larger districts, achieving racial
balance targets often required drawing non-contiguous attendance zones or transporting students
between pairs or clusters of schools located in distant neighborhoods (Armor, 1995). These
types of school desegregation techniques are referred to by Welch and Light (1987) as
“pairing/clustering” plans.6 Implementation of these plans resulted in rapid and dramatic
increases in school integration. According to Clotfelter (2004), in the ex-Confederate states of
the South, the percentage of black students attending schools that were 90 percent or more black
fell from 78 percent in 1968 to 25 percent just four years later. Although changes in the extent of
5

402 U.S. 1 (1971).
The term “busing” has frequently been used in discussions of school desegregation, but it has no clear meaning.
Any of the desegregation techniques discussed in this section, including those characterized below as using
mandatory assignment and those relying on voluntary choices, might result in transportation that could be called
“busing.” However, “pairing/clustering” may be the one technique that is most associated with the term “busing.”
6
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segregation in regions outside the South were not as dramatic, many districts outside the South
were required to implement desegregation plans that involved rezoning and pairing/clustering
provisions similar to the plans implemented in the South.
In the late 1970s, in efforts to reduce whites’ resistance to school desegregation, school
districts sought, and courts began to approve, alternative techniques to achieve desegregation
goals. For example, in 1977, the San Diego School District in California adopted a plan to
integrate schools by encouraging minority students to voluntarily transfer from their
neighborhood schools to predominantly white schools located elsewhere in the district, referred
to as “majority-to-minority transfer” programs by Welch and Light (1987), and by attracting
white students to “magnet schools”7 in predominantly minority neighborhoods that offered
specialized programs. Unlike rezoning and pairing/clustering techniques that rely on mandatory
student assignment, these transfer and magnet programs rely on voluntary choices to achieve
racial integration goals.
In the mid-1980s, some districts, including Yonkers in New York and San Jose in
California adopted “controlled choice” programs that eliminated attendance zones, required
parents to select schools, and then assigned students to satisfy racial balancing targets while
maximizing assignment of students to the schools their families select. Even though parental
choice is emphasized, parents could be denied their first choice of schools in order to satisfy
racial balancing targets. Thus, “controlled choice” programs are difficult to categorize as
primarily employing either voluntary choice or mandatory assignment techniques.
In addition to establishing the principle of eliminating racially identifiable schools, the
Green (1968) decision introduced the concept of “unitary” status. When a school district
Magnet schools are public schools “of voluntary enrollment designed to further integration by drawing students
away from their neighborhoods and private schools through distinctive curricula and high quality” (Missouri v.
Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1657 n.6, 109 L. Ed. 2d 31, 1990).
7
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successfully eliminated a dual school system that separates black and white students, it is said to
have achieved unitary status. The Green (1968) decision clarified that in order to eliminate the
vestiges of discrimination from a dual school system, school districts needed to address all
aspects of school operations including (1) student assignment, (2) faculty assignment, (3) staff
assignment, (4) transportation, (5) extracurricular activities, and (6) facilities—the so-called
“Green factors.” The Green (1968) decision also emphasized that districts found to be operating
a dual school system should remain under the supervision of the courts until unitary status is
achieved. One result of this principle is that districts under federal court orders to desegregate
were often required for many years to seek prior approval from the courts before making any
policy changes that might affect one of the Green factors.
The Green (1968) decision left two sets of questions about unitary status unanswered.
One set of questions concerned what districts needed to do to achieve unitary status. Particularly
controversial was the question of whether a district needed to achieve and maintain specific
racial balancing targets in order to achieve unitary status, and if so, for how long did the district
need to maintain those targets. A second set of questions concerned the obligations faced by a
district that had achieved unitary status. Some language in Green (1968) and subsequent
decisions suggests that as long as it did not adopt policy changes with discriminatory intent, a
district that had achieved unitary status was not obligated to maintain school desegregation plans
or seek to achieve racial balancing targets. However, in several cases, lower courts did continue
to oversee and require maintenance of desegregation plans in districts that the courts had
declared unitary.
The Supreme Court remained largely silent on questions of unitary status during the
1970s and 1980s, but finally clarified several issues in two important cases in the early 1990s. In
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Dowell v. the Oklahoma City Board of Education (1991),8 the majority opinion of a divided
Supreme Court established several influential principles. The first principle was that court
supervision of districts that had been found to be operating dual school systems should be
temporary. The second principle was that good faith compliance with desegregation court orders
and elimination of the vestiges of past discrimination “to the extent practicable” were sufficient
to be declared unitary. The third principle was that, once a district is declared unitary, it no
longer needs court approval for policy changes and is not obligated to maintain racial balancing
plans. In Freeman v. Pitts (1992),9 the majority opinion further clarified that so long as the
district made good faith efforts to comply with court orders and had eliminated vestiges of
discrimination to the extent practicable, it did not need to achieve or maintain specific racial
balance targets in order to attain unitary status. The Freeman (1992) decision also established
that a district could be declared unitary and released from court supervision with respect to one
or more of the Green factors without having achieved unitary status on all of the Green factors.
That is, a district that was declared unitary on student assignment is not yet considered as
achieving unitary status, but it is able to modify student assignment plans that were adopted to
desegregate schools. This partial unitary status on student assignment is often the reason why
school districts under school desegregation orders frequently modified student assignment
plans.10
These decisions in the early 1990s effectively relaxed the requirements for achieving
unitary status and allowed districts that had achieved unitary status to move away from student
assignment policies designed to achieve racial balancing requirements. In subsequent years,
scholars and leading civil rights groups have claimed that these changes had resulted in a retreat
8

498 U.S. 237 (1991).
503 U.S. 467 (1992).
10
See the footnote 13 (Tucson in Arizona) for an example.
9
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from the goals of integrated schooling and in substantial increases in segregation (Orfield &
Eaton, 1996). As a result, researchers have been concerned with determining what changes have
taken place since the early 1990s in districts that had formerly implemented desegregation plans.
Much of the recent research on this question has focused on the effects of achieving
unitary status and being released from desegregation consent decrees and court orders. Clotfelter
et al. (2006) examine the 100 largest school districts in the South and Border states over the
period 1993 to 2003 during which time the share of districts released from court orders increased
from 12 to 45 percent. They find that these districts experienced an increase in the share of
minority students attending predominantly non-white schools. Using a national sample of midand large-size districts, Lutz (2011) finds that being released from court orders is associated with
a moderate increase in racial segregation. Reardon et al. (2012) confirm the Lutz (2011)’s
findings on school segregation using a larger sample of districts. Both Lutz (2011) and Reardon
et al. (2012) find that the increase in racial segregation is more pronounced in the South.
Rather than focusing on the effect of achieving unitary status, this present study focuses
on the effect of actual changes in school assignment policies in districts that were employing
meaningful desegregation plans prior to the Dowell (1991) and Freeman (1992) decisions.
Focusing on the effects of changes in school assignment policies rather than the effects of being
declared unitary is useful for several reasons.
First, there are an important set of districts that voluntarily adopted desegregation plans
without ever being subject to court orders. These districts adopted plans to avoid loss of federal
funding under provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in response to administrative actions
by the Office for Civil Rights, or in order to avoid anticipated law suits. For instance, Seattle in
Washington, Wake County in North Carolina, and Cambridge in Massachusetts, each have
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employed widely studied student assignment policies that have been used as models for other
districts, but none of these districts have ever been subject to desegregation court orders.
Although the legal obligations of these districts are not directly influenced by the Dowell (1991)
and Freeman (1992) rulings, the choices these districts make about student assignment policies
can be influenced by the potential legal ramifications of any policy changes and by norms which
are shaped by the choices of districts whose legal obligations are more directly influenced by the
decisions. Examination of these districts can help to provide more complete evidence on the
effects of changes in school desegregation plans.
Second, for several reasons, the timing of actual policy changes often differs substantially
from the date that unitary status is achieved. Most districts that were declared unitary prior to the
1990s did not substantially modify their school assignment policies until after the Dowell (1991)
and Freeman (1992) rulings clarified that they could abandon their school desegregation plans.
In these cases, the date of being declared unitary tells us almost nothing about the timing of
policy changes.11 The oversight of desegregation orders by the Office for Civil Rights (OCR)
also contributed to maintaining school desegregation plans in some school districts that had been
declared unitary.12 Also, the date of being declared unitary and being released from court
supervision is often ambiguous. In some cases, districts may have achieved unitary status with
respect to student assignment but still remain under court supervision with respect to other Green

11

For example, when the Omaha Public Schools in Nebraska had attained unitary status in 1984, the district court
stated that the district remains under an unquestionable legal duty to maintain integrated school system, so the
district kept desegregation plans in place until 1999.
12
For example, Palm Beach County Schools in Florida achieved unitary status in 1979, but, due to the OCR's
segregation allegation in 1989, the district submitted new desegregation plans to the OCR in 1991. After the OCR
stopped monitoring the district in 1999, the district replaced previous desegregations with alternative choice plans in
2000. Also, Fort Wayne Community Schools in Indiana, not considered as achieving unitary status (Reardon et al.,
2012), substantially changed its desegregation plans after the OCR dropped all potential segregation charges against
the district in 1976 (except the teacher assignment issue).
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factors.13 In other cases, even after the Dowell (1991) and Freeman (1992) decisions, districts
entered into legally binding agreements to maintain desegregation efforts for some period of time
as a condition of being declared unitary, and thus, actual release from court supervision did not
occur for a number of years after being declared unitary.14 Finally, it is possible that important
changes in a district’s student assignment policies led to legal challenges that resulted in a
declaration of unitary status, in which case the relevant policy changes preceded the declaration
of unitary status.15
Third, it is important for policy purposes to examine whether the impacts of changes in
student assignment policies associated with the achievement of unitary status depend on the type
of policies selected in districts. Many districts that formerly were or currently are implementing
student assignment policies designed to promote racial school integration face a wide range of
assignment policy options. Information on the effects of different kinds of policy options can be
an important input into the choices these districts make.
1.3. Types of Policy Changes
Two approaches can be taken to characterize the policy changes that school districts
adopted after the Dowell (1991) and Freeman (1992) decisions. Desegregation plans adopted in
the two decades following the Green (1968) decision tended to employ rezoning,
pairing/clustering, majority-to-minority transfers, magnet schools, or controlled choice. One
13

For example, the district court ordered that the Tucson Unified School District in Arizona AZ be declared partially
unitary in student assignment in 2008, so the district replaced its desegregation plans before achieving unitary status
in 2011.
14
For example, in 1994, Judge Barefoot Sanders declared Dallas Independent School District in Texas unitary
pending the elimination of some problems related to school desegregation plans. Nine years after the 1994 decision,
Dallas became unitary after addressing some of the issues.
15
For example, a Chinese-American parent sued over the admission policy at the competitive Lowell High School in
San Francisco, California where Asians had to score higher than other ethnic groups to gain admission because of
the court mandate of not having more 40 percent of the enrollment of a school of one ethnic group. In 1999, a
federal judge held that the school board could not consider children’s race and ethnicity. In the same year, San
Francisco school officials stopped using race and ethnicity as determining factors in assigning students to school,
and the district was eventually declared unitary in 2005.
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approach to characterizing policy changes is to describe how districts modified or discontinued
the use of specific desegregation techniques. This approach presents several challenges. The
first problem is that each district uses a unique mix of student assignment techniques and makes
unique changes in that mix of techniques. Nearly all desegregation plans employ a number of
the tools and techniques listed above in a great variety of combinations, so a district can
experience simultaneous changes in several desegregation policies at the same point of time.
Thus, it is difficult to develop a small set of policy change types that adequately captures
meaningful variation across districts. The second problem is that a district can make frequent
changes to its desegregation plan. If a district redrew school attendance zone boundaries to
assign students to neighborhood schools after several changes in the boundaries that focused on
maintaining racial balancing targets, the approach focusing solely on the assignment techniques
would classify each of these changes as the same type of change. The third problem is that it is
often difficult to determine which of the several techniques a school district employs is the most
important, or even the most extensive part of their desegregation plan. Focusing on the changes
in desegregation techniques would not capture the relative importance of the several techniques
used in a district.
Another approach to characterizing changes in student assignment policies is to focus on
the goals and priorities of the assignment policies. Any student assignment policy needs to
balance several disparate objectives: promoting racial integration of schools, maintaining
neighborhood schools, avoiding socioeconomic isolation of students, and providing families
choices of schools and educational programs. The key aspect of the Dowell (1991) and Freeman
(1992) decisions is that these decisions made it easier for school districts to deemphasize the
goals of promoting racial integration in their student assignment policies. As several scholars
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have suggested (Chaplin, 2002; Frankenberg, 2011; Kahlenberg, 2001; Holley-Walker, 2010;
Reardon et al., 2006), one way to characterize changes in student assignment plans is by
identifying whether racial integration goals were replaced with the goals of: (1) increasing
neighborhood assignments; (2) avoiding the isolation of socioeconomically disadvantaged
students; or (3) expanding parental ability to choose schools. Because it avoids the problems
created by focusing on the changes in previous assignment techniques and focuses on what are
likely to be substantively important distinctions between student assignment policies, this
approach is employed in the present study.
This approach to characterizing changes in student assignment policies by the goals is not
without challenges. The main challenge is identifying how the priorities embodied in a set of
student assignment policies have changed. Usually it is clear when a district has deemphasized
the achievement of racial balancing targets. However, a district that deemphasized racial
balancing targets might increase the emphasis on several other goals. For example, the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) in North Carolina replaced their racial balancing plans
with assignment plans that district officials refer to as an “open enrollment” program. The plan
allowed parents to rank preferences among public schools, and the district made efforts to assign
students to their highest priority schools. The plan, however, also guaranteed students’
admission to their neighborhood school, which greatly limits the ability of students outside of
higher income neighborhoods to attend their first choice schools. Although the plan nominally
emphasized the goal of expanding choice, the objective of allowing students to attend their
neighborhood schools was the more dominant objective in this student assignment plan.
The objectives emphasized in some student assignment plans are unambiguous, but for
many districts, judgments about the relative importance of neighborhood schools, socioeconomic
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balancing criteria, and parental choice in newly adopted plans have to be made. An extensive
appendix to this paper provides a summary description of the changes made in student
assignment plans in each district in the sample and the classification of the policy changes in
terms of the three categories listed above.
1.4. Data
This section is divided into four subsections. The first discusses the sample, the second
discusses the data sources, the third discusses the outcome measures, and the fourth presents
summary statistics.
1.4.1. Sample
A study by Welch and Light (1987), commissioned by the OCR, provides information on
a sample of school districts that implemented school desegregation plans. This sample has
several advantages for purposes of this study. First, the target population for this study is school
districts that had adopted substantial desegregation plans prior to 1991, either by court orders,
OCR orders, or voluntary choices. While other data sources provide information on which
school districts were subject to court desegregation orders (Logan & Oakley, 2004; Reardon et
al., 2012), the dataset assembled by Welch and Light (1987) is the only data source that includes
the districts that implemented desegregation plans by OCR orders, state legislation, and
voluntarily. Also, Welch and Light (1987) provide information on the details of school
desegregation plans implemented in school districts, which makes it possible to determine the
changes in desegregation policies made after 1990. The Welch and Light (1987) sample
includes around one half of the school districts that were ever subject to school desegregation
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orders with the enrollment greater than 10,000 and with the proportion of black students between
10 and 90 percent in 1990.16
The current study excludes the following districts from the Welch and Light sample.
First, the 16 districts in the sample that did not adopt any desegregation plans are excluded. As
this study focuses on estimating the effect of major changes in school desegregation plans, it is
inappropriate to include districts that did not have desegregation plans. The districts excluded by
this restriction are 15 districts with the “No plan” classification and one district (New Orleans in
Louisiana) which only gave students options to voluntarily transfer to another school (a
“Freedom of choice” plan by Welch and Light, 1987).17 Second, 11 more districts were
excluded because they have a white population of less than 10 percent or a black population of
less than 10 percent in the first year that each district appeared in data.18 These exclusions leave
a sample of 98 school districts, which are listed in Table 1-1.19
1.4.2. Data Sources
I used several sources to document the exact timing of changes in student assignment
policies in the sample districts. First, school desegregation lawsuit decisions were found using
Lexis-Nexis, the summary document of unitary status used for Clotfelter et al. (2006), and the
data section of “Desegregation Court Cases & School Demographic Data” of the Initiative in
Author’s calculation using the data of Reardon et al. (2012)
Yonkers in New York and Lorain in Ohio adopted desegregation plans in the late 1980s, so they are treated as
having desegregation plans.
18
Some of these 14 districts are the “No plan” districts and the “Freedom of choice” districts. The full sample
includes eight districts with a white population of less than 10 percent and six districts with a black population of
less than 10 percent in the earliest year when student enrollment by race appears in the data are excluded. The eight
excluded districts with less than 10% white population are Birmingham, AL; Oakland, CA; Harford, CT; Atlanta,
GA; Detroit, MI; New Jersey, NJ; Memphis, TN; and San Antonio, TX. The six excluded districts with less than 10%
black population are Tucson, AZ; San Jose, CA; Amarillo, TX; Ector, TX; El Paso, TX; and Raleigh, WV.
School-level information in Georgia, Missouri, and Virginia first appeared in 1993, 1991, and 1992 NCES survey,
respectively.
19
New Castle County District in Delaware had been formed by school desegregation order of the U.S. District Court
in 1978 and was treated as a single district by Welch and Light (1987). The county district was divided into four
racially balanced districts, Brandywine, Christina, Colonial, and Red Clay in 1981, and I treat the four districts as
separate districts.
16
17
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Spatial Structures in Social Sciences (S4) project at Brown University.20 Second, school district
websites, local newspapers, the electronic archives of Education Week, and websites of the Civil
Rights Project and the Integration Reports were searched for additional information beyond legal
documents.21 Third, district officials were contacted to verify conflicting information on student
assignment policies. Appendix A lists key sources of information on school assignment policy
for the districts that I classified as adopting any of the three types of policy changes.
The data to measure school segregation come from the Common Core of Data (CCD) of
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Public Elementary/Secondary School
Universe (PSU) Survey of the CCD has reported student enrollment by race since 1987.22 The
primary unit of analysis of this paper is a school district, and the CCD provides school-level data
with district identifiers.
1.4.3. Outcome Measures
Segregation is measured using a dissimilarity index, an exposure index, and the
percentage of minority students attending schools that were 90 percent or more minorities. The
dissimilarity index is a district-level measure that characterizes the distribution of two groups
across the schools within a district. The exposure index measures the degree of potential contact
between two groups within the schools of a district. The percentage of minority students in 90100 percent minority schools measures racial isolation.
The black/white dissimilarity index can be computed as:
1

bij

wij

Di = 2 ∑nj=1 | Bi − Wi |

20

Duke University Faculty Database: http://fds.duke.edu/db/attachment/282
Spatial Structure in Social Science Project: http://www.s4.brown.edu/schoolsegregation/desegregationdata.htm
21
The Civil Rights Project: http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/
The Integration Reports: http://theintegrationreport.wordpress.com/
22
Because not all states reported student counts by race in 1987, I use the PSU Survey from 1988 for data analysis.
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where bij and wij refer to the number of blacks and whites in school j in district i, respectively,
and Bi and Wi refer to the total number of black and white students in the district, respectively.
The dissimilarity index measures the degree to which blacks and whites are evenly spread among
schools. It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values representing more segregation and lower
values representing a more even distribution of blacks and whites across schools. More
generally, the dissimilarity index can be interpreted as the proportion of blacks (or whites) who
would have to move from schools where they are overrepresented to schools where they are
underrepresented to achieve a racial composition in each school that matches the racial
composition of the district as a whole. Dissimilarity indices can be computed for any two groups.
For instance, the non-white/white dissimilarity index can be computed by replacing the number
of blacks with the number of non-whites (blacks and Hispanics) in the equation above.
An index of exposure of black students to white students (denoted as the black/white
exposure index) can be computed as:
bij

Ei = ∑nj=1 Bi

wij
(bij+wij)

where bij, wij, and Bi are defined as in the previous equation. This index can be interpreted as the
proportion of students who are white in the typical black student’s school, and thus, higher
values represent greater exposure of black students to white students. An exposure index
captures the likelihood that a person from one group will encounter and interact with a person
from another group in a particular setting, in this case a school. Like the non-white/white
dissimilarity index, the non-white/white exposure index can be computed by replacing the
number of blacks with the number of non-whites (blacks and Hispanics) in the equation above.
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As a measure of racial isolation, I also compute the percentage of black students
attending schools that were 90 percent or more black and the percentage of non-white students
attending schools that were 90 percent or more minorities.
1.4.4. Summary Statistics
Table 1-1 presents the major policy change of each district since 1990. Among the 98
districts in the study sample, 50 districts made changes to their desegregation plans during the
1990s or 2000s. In 29 of these cases, the districts implemented assignment policies focusing on
the goal of promoting neighborhood schools; in 9 cases, the districts shifted emphasis from
achieving racial balance to achieving socioeconomic balance; and in 12 cases, the districts
deemphasized the goal of racial balance and sought to expand parental school choice.
Table 1-2 presents baseline statistics of the sample districts in 1990 or the earliest year
that the district appears in data. The mean black/white dissimilarity index of the sample districts
is 0.37, which means 37 percent of black students would have to move from schools where black
students are overrepresented to schools where they are underrepresented to achieve perfect
school integration. The mean non-white/white dissimilarity index is 0.35, which is similar to the
black/white dissimilarity index. The mean black/white exposure index is 0.47, and the mean
non-white/white exposure index is 0.43. When all school districts in my sample had school
desegregation plans, 11 percent of black students attended schools that were 90 percent or more
blacks, and 16 percent of non-white students attended schools that were 90 percent or minorities.
In terms of student composition, 51 percent of students in the districts are white, 37 percent of
students are black, and 17 percent of students attend private schools. The average number of
students is approximately 60,000.
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Summary statistics by the type of policy change reveal that the districts adopting changes
that emphasize neighborhood schools (neighborhood policies) and districts replacing racial
balancing consideration with SES balancing consideration (SES policies) are more similar to
each other than districts that expanded school choice (choice policies). Among the districts that
changed student assignment policies, districts that adopted choice policies have the lowest
baseline level of school segregation and the highest percentage of white students.
Districts that did not change assignment policies in the 1990s and 2000s (no change
group) are slightly different from the districts that changed the policies. Compared to the
districts with any types of policy changes, school districts in the no change group have the
highest level of school segregation and the largest student enrollment. However, the racial
composition of students of the no change districts is similar to the sample average. In terms of
the number of school districts that belongs to each Court of Appeals, there is variation in the
number by policy change types. All districts in Circuits 6 and 10 that changed their assignment
policies chose neighborhood assignments.
As presented in Table 1-1, the year of the policy change is evenly distributed in the 1990s
and 2000s. There are 25 districts that changed their policies in the 1990s, and 25 districts that
did so in the 2000s. More districts adopted the neighborhood assignments in the 1990s than in
the 2000s. In contrast, slightly more districts replaced their desegregation policies with the SES
and the choice policy groups in the 2000s than in the 1990s.
Figure 1 plots the trends in school segregation measured in the non-white/white
dissimilarity index, one of the three segregation measures used in this study.23 Panel A of Figure
1 presents the trends of districts with and without changes in student assignment policies by
23

Figures using the black/white dissimilarity index are similar to the figures using the non-white/white dissimilarity
index. Because Welch and Light (1987) presented the effects of school desegregation plans in terms of the nonwhite/white dissimilarity index, I use the same measure to draw figures.
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school year. The level of school segregation in the 1990s is higher for the districts in the no
change group than the districts with any policy changes, which is consistent with the baseline
statistics of school segregation presented in Table 1-2. However, school segregation increases
rapidly in the districts that changed their policies, and, after 2000, the segregation level of the
policy change group becomes higher than the level of the no change group. Panel B of Figure 1
plots the trends in school segregation only for the districts with the policy changes by time since
the policy is enacted. This reveals that, in all three policy groups, school segregation trends
upward even before the policy change. Panel B of Figure 1 also reveals that school segregation
in the neighborhood policy group increased sharply in the first year of the policy change. In the
districts that adopted neighborhood assignments, the percent increase in school segregation
between the year of the policy change and the previous year is approximately five times greater
than the average percent increase in the five years prior to the policy change. There is no
discontinuity in the segregation outcome in the districts in both SES and choice policy groups.
Panels A and B of Figure 1 suggest that the changes in student assignment policies may have
contributed to the increase in school segregation, especially for the districts in the neighborhood
policy group. In the next two sections, I formally test the effects of the policy changes on school
segregation.
1.5. Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy of this paper uses the variation in the timing of policy changes
across districts to estimate the effect of the changes (an interrupted time series design). This
design with trend controls identifies the association between a policy change and a particular
outcome by comparing deviations from outcome trends in districts that have implemented the
policy change to deviations from outcome trends during the same year in districts that have not
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(yet) implemented the policy change. In studies where the introduction of the policy change is
initiated at different times in different districts, this design can help to address potential bias from
the other events associated with the outcome of interest. Specifically, such time-specific events
can threaten causal inferences only if they occurred at the same time as the introduction of the
policy change, which is unlikely if the change is introduced at different points in time in different
districts and the timing of adoption is unrelated to district characteristics that might influence
outcome trends (Shaddish, Cook, & Campbell, 2001).
The interrupted time series design can be estimated by the following regression equation:
Yict = β Dict + θi + δi Tt + ct + Zictꞌψ + ɛict.

(1)

In this equation, i, c, and t index district, court circuit, and year, respectively. Y is the outcome
of interest, one of the school segregation measures. D is an indicator of the policy changes that
takes the value of 1 in years after the district changed student assignment policies and 0
otherwise. θi is district-fixed effects. A time counter variable (T) takes on a value of 1 for the
first year of the time series and increases by one for each subsequent year. δi is the slope of a
district specific trend line. ct is circuit specific year fixed-effects which control for year specific
events and account for the differences among the circuit courts in the probability of policy
changes found by Reardon et al. (2012). The vector of Zict includes controls of total enrollment,
percent of white students, percent of black students, and percent of black students squared.24 ɛict
is a random error term, and, because observations for multiple years are used for each district,
standard errors are clustered at the district levels. β indicates the average effects of the changes
in student assignment policies. β specifically tells how much, on average, school segregation
measures deviate from district-specific trends following the policy changes controlling for how
24

Because these control variables may have been affected by the assignment policy changes, I also examined the
sensitivity of primary findings to excluding the controls. Results are not sensitive to the exclusion of the controls.
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much the measures in the districts in the same federal circuit without policy changes deviate
from their specific time trend in the same years.
The district-specific time trend (T) is included in the regression for the following reasons.
First, as shown in Figure 1, the dissimilarity index was trending upwards prior to the changes in
school assignment policies. Second, the student demographic controls included in the vector Zict
was also trending. Third, unobservable trending factors that affect school segregation might also
be correlated with the control variables. Without including the treads, β will capture a spurious
relationship between Yict and control variables (Wooldridge, 2003).
The effects by the type of policy change can be estimated by the following regression:
Yict = β1 D1ict + β2 D2ict + β3 D3ict + θi + δi Tt + ct + Zictꞌψ + ɛict

(2)

This equation (2) includes three types of policy changes: increasing neighborhood assignments
(D1); avoiding the isolation of socioeconomically disadvantaged students (D2); and expanding
parental ability to choose schools (D3). Estimates of the policy change parameters (β1, β2, and β3)
indicate how much, on average, a school segregation measure deviates from district-specific
trends following the adoption of the corresponding policy change (D1, D2, and D3), controlling
for how much the segregation measure in the districts in the same federal circuit without policy
changes deviate from their specific time trend in the same years.
I limit the sample to observations that are ten or fewer years prior to or ten or fewer years
following the implementation of policy changes for three reasons.25 First, as shown in Panel B
of Figure 1, the effect of the changes in student assignment plans seems immediate. Thus,
school segregation outcomes that are far away from the year of the policy change may not be
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Because the number of units (districts) is sufficiently large relative to the number of time periods in the data used
for this study, I can assume rough independence in the cross section (See Wooldridge, 2002). Nonetheless, I also
tested the sensitivity of primary findings to changes in the length of the time period used (all years, five years, and
three years). These results are robust to the length of the time period used.
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relevant for predicting the counterfactual school segregation. Second, for school districts that
adopted changes in the early 1990s, using more than ten years prior to the policy changes might
reflect the effect of school desegregation plans. Third, using lengthy time-series is susceptible to
the inconsistency of standard errors due to auto-correlation and relies more heavily on functional
form assumptions.
1.6. Results
This section presents the results of school segregation analysis. Section 1.6.1 presents
primary results of school segregation, and Section 1.6.2 presents additional results of school
segregation by school types, and Section 1.6.3 presents the results of robustness and sensitivity
tests.
1.6.1. Primary Results
Table 1-3 presents estimated effects of student assignment policy changes on school
segregation. Even numbered columns present the results of black to white segregation, and odd
numbered columns present the results of non-white to white segregation. Average policy effects
on school segregation are computed using equation (1) which controls for court circuit-by-year
and district fixed-effects with district-specific time-trends.
Panel A of Table 1-3 presents the average effects of assignment policy changes on school
segregation. I find that the replacement of school desegregation plans with alternative student
assignment plans, on average, increases the black/white school dissimilarity index by 0.03. The
estimated effect for non-white to white school segregation is similar to the effect of black to
white segregation. Both estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The average
effects of assignment policy changes on school segregation are 8 percent of the sample mean of
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the dissimilarity index and 18 to 19 percent of the 1990 cross-sectional standard deviation of the
index.
The impact estimates measured using the exposure index are -0.011 for black/white
segregation and -0.009 for non-white/white segregation, which indicates that the assignment
policy changes decrease the exposure index by about 0.01. The estimates are statistically
significant at the 1 percent level. The average effects estimated using the exposure index are 2
percent of the sample mean of the exposure index and 5 to 6 percent of the 1990 cross-sectional
standard deviation of the index. The impacts estimated using the exposure index are relatively
small, but this measure is sensitive to the changes in demographic changes. If the districtspecific trend controls cannot fully address the downward trends in the black/white and nonwhite/white exposure indices due to the decline in white enrollment in public schools,26 the
impact of the assignment policy changes could be underestimated using the measures.
The replacement of school desegregation plans with alternative student assignment plans,
on average, increases the percentage of black or non-white students in 90-100 percent black or
minority schools by three percentage points. Because the baseline share of such students was
small (11 percent for blacks and 16 percent for minorities), the three percentage point increase is
a substantial increase in racial isolation.
Using all three measures, I consistently find that the assignment policy changes increased
school racial segregation. The magnitude of impacts on school segregation is greater in terms of
the changes in the evenness of students’ racial distribution and racial isolation than the changes
in the degree of potential contact between different racial groups in schools.

“From fall 2001 through fall 2011, the number of White students enrolled in prekindergarten through 12th grade
in U.S. public schools decreased from 28.7 million to 25.6 million, and their share of public school enrollment
decreased from 60 to 52 percent” (The Condition of Education, NCES retrieved from
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cge.asp on May 5, 2010).
26

26

Panel B of Table 1-3 presents the estimated effect of each policy type which is computed
using equation (2) with three different policy indicator variables. Estimating effects by each
policy type reveals that school segregation increased only in the districts that adopted
neighborhood assignments. The impact estimates indicate that returning to neighborhood school
assignments increased the black/white dissimilarity index by 0.056. The estimated effect on the
non-white/white dissimilarity index is 0.051 which is slightly smaller than the effect on black to
white segregation. The effects of neighborhood assignments are 16 to 17 percent of the sample
mean and 38 to 40 percent of the standard deviation. The estimated effects of neighborhood
assignments on segregation are more than 80 percent larger than the average effect of the
assignment policy changes.
The estimated impacts of neighborhood assignments on school segregation are also larger
than the average impacts when measured using either the exposure index or the racial isolation
measure. The impact estimates of the neighborhood assignments measured using the exposure
index are -0.022 for black/white segregation and -0.018 for non-white/white segregation, which
is twice as large as the overall effect of the policy change. In terms of racial isolation, the impact
estimates of the neighborhood assignments are also approximately 80 percent larger than the
average effects on school segregation. All coefficients of the neighborhood assignments are
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Using all three measures, the impact estimates of
adopting socioeconomic balancing policies and expanding school choice policies on school
segregation are small in magnitude (less than 0.01) and statistically insignificant.
1.6.2. School Segregation by School Types
School attendance zones are typically smaller for elementary and middle schools than for
high schools, so the impacts of neighborhood assignments on school segregation are likely to be
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larger for elementary and middle schools than for high schools. Thus, I analyze the impact on
school segregation separately for elementary and middle schools and for high schools.27 Table
1-4 presents the results of this analysis. As expected, segregation effects for elementary and
middle schools are at least 10 percent larger than the main results measured using all types of
schools. The biggest difference between the main results of all types of schools and the results
of elementary and middle schools appears when the racial isolation measure is used. The impact
estimates measured using the racial isolation measures indicate that the assignment policy
changes increase the percentage of minority students attending schools that were 90 percent or
more minorities by 7 percentage points, which is 20 percent larger than the main results.
In contrast, segregation effects for high schools are smaller than the main results
measured using all types of schools. Consequently, segregation effects for high schools are
substantially smaller than the segregation effects for elementary and middle schools. When
school segregation is measured using the dissimilarity index, the impact estimates on high school
segregation indicate that the overall changes in student assignment policies increase high school
segregation by 0.019 and the neighborhood assignments increase high school segregation by
0.032 to 0.036. The magnitude of the impacts is 32 to 43 percent smaller than the main results
estimated using all types of schools and 40 to 54 percent smaller than the results estimated using
elementary and middle schools. These results are statistically significant at the 1 or 5 percent
level depending on the sample used.
When school segregation is measured using the exposure index, the estimated effects on
school segregation are only statistically significant for neighborhood assignments. The impacts
of neighborhood assignments on high school segregation are 60 to 70 percent smaller than the
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Segregation indices are computed using schools only serving grades between K and 8 (elementary and middle
schools) and others, separately.
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impacts of neighborhood assignments on elementary and middle school segregation. The impact
estimates measured using the racial isolation measures are small and statistically insignificant.
Because a large proportion of minority students drop out from high school, the exposure index
and the racial isolation measure are likely to capture both the impact of the assignment policy
changes and the impact of the decrease in minority enrollment in high schools on the measures.
Using the dissimilarity index which is least sensitive to the demographic changes, the size
of the impact estimates for high school segregation is about half the size of the impact estimates
for elementary and middle school segregation. Based on the fact that attendance zones of
elementary and middle schools are geographically smaller than attendance zones of high schools,
the results presented in Table 1-4 support that the impact of the assignment policy changes on
school segregation is driven by student reallocation across attendance zones.
1.6.3. Robustness and Sensitivity Checks
Table 1-5 presents the impact estimates measured using the districts that adopted the
same type of policy. Because school districts with the same type of policy change are likely to
be similar to one another, policy effects measured using the districts with the same type of policy
change can address the concerns about the endogeneity of student assignment policies. In Table
1-5, the left-hand side columns under the subtitle of “Neighborhood”, the middle columns under
the subtitle of “SES”, and the right-hand side columns under the subtitle of “Choice” present the
estimated effects measured only using the school districts that implemented neighborhood school
assignments, the school districts that implemented socioeconomic balancing policies, and the
school districts that expanded school choice policies, respectively.
Depending on the school segregation measure used, the estimated effects of
neighborhood assignments presented in Table 1-5 are 4 to 24 percent smaller than the main

29

estimated effects. However, the within-group analysis consistently finds the statistically
significant increase in school segregation regardless of the school segregation measure used. In
contrast, in the SES and Choice groups, the assignment policy changes have no impact on school
segregation. The estimated effects of the SES balancing and choice policies of the within-group
analysis are small and statistically insignificant, which is similar to the main estimate effects.
These similar results between the within-group analysis (Table 1-5) and the across-group
analysis (Table 1-3) suggest that the main findings of this paper are not likely to be biased due to
the endogeneity of policy types adopted in districts.
Next, I test whether the estimated effects on school segregation are biased due to the
subsequent changes in student assignment polices. There are districts that experienced more than
one policy change at different points in time, and the characteristics of the subsequent policy
change are often different from the characteristics of the initial policy change. Because the main
analysis is based on the initial policy change, the estimated effects of each policy option on
school segregation may be biased by using the observations after the second policy change that
can be classified as a different policy option from the initial policy change. Columns (1) to (6)
of Table 1-6 present the results estimated using only observations before the second policy
change. The results of this analysis are virtually same as the main results estimated using all the
observations, which suggests that the main findings of this paper are not biased due to the
subsequent changes in student assignment plans. These results also suggest that the initial policy
change is most important in estimating the impact of the removal of school desegregation plans
and subsequent policy changes are not as influential as the initial policy change.
In addition, I test whether the results of the socioeconomic balancing policies are
sensitive to including other school districts that implemented the similar policies out of the
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sample districts. The additional districts are the five districts whose assignment policies are well
characterized by other scholars as switching from racial balancing goals to SES balancing goals
in the 1990s and 2000s (Berkeley, CA; San Jose, CA; Cambridge, MA, Montgomery, MD, and
Wake, NC).28 Columns (7) to (12) of Table 1-6 present the results of this estimation. The
impact estimates of the implementation of SES balancing polices are virtually zero, which
confirms that replacing race considerations with the SES factors does not increase school racial
segregation. In addition, the effects of neighborhood assignments are unchanged. Because these
five districts are well-known cases of using the SES assignments, the similar impact estimates
between the main results presented in Table 1-3 and the additional results presented in Table 1-6
suggest that potential errors subject to the classification of the SES policy in the sample are not
substantial.
In Table 1-7, I turn to the limitations of classifying the changes in school desegregation
plans used in this study. One potential shortcoming of classifying the assignment policy changes
by policy goals is that one district may have policies that focus on two different goals similarly.
Another shortcoming of this study is that, even though this study focuses on the policy changes
in the 1990s and 2000s, the changes in earlier years may be the most important policy changes.
Thus, I examine the sensitivity of primary findings to changes in the judgments about the most
ambiguous cases in the sample. The following school districts are reclassified for this analysis.
Duval School District in Florida ended two decades of forced busing in 1991 and
introduced magnet schools, so it was initially classified as the “Neighborhood” group. Duval is
reclassified as the “Choice” group because the district established a large number of magnet
schools after the removal of busing. Lee and Polk School Districts in Florida implemented
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San Jose in California is included in the sample of Welch and Light (1987) but was excluded from previous
analysis due to exclusion restrictions (having less than 10 percent of black students in a district).
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school choice programs with explicit diversity balance targets so they were classified as the
“Choice” group. Because the choice programs also include proximity preference based on the
distance between home and school, the two districts are reclassified as the “Neighborhood”
group. East Baton Rough Parish (EBRP) District in Louisiana created “community sensitive
attendance zones” and also opened a large number of magnet schools, so it was classified as the
“Neighborhood” group. The EBRP is reclassified as the “Choice” group. Austin Independent
School District in Texas removed the pairing of elementary schools and implemented a
neighborhood school policy in 1987. Austin removed the pairing completely in 2000, so it was
initially classified as the “Neighborhood” group. However, only 1,300 out of 78,000 students
were bused in 2000 because of the 1987 policy change, so Austin is reclassified as the “No
Change” group. Forced busing in Dallas Independent School District in Texas also largely went
away in the 1980s, so the district that was initially classified as the “Neighborhood” group is also
reclassified as the “No Change” group.
Table 1-7 presents the results of this reclassification. After reclassifying the two districts
in Texas as the “No Change” group, the estimated effects of the overall policy change are
slightly larger than the main results presented in Table 1-3. The estimated effects of the
neighborhood assignments and choice policies are also very similar to the main results even after
four districts in the “Neighborhood” group were reclassified as either the “Choice” group or the
“No Change” group, and two districts in the “Choice” group were reclassified as the
“Neighborhood” group. In short, the reclassification of the most sensitive cases does not change
the main findings of this study.
Finally, Table 1-8 presents the results of using observations that are five or fewer years
prior to or five or fewer years following the implementation of policy changes. Impact estimates
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using the five year window are slightly smaller than the main estimated effects using the ten year
window, but all the impact estimates of the overall policy change and the neighborhood
assignments are statistically significant and reach qualitatively same conclusions.
1.7. Conclusion
This paper documents how school districts replaced school desegregation plans in the
1990s and 2000s, and, using the information collected and classified through archival study, it
estimates the effects of these policy changes on school segregation. I find that school districts
have substantially modified school desegregation plans over the last two decades. New policies
that replaced previous desegregation plans mostly use race-neutral ways of assigning students
across schools. The assignment policies can be classified as having three different goals of (1)
increasing neighborhood assignments, (2) integrating students along socioeconomic lines, and (3)
expanding school choice options. I find that overall changes in student assignment policies
increase school segregation. Estimated effects by the policy types indicate that the increase in
school segregation is driven by the districts that adopted neighborhood assignments. The effect
of the neighborhood assignments is almost twice as large as the average effect. Districts that
adopted socioeconomic balancing plans and expanded school choice plans, however, were
successful in maintaining the level of school integration. In addition, the changes in student
assignment policies increased school segregation in the year of policy change without any
lagging effects in subsequent years.
One should be careful interpreting the results of this paper because the estimated effects
presented in this paper are likely to underestimate the effects of specific policy types. First,
because many school districts simultaneously expanded school choice programs when they
implemented neighborhood assignments or SES balancing plans, the effect of neighborhood
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assignments and the SES balancing plans on segregation could have been underestimated.
Second, the actual impact of the expansion of school choice plans could have been
underestimated because some school districts classified as the expanded choice plans include
school districts that slightly modified their pre-existing desegregation plans (e.g., transforming
public schools to magnet schools).
Despite the limitations of classifying the changes in student assignment policies, findings
of this study suggest that school districts’ assignment policy choices are crucial in maintaining
school integration. In the absence of any efforts to integrate schools, schools will become more
racially segregated when school desegregation policies are removed.
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Table 1-1. List of Sample Districts and Major Policy Changes since 1990
St.
AL
AL
AR
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CO
CT
DE
DE
DE
DE
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
GA
GA
IL
IL
IN
IN
IN
KS
KS
KY
KY
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
MD
MD

County Name
School District Name
Unitary Policy Change
Jefferson
Jefferson County
Mobilec
Mobile County
1997
1999
Pulaski
Little Rock
2007
1998
Fresno
Fresno Unified
2012
Los Angeles
Long Beach Unified
Los Angeles
Los Angeles Unified
Los Angeles
Pasadena Unified
1979
Contra Costa
West Contra Costa (Richmond)
Sacramento
Sacramento City Unified
San Bernardino
San Bernardino City Unified
San Diego
San Diego Unified
1998
1996
San Franciscoc
San Francisco Unified
2005
1999
Solano
Vallejo City Unified
Denverc
Denver
1995
1996
Fairfield
Stamford
New Castle
Brandywine
1996
2002
New Castle
Christina
1996
2002
New Castle
Colonial
1996
2001
New Castle
Red Clay Consolidated
1996
1995
Brevardc
Brevard
1978
Browardc
Broward County
1996
1995
Dadec
Miami-Dade County
2001
Duvalc
Duval County
2001
1991
Hillsboroughc
Hillsborough County
2001
2004
Leec
Lee County
1999
1998
Orangec
Orange County
2010
1996
Palm Beachc
Palm Beach County
1979
2000
Pinellasc
Pinellas County
2000
2003
Polkc
Polk County
2000
1992
c
Volusia
Volusia County
1970
Doughertyc
Dougherty County
Muscogeec
Muscogee County
1997
1993
Cook
City of Chicago
2009
Winnebago
Rockford
2001
Allen
Fort Wayne
Marion
Indianapolis
1998
1999
St. Joseph
South Bend
Wyandotte
Kansas City
1997
1997
Sedgwick
Wichita
2008
Fayettec
Fayette County
Jefferson
Jefferson County (Louisville)
2000
1991
Caddoc
Caddo Parish
2006
Calcasieuc
Calcasieu Parish
East Baton Rougec East Baton Rouge Parish
2003
1996
Jeffersonc
Jefferson Parish
2009
Rapidesc
Rapides Parish
2006
2006
Terrebonnec
Terrebonne Parish
c
Baltimore City
Baltimore City
Harfordc
Harford County
-

Policy Type
Neighborhood
Neighborhood
Neighborhood

SES
Neighborhood
Neighborhood
SES
SES
Neighborhood
Choice
Neighborhood
Neighborhood
Choice
Choice
Neighborhood
Choice
Choice
Choice

Neighborhood

Neighborhood
Neighborhood
Neighborhood
Neighborhood
SES
Neighborhood
Choice
SES

Deseg.
1971
1971
1971
1978
1980
1978
1970
1969
1976
1978
1977
1971
1975
1974
1970
1978
1978
1978
1978
1969
1970
1970
1971
1971
1969
1972
1970
1970
1969
1969
1980
1971
1982
1973
1971
1973
1981
1977
1971
1972
1975
1969
1969
1970
1971
1969
1969
1974
1965
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MD
MA
MA
MA
MI
MI
MN
MO
MO
NE
NV
NJ
NY
NY
NY
NC
NC
NC
NC
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OK
OK
OK
OR
PA
PA
SC
SC
SC
TN
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
VA
VA
VA
VA
WA
WA
WI
c

Prince George'sc
Suffolk
Bristol
Hampden
Kent
Ingham
Hennepin
Jackson
St. Louis Cityc
Douglas
Clarkc
Hudson
Erie
Monroe
Westchester
Cumberlandc
Gastonc
Mecklenburgc
New Hanoverc
Summit
Hamilton
Cuyahoga
Franklin
Montgomery
Lorain
Lucas
Comanche
Oklahoma
Tulsa
Multnomah
Philadelphiac
Allegheny
Charlestonc
Greenvillec
Richland
Davidsonc
Travis
Tarrant
Tarrant
Harris
Lubbock
McLennan
Arlingtonc
Norfolk Cityc
Pittsylvaniac
Roanoke Cityc
King
Pierce
Milwaukee

Prince George’s County
Boston
New Bedford
Springfield
Grand Rapids
Lansing
Minneapolis
Kansas City
St. Louis City
Omaha
Clark County
Jersey City
Buffalo City
Rochester City
Yonkers City
Cumberland County
Gaston County
Charlotte-Mecklenburg
New Hanover County
Akron City
Cincinnati City
Cleveland Municipal
Columbus City
Dayton City
Lorain City
Toledo City
Lawton
Oklahoma City
Tulsa
Portland
Philadelphia City
Pittsburgh
Charleston County
Greenville County
Richland County 01
Metropolitan Nashville
Austin Independent
Dallas Independent
Fort Worth Independent
Houston Independent
Lubbock Independent
Waco Independent
Arlington County
Norfolk City
Pittsylvania County
Roanoke City
Seattle
Tacoma
Milwaukee

2002
1987
2003
1999
1984
1995
2001(02)
1978
n.a.
2002
1983
1991
1998
1988
2002
1994
1991
1983
2009
1994
1985
n.a.
1998
1983
2003
1990
1983
1991
1989
1985
n.a.
-

2001
2000
2005
2001
1999
1999
2003
2004
2002
2007
1993
1996
2002
1996
2002
2008
2000
1994
1998
1998
2001
1997
1998

indicates counties that are coterminous with a school district
New Castle School District, DE, was subdivided into four school districts listed above.

Neighborhood
SES
Neighborhood

Choice
Neighborhood
Neighborhood

Choice
Choice

Neighborhood
Neighborhood

Neighborhood
Neighborhood
Neighborhood

Neighborhood
SES
Neighborhood
Neighborhood
Neighborhood
SES

SES
Neighborhood

Choice
Choice

1973
1974
1976
1974
1968
1972
1974
1977
1980
1976
1972
1976
1976
1970
1986
1969
1970
1970
1969
1977
1973
1979
1979
1976
1985
1980
1973
1972
1971
1974
1978
1980
1970
1970
1970
1971
1980
1971
1973
1971
1978
1973
1971
1970
1969
1970
1978
1968
1976
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Table 1-2. Baseline Statistics of Sample Districts
Policy Change Type
Variable
Black/white dissimilarity index
Non-white/white dissimilarity index
Black/white exposure index
Non-white/white exposure index
Percentage of black students in 90-100% black schools
Percentage of minority students in 90-100% min. schools
Total student enrollment
Percent white students
Percent black students
Number of districts in Circuit 1 (MA)
Number of districts in Circuit 2 (CT, NY)
Number of districts in Circuit 3 (DE, NJ, PA)
Number of districts in Circuit 4 (MD, NC, SC, VA, WV)
Number of districts in Circuit 5 (LA, MS, TX)
Number of districts in Circuit 6 (KY, MI, OH, TN)
Number of districts in Circuit 7 (IL, IN, WI)
Number of districts in Circuit 8 (AR, MO, MN, NE)
Number of districts in Circuit 9 (AZ, CA, NV, OR, WA)
Number of districts in Circuit 10 (CO, KS, OK)
Number of districts in Circuit 11 (AL, GA, FL)
Number of Southern districts
Total number of districts

All

Neighbor
-hood

SES

Choice

No
change

0.37
(0.16)
0.35
(0.15)
0.47
(0.19)
0.43
(0.19)
0.11
(0.18)
0.16
(0.21)
59,957
(76,668)
0.51
(0.20)
0.37
(0.17)
3
4
7
14
12
12
6
5
14
6
15
51
98

0.34
(0.15)
0.32
(0.13)
0.43
(0.16)
0.40
(0.15)
0.09
(0.11)
0.14
(0.15)
58,630
(35,384)
0.47
(0.16)
0.43
(0.17)
1
0
2
4
3
5
1
3
2
3
5
17
29

0.36
(0.18)
0.35
(0.16)
0.48
(0.20)
0.42
(0.21)
0.10
(0.16)
0.18
(0.24)
56,825
(56,751)
0.50
(0.20)
0.35
(0.14)
1
0
2
2
3
0
0
0
1
0
0
7
9

0.31
(0.09)
0.28
(0.08)
0.54
(0.15)
0.51
(0.15)
0.03
(0.07)
0.06
(0.09)
60,098
(33,986)
0.58
(0.17)
0.34
(0.15)
0
2
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
5
7
12

0.40
(0.18)
0.38
(0.16)
0.47
(0.21)
0.43
(0.21)
0.15
(0.22)
0.19
(0.25)
61,310
(102,771)
0.52
(0.22)
0.35
(0.18)
1
2
2
8
5
7
4
1
10
3
5
20
48

Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation in parentheses) are measured using the Public
Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey.
Means are computed using the value in 1990 or the earliest year appeared in data.
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Figure 1-1. Trends in School Segregation
Panel A. All districts

Panel B. Districts with policy changes

Notes: The plots are means for the relevant groups. The data is from the PSU annual panel.
For the graphical presentation, “Time since policy is encacted” equals 1 in the year of the policy implementation
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Table 1-3. Estimated Effects on School Segregation
Dissimilarity Index

Panel A: Average Effects
Policy change

Observations
Number of school districts
Panel B: Differential Effects
Neighborhood
SES
Choice

Observations
Number of school districts

Exposure Index

Racial Isolation

Black/
White
(1)

Non-White/
White
(2)

Black/
White
(3)

Non-White/
White
(4)

Black

Non-White

(5)

(6)

0.030***
(0.009)

0.028***
(0.008)

-0.011***
(0.004)

-0.009**
(0.004)

0.027**
(0.011)

0.032***
(0.011)

2,047
98
(7)

2,047
98
(8)

2,047
98
(9)

2,047
98
(10)

2,047
98
(11)

2,047
98
(12)

0.056***
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.009)
-0.005
(0.018)

0.051***
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.009)
-0.003
(0.016)

-0.022***
(0.005)
0.005
(0.005)
0.004
(0.009)

-0.018***
(0.004)
0.003
(0.003)
0.003
(0.007)

0.049***
(0.017)
-0.009
(0.009)
0.004
(0.013)

0.056***
(0.016)
-0.006
(0.014)
0.003
(0.016)

2,047
98

2,047
98

2,047
98

2,047
98

2,047
98

2,047
98

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 1-4. Estimated Effects on School Segregation by School Types
Elementary and Middle Schools
Dissimilarity Index
VARIABLES
Panel A: Average Effects

Policy change

Observations
Number of school districts
Panel B: Differential Effects
Neighborhood
SES
Choice

Observations
Number of school districts

Black/
White
(1)

Non-Wh/
White
(2)

Exposure Index
Black/
White
(3)

Non-Wh/
White
(4)

0.035*** 0.032*** -0.013**
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.005)
2,047
98
(13)

2,047
98
(14)

2,047
98
(15)

-0.011**
(0.004)
2,047
98
(16)

High Schools

Racial Isolation
Black

Non-Wh.

(5)

(6)

0.033*** 0.036***
(0.012)
(0.013)
2,047
98
(17)

2,047
98
(18)

Dissimilarity Index

Exposure Index

Black/
White
(7)

Non-Wh/
White
(8)

Black/
White
(9)

Non-Wh/
White
(10)

Black

Non-Wh.

(11)

(12)

0.019**
(0.009)

0.019**
(0.009)

-0.005
(0.003)

-0.003
(0.003)

0.010
(0.012)

0.018
(0.013)

2,047
98
(19)

2,047
98
(20)

2,047
98
(21)

2,047
98
(22)

2,047
98
(23)

2,047
98
(24)

0.066*** 0.060*** -0.027*** -0.020*** 0.059*** 0.067*** 0.032*** 0.036*** -0.008*
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.018)
(0.018)
(0.012)
(0.012) (0.004)
-0.009
-0.006
0.009
0.003
-0.007
-0.013
0.014
0.004
-0.006
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.007)
(0.004)
(0.012)
(0.019)
(0.014)
(0.018) (0.007)
-0.002
-0.001
0.002
0.001
0.004
-0.001
-0.009
-0.008
0.003
(0.022)
(0.019)
(0.011)
(0.009)
(0.014)
(0.016)
(0.017)
(0.016) (0.008)
2,047
98

2,047
98

2,047
98

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

2,047
98

2,047
98

2,047
98

Racial Isolation

2,047
98

2,047
98

2,047
98

-0.008** 0.014
(0.003) (0.021)
0.004
-0.013
(0.004) (0.011)
0.003
0.017
(0.006) (0.014)
2,047
98

2,047
98

0.020
(0.018)
0.010
(0.022)
0.020
(0.027)
2,047
98
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Table 1-5. Estimated Effects on School Segregation: Within-group Analysis
Neighborhood

Panel A: Dissimilarity Index
Policy change

Observations
Number of school districts
Panel B: Exposure Index
Policy change

Observations
Number of school districts
Panel C: Racial Isolation
Policy change

Observations
Number of school districts

SES

Choice

Black/
White
(1)

Non-White/
White
(2)

Black/
White
(3)

Non-White/
White
(4)

Black/
White
(5)

Non-White/
White
(6)

0.044**
(0.017)

0.039**
(0.018)

-0.015
(0.016)

-0.018
(0.014)

-0.011
(0.022)

-0.013
(0.015)

493
29
(7)

493
29
(8)

161
9
(9)

161
9
(10)

213
12
(11)

213
12
(12)

-0.018**
(0.007)

-0.016**
(0.006)

0.007
(0.011)

0.005
(0.007)

0.004
(0.008)

0.007
(0.006)

493
29
(13)

493
29
(14)

161
9
(15)

161
9
(16)

213
12
(17)

213
12
(18)

0.047*
(0.024)

0.053**
(0.024)

-0.004
(0.008)

-0.002
(0.017)

-0.014
(0.012)

-0.005
(0.006)

493
29

493
29

161
9

161
9

213
12

213
12

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 1-6. Estimated Effects on School Segregation – Sensitivity Checks
W/O observations after the 2nd policy change
Dissimilarity Index
VARIABLES

Neighborhood
SES
Choice

Observations
Number of
school districts

Black/
White
(1)

Non-Wh/
White
(2)

Exposure Index
Black/
White
(3)

Non-Wh/
White
(4)

With additional SES policy districts

Racial Isolation
Black

Non-Wh.

(5)

(6)

Dissimilarity Index
Black/
White
(7)

Non-Wh/
White
(8)

Exposure Index
Black/
White
(9)

Non-Wh/
White
(10)

Racial Isolation
Black

Non-Wh.

(11)

(12)

0.054*** 0.050*** -0.022*** -0.017*** 0.048*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.051*** -0.022*** -0.017*** 0.048*** 0.055***
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.017)
(0.016)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.005)
(0.004)
(0.017)
(0.016)
-0.001
-0.003
0.004
0.003
-0.006
0.001
0.002
-0.000
0.000
0.001
-0.007
-0.001
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.005)
(0.004)
(0.008)
(0.012)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.006)
(0.010)
-0.001
0.001
-0.001
0.001
0.007
0.006
-0.005
-0.003
0.004
0.003
0.004
0.003
(0.019)
(0.017)
(0.010)
(0.008)
(0.013)
(0.017)
(0.018)
(0.016)
(0.009)
(0.007)
(0.013)
(0.016)
2,026

2,026

2,026

2,026

2,026

2,026

2,140

2,140

2,140

2,140

2,140

2,140

98

98

98

98

98

98

103

103

103

103

103

103

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 1-7. Estimated Effects on School Segregation – Alternative Classification
Dissimilarity Index

Panel A: Average Effects
Policy change

Observations
Number of school districts
Panel B: Differential Effects
Neighborhood
SES
Choice

Observations
Number of school districts

Exposure Index

Racial Isolation

Black/
White
(1)

Non-White/
White
(2)

Black/
White
(3)

Non-White/
White
(4)

Black

Non-White

(5)

(6)

0.032***
(0.009)

0.029***
(0.009)

-0.012***
(0.004)

-0.009**
(0.004)

0.029**
(0.011)

0.030**
(0.011)

2,047
98
(7)

2,047
98
(8)

2,047
98
(9)

2,047
98
(10)

2,047
98
(11)

2,047
98
(12)

0.056***
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.009)
0.005
(0.020)

0.050***
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.009)
0.009
(0.018)

-0.021***
(0.004)
0.005
(0.005)
-0.005
(0.011)

-0.015***
(0.004)
0.003
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.009)

0.043**
(0.018)
-0.008
(0.009)
0.025
(0.019)

0.047***
(0.017)
-0.007
(0.014)
0.021
(0.021)

2,047
98

2,047
98

2,047
98

2,047
98

2,047
98

2,047
98
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Table 1-8. Estimated Effects on School Segregation with Alternative Length of Time Period
Dissimilarity Index

Panel A: Average Effects
Policy change effect

Observations
Number of school districts
Panel B: Differential Effects
Neighborhood
SES
Choice

Observations
Number of school districts

Black/White
±10 yrs
±5 yrs
(1)
(2)

Non-White/White
±10 yrs
±5 yrs
(3)
(4)

Black/White
±10 yrs
±5 yrs
(5)
(6)

0.030*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.022*** -0.011*** -0.010***
(0.009)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.004)
(0.004)
2,047
98
(13)

1,628
98
(14)

2,047
98
(15)

Racial Isolation

Exposure Index

1,628
98
(16)

2,047
98
(17)

1,628
98
(18)

Non-White/White
±10 yrs
±5 yrs
(7)
(8)

Black
±10 yrs ±5 yrs
(9)
(10)

-0.009**
(0.004)

-0.007**
(0.003)

0.027**
(0.011)

2,047
98
(19)

1,628
98
(20)

2,047
98
(21)

Non-white
±10 yrs
±5 yrs
(11)
(12)

0.017* 0.032*** 0.023***
(0.010) (0.011)
(0.009)
1,628
98
(22)

2,047
98
(23)

0.056*** 0.040*** 0.051*** 0.037*** -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.013*** 0.049*** 0.032** 0.056***
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.017) (0.015) (0.016)
-0.001
0.006
-0.003
0.003
0.005
-0.001
0.003
-0.001
-0.009
-0.004
-0.006
(0.009)
(0.005)
(0.009)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.001)
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014)
-0.005
-0.003
-0.003
-0.001
0.004
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.004
-0.004
0.003
(0.018)
(0.014)
(0.016)
(0.011)
(0.009)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.013) (0.011) (0.016)
2,047
98

1,628
98

2,047
98

1,628
98

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

2,047
98

1,628
98

2,047
98

1,628
98

2,047
98

1,628
98

2,047
98

1,628
98
(34)
0.034**
(0.013)
0.017
(0.014)
0.003
(0.011)
1,628
98
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Chapter 2. The impact of ending school desegregation plans on ninth grade repetition rates

2.1. Introduction
The landmark Supreme Court decisions of Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and
subsequent cases led to the implementation of school desegregation plans in hundreds of school
districts across the country. Implementation of court-ordered school desegregation plans resulted
in rapid and dramatic increases in school integration. In 125 school districts examined by Welch
and Light (1987), the proportion of black students attending virtually all-minority schools fell
from 62 to 30 percent between 1968 and 1980.1 The school desegregation was even more
successful in the areas where schools were most racially segregated. In the ex-Confederate states
of the South, the percentage of black students attending schools that were 90 percent or more
black fell from 78 percent in 1968 to 25 percent just four years later (Clotfelter, 2004). Recent
literature has found that school desegregation has brought beneficial effects to black students
including lower dropout rates (Guryan, 2004; Reber, 2010), reduced criminal convictions
(Weiner, Lutz, & Ludwig, 2009), increased income (Ashenfelter, Collins, & Yoon, 2006;
Johnson, 2011), and improved adult health (Johnson, 2011).
In the last two decades, a large number of school districts in the U.S. have removed
school desegregation plans or have adopted dramatic changes in their desegregation plans. A
number of studies find that school segregation increases in the school districts that were released
from court desegregation orders (Clotfelter, Vigdor, & Ladd, 2006; Lutz, 2011; Oh, 2015;
Orfield & Eaton, 1996; Reardon, Grewal, Kalogrides, & Greenberg, 2012). In addition to the
impact on school segregation, Billings, Deming, and Rockoff (2014) find that the end of race-

1

Throughout this paper, a school year is denoted by the calendar year in which it starts (e.g., the 2000-2001 school
year is denoted as 2000).
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based busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina negatively affects high school test scores
for both white and minority students, high school graduation and four-year college attendance for
whites, and crime rates for minority males in majority-minority schools. Using the 1990 and
2000 IPUMS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series), Lutz (2011) also finds that dismissal
from a court order leads to small increases in black dropout rates in non-Southern districts.
This paper contributes to previous literature by examining the impact of the changes in
school desegregation plans on ninth grade repetition rates in approximately 100 school districts.
In addition, it examines how the impact of the policy change on the grade repetition rates is
mediated through its impact on school segregation. The impact of the desegregation policy
changes on educational outcomes is likely to depend on the changes in peer racial composition
and related changes in schools. The present study uses approximately 100 school districts to
explore whether the effect of the policy change on grade repetition rates is related to the effect of
the same policy change on school segregation.
In addition, this study uses an educational outcome that can be consistently measured
across school districts. Educational outcomes reported by the National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES) or other agencies are based on state reports, but there are substantial
differences in measuring an outcome over time, across states, and even across school districts
within a state. Due to these measurement issues, scholars often compute educational outcomes
in their own way. For example, following Heckman and LaFontaine (2010), high school
graduation is often computed by dividing the number of diplomas issued by a school district in a
given year by the number of entering eighth grade students five years earlier. However, because
there is a five-year gap between the years measuring the number of the eighth graders and the
number of students who received diplomas, the diplomas awarded in a given year include awards
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received by members of other cohorts in addition to the cohort that first entered high school five
years earlier. In addition, this measure is sensitive to net transfers in and out of the school
district in the five years. Instead of relying on this problematic measure, this paper examines the
grade repetition rate that compares the grade of enrollment across two consecutive years.
Among many grade levels, this paper focuses on the ninth grade repetition rate which is the
proportion of ninth grade students who could not be promoted to the tenth grade and remain in
the same grade for a subsequent school year.
Examining ninth grade repetition rates is important because ninth grade repetition is
closely related to high school dropout and later life outcomes (Hauser, Pager, & Simmons, 2004;
Jimerson, 1999). Grade repetition is one of the powerful predictors of high school dropout, with
retained students being 5 to 11 times more likely to drop out (Jimerson, Anderson, & Whipple,
2002). In particular, ninth-grade academic outcomes such as percentage of courses failed are
correlated with the probability of dropping out of high school which implies that the transition
from the ninth grade to the tenth grade can alter students’ educational trajectories (Neild, StonerEby, & Furstenberg, 2008). Having a high school credential has substantial impacts on labor
market outcomes (Autor, Katz, & Kearney, 2008; Oreopoulos, 2007; Rouse, 2007).
Descriptively, young adults ages 25-34 without a high school credential have lower annual
earnings ($22,900 vs. $30,000) and higher unemployment rates (15 percent vs. 12 percent) than
high school completers (Kena et al., 2014). If the removal of school desegregation policies
increases ninth grade repetition rates, it can also increase the proportion of students who drop out
of high school, and lead to a negative impact on subsequent life courses.
The identification strategy of this paper compares the ninth grade repetition rates of
school districts that changed school desegregation plans in a year to the outcome of school
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districts that did not change school desegregation plans in the same year, after controlling for
district-specific trends. In the 98 school districts examined in this paper, I find that the changes
in student assignment policies associated with being released from desegregation obligations
increased ninth grade repetition rates. My results suggest that the desegregation policy changes
increased the ninth grade repetition rates by 3 to 4 percentage points, which is an increase of 0.2
standard deviations. The impact on the ninth grade repetition rate is driven by the school
districts where school segregation was substantially increased due to the changes in
desegregation policies. In addition, I find no evidence that the desegregation policy changes
affect student movements from other districts or private schools.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides background on grade repetition.
Section 2.3 describes the theoretical framework. Section 2.4 describes the data. Section 2.5
explains the empirical strategy, Section 2.6 presents results, and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2. Background
In 2007, 11 percent of public school students in kindergarten through grade 12 repeated a
grade since starting school (Aud, Fox, & KewalRamani, 2010). Among grades 1 through 9, the
first and ninth grade students repeat the grade most frequently (Warren, Hoffman, & Andrew,
2014). Relative to whites, grade repetition rates of blacks (21 percent vs. 9 percent) and
Hispanics (12 percent vs. 9 percent) are substantially higher (Aud et al., 2010). Reasons for
repeating a grade include grade retention due to the lack of academic progress and suspension
due to misbehavior. Throughout this paper, I use the term of grade repetition to distinguish it
from grade retention which is one of the two main reasons of repeating a grade.
Grade retention is a widely used educational remedy that holds back students when they
lack required academic skills to advance to the next grade. Being retained, especially in a
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primary grade, can help students perform better in classes (Alexander, Entwisle, & Dauber,
2003). However, initial academic improvements occur only during the year that the student is
retained, and the achievement gains decline within 2 to 3 years of retention (Jimerson, Woehr,
Kaufman, & Anderson, 2003). In addition, the causal effect of retention in later grades is unclear.
It has no impact at best or negatively affects academic performance and high school completion
(Jimerson, 1999; Jimerson et al., 2002; Hauser et al., 2004; Neild et al., 2008). The main source
of the negative impacts is due to the stigma of failure associated with grade retention that
negatively influences students’ self-esteem and peer relationships (Anderson, Jimerson, &
Whipple, 2005; Jimerson, 2001).
Suspension is temporary removal from regular school activities either in or out of school
due to behavioral problems. Suspension is a commonly used discipline tool to improve student
behavior. In 2007, about 25 percent of public school students in grades 9 through 12 had been
suspended (Aud, KewalRamani, & Frohlich, 2011). Suspensions can last one day to several
weeks. The vast majority of suspensions are due to minor infractions of school rules, and in
these cases, suspension only lasts a couple of days. Serious infractions which often involve
school violence, a weapon, or illegal drugs can result in lengthy suspensions. For example, in
cases of suspensions due to the use or possession of a weapon other than a firearm in school, six
percent of students were suspended for the remainder of school year (Neiman & Hill, 2011).
Despite disciplinary benefits of suspension, it can negatively affect student outcomes because the
loss of instructional time incurred during the suspension may lower students’ academic
performance. Like grade retention, the effect of suspension on academic performance is
controversial. Some studies find no impact of suspension, but they often do not account for
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either the length of suspensions or the grade in which students were suspended (Cobb-Clark et al.,
2015; Kinsler, 2013).
In addition to the impact of suspension on academic achievement, civil rights groups
argue that suspended students are often left without adult supervision out of school so engage in
risky behaviors (Losen & Gillespie, 2012; Losen & Skiba, 2014). Civil rights groups also argue
that the disparity in suspension rates across racial groups are due to discriminatory actions of
teachers or school principals against minority students. There are differences in rates of
suspension by race. In 2007, 49 percent of blacks in grades 9 through 12 had ever been
suspended while 26 percent of Hispanics, 18 percent of whites, and 13 percent of Asian students
in grades 9 through 12 had ever been suspended (Aud et al., 2011).
Suspension is often short, so suspended students are not likely to repeat a grade because
they fail to have the minimum number of class days from their initial suspension. Likewise, due
to the short length of suspensions, the negative impacts of suspension on academic achievement
are not likely due to the loss of instructional time. Thus, the main mechanism that suspension
leads to grade repetition is likely to be the changes in peer characteristics. Because suspended
students are more likely to interact with peer groups engaging in risky behaviors out of school,
the new peer groups may negatively affect student’s academic performance or behaviors.
Some polices contribute to the increase in the number of grade repeaters. One of the
policies can be changes in states’ accountability policies which focus on high stakes test scores.
In response to pressures to improve school performance, states and districts have been
developing several policies regarding grade level promotion standards. Applying strict standards
of grade level promotion based on test scores results in increases in grade retentions (Hauser,
Frederick, & Andrew, 2007). In addition, zero tolerance and War on Drugs policies in the 1980s
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and the Gun-Free School Act (GFSA) of 1994 have increased suspension rates (Walker, 2014).
The GFSA enacted in October, 1994 requires that all local education agencies receiving federal
funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act have a state law that expels a student
bringing a firearm or explosive device to school from school for a period of not less than a year.
In developing the law, states also included provisions for having minor weapons which often
involve suspensions. As a result of the policies, suspensions related to the possession and the use
of minor weapons were increased. Finally, the 1999 Columbine school shooting heightened
attention to the zero tolerance policies, which further increases suspension rates.
Recent changes in school desegregation plans can also influence grade retention and
suspensions. School desegregation plans improved educational attainment especially of minority
students (Guryan, 2004; Reber, 2010), but the removal of school desegregation plans may undo
this achievement. Despite the clear increase in school segregation (Clotfelter et al., 2006; Lutz,
2011; Oh, 2015; Orfield & Eaton, 1996; Reardon et al., 2012), not many studies examine student
outcomes. One recent study by Billings et al. (2014) examines socially important outcomes in
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina. They find that ending race-based busing negatively
affects high school test scores for both white and minority students, high school graduation and
four-year college attendance for whites, and crime rates for minority males in majority-minority
schools. Using approximately 100 school districts, Lutz (2011) also finds suggestive evidence
that dismissal of a court desegregation order leads to a small increase in black dropout rates in
non-Southern districts.
2.3. Theoretical Framework
Recent changes in the policies that regulate school desegregation resulted in an increase
in racially isolated schools (Clotfelter et al., 2006; Lutz, 2011; Oh, 2015; Orfield & Eaton, 1996;
Reardon et al., 2012). Because race and socioeconomic status are closely related in the U.S.,
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racially segregated schools also have a large number of students from economically
disadvantaged backgrounds. On average, minority students and economically disadvantaged
students have lower academic performance and higher rates of school rule infractions than
whites. Due to the racial and income disparity in the outcomes, schools where minority and low
income students are concentrated have large proportions of underperforming students. The
concentration of racially and economically disadvantaged students in school may increase grade
repetition rates for the three following reasons.
First, teachers may have difficulties in improving student academic performance in a
classroom with a large number of poor performing students. Literature on the costs of education
suggests that the minimum spending required to produce a given level of output is higher in
schools that have higher proportions of minority students or poor students who tend to be
underperforming (Duncombe & Yinger, 2008). The literature mainly focuses on cost
differentials by individual student’s characteristics, but it may be possible that the per-pupil costs
would increase at the increasing rate depending on the share of minority students or poor
students in a school. If so, without considering the school-level proportion of low or poor
students when calculating the per-pupil costs, the increase in the share of underperforming
students in a school may lead to insufficient funds to improve student performance in the school
with a high proportion of underperforming students. Because the removal of school
desegregation plans increases school segregation, it may also increase the number of students
who fail to meet the minimum academic progress to the next grade in the schools with high
proportions of minority or poor students.
Second, students in a classroom or a school with a large proportion of students with low
academic performance and risky behaviors will be negatively affected by their school peers.
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Substantial literature finds that school peer composition affects student outcomes. Many studies
find effects of peers on student test scores, and Lavy, Paserman, & Schlosser (2012), Bifulco,
Fletcher, and Ross (2011), Bifulco, Fletcher, Ross, and Oh (2014), and Billings et al. (2014) find
the effects of peers on high school graduation, college attendance, and labor market outcomes.
Weiner, Lutz, and Ludwig (2009) and Billings et al. (2014) also find the effects of school peers
on crime rates of young adults. Because changes in school peer composition influence student
outcomes, the increase in the number of schools with higher proportions of students with low
academic performance and risky behaviors will increase grade repetition rates because more
students would have to repeat a grade due to grade retention or suspension.
Third, teachers might use suspensions more frequently as a disciplinary tool in schools
with high proportions of minority and disrupting students. In a classroom with a small number
of disrupting students, teachers will be able to address disruptive behavior in the classroom. In
contrast, when the number of disrupting students is beyond a teacher’s capacity to handle, he or
she may choose suspension to solve classroom disruption. This possibility can be magnified
under the current accountability system which evaluates teacher performance based on student
test scores. Due to the pressure to improve student test scores, teachers will be more likely to
resort to suspensions which can be effective in creating productive learning environments in a
short run. In addition, some scholars argue there are disparities in school discipline practices that
treat minority students less favorably (Losen & Gillespie, 2012; Losen & Skiba, 2014). If so,
teachers would apply school rules more strictly in schools with more minority students.
2.4. Data
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This section is divided into four subsections. The first discusses the sample, the second
describes data sources, the third discusses the measurement of ninth grade repetition rates, and
the fourth presents summary statistics.
2.4.1. Sample
A study by Welch and Light (1987), commissioned by the OCR (Office for Civil Rights),
provides information on a sample of school districts that implemented school desegregation
plans. Of the data sources that provide information on school desegregation plans, Welch and
Light (1987) is the only one that includes districts that implemented desegregation plans by OCR
orders, state legislation, and voluntarily.2 The Welch and Light (1987) sample includes around
one half of the school districts that were ever subject to school desegregation orders with the
enrollment greater than 10,000 students and with the proportion of black students between 10
and 90 percent in 1990.3
This study uses the Welch and Light (1987) sample but excludes the following districts.
First, the 16 districts in the sample that did not adopt any desegregation plans are excluded. As
this study focuses on estimating the effect of major changes in school desegregation plans, it is
inappropriate to include districts that did not have desegregation plans. The districts excluded by
this restriction are 15 districts with the “No plan” classification and one district (New Orleans in
Louisiana) which only gave students options to transfer to different public schools (“Freedom of
choice” plan by Welch and Light).4 Second, eight districts with a white population of less than
10 percent and six districts with a black population of less than 10 percent in the earliest year

2

Other data sources provide information on which school districts were subject to court desegregation orders (Logan
& Oakley, 2004; Reardon et al., 2014).
3
Author’s calculation using the data of Reardon et al. (2012)
4
Yonkers in New York and Lorain in Ohio adopted desegregation plans in the late 1980s, so they are treated as
having desegregation plans.
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when student enrollment by race appears in the data are excluded.5 These exclusions leave a
sample of 98 school districts, which are listed in Table 2-1.6
2.4.2. Data Sources
The data to measure grade repetition rates come from the Common Core of Data (CCD)
of the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Public Elementary/Secondary School
Universe (PSU) Survey of the CCD has reported student enrollment by grade since 1987. Racespecific enrollment of each grade is available since the late 1990s but is volatile until the early2000s.
I document the year of the major changes in school desegregation plans that occurred
following the release from court-ordered desegregation plans or under continuing desegregation
obligations. The legal term “unitary” signifies that a school district successfully eliminated a
dual school system that separates black and white students. Information on the year that a
district achieved unitary status is available from other sources (Clotfelter et al., 2006; Lutz,
2011), but the timing of court rulings is often not contemporaneous with changes in school
desegregation plans. Even though scholars often use the year of unitary decision as the year of
the court release of school desegregation orders, the implications of achieving unitary status were
unclear until Dowell v. the Oklahoma City Board of Education (1991) and Freeman v. Pitts
(1992) allowed districts that had achieved unitary status to move away from student assignment
policies designed to achieve racial balancing requirements.

5

The eight excluded districts that have less than 10% white students are Birmingham, AL; Oakland, CA; Harford,
CT; Atlanta, GA; Detroit, MI; New Jersey, NJ; Memphis, TN; and San Antonio, TX. The six excluded districts with
less than 10% black students are Tucson, AZ; San Jose, CA; Amarillo, TX; Ector, TX; El Paso, TX; and Raleigh,
WV. School-level information in Georgia, Missouri, and Virginia first appeared in 1993, 1991, and 1992 NCES
survey, respectively.
6
New Castle County District in Delaware had been formed by school desegregation order of the U.S. District Court
in 1978 and was treated as a single district by Welch and Light (1987). The county district was divided into four
racially balanced districts, Brandywine, Christina, Colonial, and Red Clay in 1981, and I treat the four districts as
separate districts.
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There are frequently substantial time gaps between the year of being declared unitary and
the year of major changes in school desegregation plans for following reasons (See Oh (2015)
for more details). First, most districts that were declared unitary prior to the 1990s, before the
Dowell (1991) and Freeman (1992) decisions, did not substantially modify their school
assignment policies. In these cases, the date of being declared unitary tells us almost nothing
about the timing of policy changes. Second, the date of being declared unitary and being
released from court supervision is often ambiguous. In some cases, districts may have achieved
unitary status with respect to student assignment but still remain under court supervision with
respect to other factors. Third, even after the Dowell (1991) and Freeman (1992) decisions,
districts entered into legally binding agreements to maintain desegregation efforts for some
period of time as a condition of being declared unitary, and thus, actual release from court
supervision did not occur for a number of years after being declared unitary. Fourth, it is
possible that important changes in a district’s student assignment policies led to legal challenges
that resulted in a declaration of unitary status, in which case the relevant policy changes preceded
the declaration of unitary status.
Thus, instead of relying on the year of unitary decisions, I document the exact timing of
changes in student assignment policies in the sample districts using the following sources. First,
school desegregation lawsuit decisions were found using Lexis-Nexis, the summary document of
unitary status used for Clotfelter et al. (2006), and the data section of “Desegregation Court
Cases & School Demographic Data” of the Initiative in Spatial Structures in Social Sciences (S4)
project at Brown University.7 Second, school district websites, local newspapers, the electronic
archives of Education Week, and websites of the Civil Rights Project and the Integration Reports

7

Duke University Faculty Database: http://fds.duke.edu/db/attachment/282
Spatial Structure in Social Science Project: http://www.s4.brown.edu/schoolsegregation/desegregationdata.htm
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were searched for additional information beyond legal documents.8 Third, district officials were
contacted to verify conflicting information on student assignment policies. Appendix A presents
the details of the data sources used, and Table 2-1 presents the year of the major policy change of
the sample districts of this paper.
2.4.3. Outcome measurement
Grade repetition rates which track the proportions of each grade repeaters among the
students who entered the first grade in the same year (denoted as cohorts) is rarely available.
Thus, education scholars have developed several ways of measuring grade repetition rates by
comparing grade of enrollment across consecutive years (Hauser et al., 2007; Warren & Saliba,
2012; Warren et al., 2014). Following these education scholars, the ninth grade repetition rate is
measured as the percent change of the ninth grade enrollment in a year compared to the eighth
grade enrollment in its previous year. This measure captures the percent of the ninth grade
students who retained in the ninth grade without progressing to the tenth grade. Specifically, the
ninth grade repetition rate is measured by the following equation (1).
Ninth Grade repetition Rateit =

Grade 9 Enrollmen,it − Grade 8 Enrollment,it−1
Grade 8 Enrollment,it−1

x 100

(1)

The two main components of this measure are the eighth and ninth grade enrollment of a
district. Because these two components are affected by many factors, this measure cannot
present the current level of grade repetition rates of a district. For example, in a district where a
majority of its middle school students are from adjacent districts, the eighth grade enrollment of
the district can be larger than the ninth grade enrollment, resulting in negative ninth grade
repetition rates using this measure. This issue is similar in the districts where a large number of
students enrolled in private elementary or middle schools attend public high schools. This
8

The Civil Rights Project: http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/
The Integration Reports: http://theintegrationreport.wordpress.com/
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measure can be also affected by several factors including ninth grade dropout rates. Holding
constant all other factors that affect the eighth and the ninth grade enrollment, however, this
measure can be used to examine the changes in the grade repetition rates in a district. Because
this measure has a number of limitations, I use regression controls to overcome some of the
issues related to the measure (i.e., district-specific trend controls). In addition, in Section 2.6.3, I
carefully examine alternative sources that the eighth and the ninth grade enrollment can be
affected to show that this measure using the regression control captures the changes in the grade
repetition rates for the purpose of this study.
This study focuses on ninth grade repetition rates due to another limitation of the
measurement of the grade repetition rates. Measuring grade repetition rates of higher than the
ninth grade based on the grade of enrollment across two consecutive years will be less accurate
because the ninth grade is the first grade in which a large number of students are held back. For
example, measuring tenth grade repetition rates by comparing the tenth grade enrollment to the
ninth grade enrollment across two consecutive years would be biased due to the inclusion of
students who repeat the ninth grade. Later grade repetition rates are more closely related to
socially important outcomes such as high school dropout and completion rates, and the ninth
grade is the latest grade that the repetition rates can be accurately measured. Thus, this study
focuses on ninth grade repetition rates.
2.4.4. Summary Statistics
Table 2-1 presents the sample districts. “Unitary” lists the year of the release from court
desegregation orders, and “Policy Change” lists the year of the desegregation policy change
since 1990. The comparison between “Unitary” and “Policy Change” shows that the year of the
court decision is not always close to the year of the policy change. Some of the districts that are
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still subject to the desegregation orders changed their desegregation plans. In contrast, a few
districts were released from such orders but have not changed their desegregation plans. Among
the 98 districts in the study sample, 50 districts made changes to their desegregation plans during
the 1990s or 2000s.
Table 2-2 presents baseline statistics for the sample districts in 1990 or the earliest year
that the district appears in the data.9 Baseline statistics are presented for all districts and districts
with and without policy changes. The average ninth grade repetition rate of all districts is 19
percent. The average number of students is approximately 60,000. In terms of student
composition, 51 percent of students in the districts are white, 37 percent of students are black,
and 12 percent of students are Hispanic.
To capture different aspects of school segregation, three common measures of
segregation are presented: the non-white to white dissimilarity index, the non-white to white
exposure index, and the percent of non-white students attending a school with 90 percent or more
minorities. The dissimilarity index measures the degree to which non-whites and whites are
evenly spread among schools. It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values representing more
segregation and lower values representing a more even distribution of non-whites and whites
across schools. This index measures school segregation conditional on each district’s student
racial composition, so it is not sensitive to the changes in the racial composition over time.
However, because it captures student movements across the district mean of school racial
composition, it misses the movements below or above the mean.
This shortcoming can be overcome by the exposure index which measures the proportion
of white students in the typical non-white student’s school. Higher values of the exposure index

9

School-level information in Georgia, Missouri, and Virginia first appeared in 1993, 1991, and 1992 NCES survey,
respectively.
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represent greater exposure of non-white students to white students. The percent of non-white
students in a school with more than 90 percent minorities measures the racial isolation of nonwhite students. These last two measures are easy to interpret but sensitive to the changes in
student racial composition such as the decrease in the number of white students due to the
decrease in the share of white population in the U.S.
The mean non-white/white dissimilarity index of the sample districts is 0.35, which
means 35 percent of non-white students would have to move from schools where they are
overrepresented to schools where they are underrepresented to achieve a racial composition in
each school that matches the racial composition of the district as a whole. The mean nonwhite/white exposure index is 0.43 which means the proportion of white students in the typical
non-white student’s school is 43 percent. 16 percent of non-white students were attending a
school with 90 percent or more non-white students.
Summary statistics by the policy change status show that the districts that changed their
desegregation policies in the 1990s and 2000s (the change group) are similar to that districts that
have not changed their policies (the no change group). The ninth grade repetition rate for the
change group is 20 percent, which is slightly higher than the rate of the no change group (18
percent). Compared to the districts with the policy changes, school districts in the no change
group have higher levels of school segregation measured using the dissimilarity index and a
higher percent of minority students10 in schools with 90 percent or more minorities. The school
segregation level measured using the exposure index is the same for both groups. The
differences in the segregation measures between the change and the no change groups suggest
that overall student distribution of the no change group is similar to the one of the change group,
but the no change group has more schools in the center of the racial distribution of schools. That
10

Minority is defined as black and Hispanic.
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is, school districts in the no change group have more schools that have just below or above the
district mean of the percentage of black or non-white students. School districts in the no change
group are also slightly bigger in terms of student enrollment and have lower proportions of
minority students.
Examination of the observable variables listed in Table 2-2 reveals that the policy change
and the no change groups are similar in the observable characteristics. The last column of Table
2-2 examines whether there are statistical differences between the means of the two groups using
t-tests. Among the eight variables, the only significant difference is in the dissimilarity index,
one of the three school segregation measures. This difference implies that the non-whites and
whites were less evenly distributed across schools in the school districts that did not change their
desegregation policies. The ninth grade repetition rate in the no change group is not statistically
different from the rate in the change group. The districts with and without the policy change are
similar in many observable ways, but it is impossible to rule out potential differences in
unobservable factors. Thus, policy impacts will be estimated both with and without the districts
that did not change desegregation policies.
2.5. Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy of this paper uses the variation in the timing of policy changes
across districts to estimate the effect of the policy changes (an interrupted time series with
comparison group design). This design with trend controls identifies the association between a
policy change and a particular outcome by comparing deviations from outcome trends in districts
that have implemented the policy change to deviations from outcome trends during the same year
in districts that have not (yet) implemented the policy change. In studies where the introduction
of the policy change is initiated at different times in different districts, this design can help to
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address potential bias from the other events associated with the outcome. Specifically, such
time-specific events can threaten causal inferences only if they occurred at the same time as the
introduction of the policy change, which is unlikely if the change is introduced at different points
in time in different districts (Shaddish, Cook, & Campbell, 2001).
To examine the causal impact of the desegregation policy changes on the ninth grade
repetition rates, I implement an interrupted time series design by estimating the below equation:
Ninth Grade Repetition Rateict = β Dict + Zictꞌψ + θi + δi Tt + ct + ɛict.

(2)

In this equation, i, c, and t index a school district, court circuit, and year, respectively. The ninth
grade repetition rate for each district is measured using equation (1). D is an indicator of the
policy changes that takes the value of 1 in years after the district changed student assignment
policies and 0 otherwise. The vector of Zict includes controls of total enrollment, percent of nonwhite students, and percent of non-white students squared. A time counter variable (T) takes on
a value of 1 for the first year of the time series and increases by one for each subsequent year. δi
is the slope of a district specific trend line. ct is circuit specific year fixed-effects which control
for year specific events and account for the differences among the circuit courts in the
probability of policy changes (See Reardon et al., 2012).11 ɛict is a random error term, and,
because observations for multiple years are used for each district, standard errors are clustered at
the district level. β indicates the average effects of the desegregation policy changes. Due to the
inclusion of the district-specific trend control, β specifically tells how much, on average, the
ninth grade repetition rate deviates from district-specific trends following the policy changes

11

Desegregation policy change is closely related to court declaration of school districts as unitary, and judicial
approaches to desegregation differ substantially across court circuits. Reardon et al. (2012) find that there are
significant differences among the court circuits in the probability of release; dismissal rates are highest in the
seventh and tenth circuits and lowest in the second, fifth, and ninth circuits.
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controlling for how much the outcome in the districts in the same federal circuit without the
policy changes deviates from their specific time trend in the same years.
The district-specific time trend (T) is included in the regression for several reasons. First,
it is important to estimate the policy impact by comparing the changes in the grade repetition
rates, because the grade repetition rates could have been trending upwards or downwards prior to
the desegregation policy changes. It is particularly important because the measurement of grade
repetition rates used in this paper is sensitive to external factors. For example, as explained
earlier, in a district where a large number of eighth grade students are from other districts, the
ninth grade repetition rates of the district measured using equation (1) will be negative because
the district’s eighth grade enrollment is larger than ninth grade enrollment. In estimating the
policy impact on the changes in the outcome, it is not problematic because the coefficient, β, will
capture the changes in the repetition rates when the negative value of the repetition rates become
smaller or positive. However, if the percent of the eighth graders transferred in or out of the
district was changing prior to the policy change due to the reasons unrelated to the desegregation
policy changes, the impact estimate of the policy changes will be affected by the changes in the
eighth grade enrollment. The inclusion of the trend control helps to address such concerns
because the policy impact is estimated after controlling for the trending factors.
Second, with the trend control, the impact estimate of the policy changes is less likely to
be affected by demographic changes. White enrollment in public schools has been declining
over time.12 Because white students have lower grade repetition rates than minority students on
average, grade repetition rates could have been increasing over time. In the absence of district-

“From fall 2001 through fall 2011, the number of White students enrolled in prekindergarten through 12th grade
in U.S. public schools decreased from 28.7 million to 25.6 million, and their share of public school enrollment
decreased from 60 to 52 percent (The Condition of Education, NCES retrieved from
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cge.asp on May 5, 2010)”
12
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specific trend controls, it will be difficult to separate the impact of the demographic changes on
the grade repetition rates from the policy impact. Third, unobservable trending factors that affect
grade repetition rates might also be correlated with the control variables in equation (2). For
example, school administrators may be more likely to use suspensions as a discipline tool when
the proportion of minority students increases in a district. It would affect grade repetition rates,
but such a tendency cannot be measured, and thus is impossible to be controlled for. Then, the
impact estimate β will capture a spurious relationship between grade repetition rates and
unobservable trending factors. A district-specific trend control would address the bias caused by
unobservable trending factors (Wooldridge, 2003).
The key identifying assumption of the model is that there is no discontinuous change in
unobserved variables that influence ninth grade repetition rates in a district, and the unobservable
variables are not influenced by the changes in school desegregation plans.
In data analysis, I test the sensitivity of results to two choices made in equation (2). First,
equation (2) includes demographic controls because of racial disparity in grade repetition rates.
One concern related to the controls is that student demographic composition could have been
affected by desegregation policy changes. Even though this is not the case in this study (results
presented later), I estimate equation (2) with and without the controls. Second, I restrict data
observations that are 10 or fewer years prior to or 10 or fewer years following the
implementation of the desegregation policy change for data analysis. I also estimate the main
model using observations that are 5 or fewer years prior to or 5 or fewer years following the
implementation of the desegregation policy change. The lengthy observations are used unless
otherwise stated.
2.6. Results
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This section has three sub-sections. Section 2.6.1 presents primary results of ninth grade
repetition rates. Section 2.6.2 presents the results by the subset of districts to explore the relation
between school segregation and ninth grade repetition rates. Section 2.6.3 presents the results of
additional tests.
Two samples are used to estimate the policy impacts. One sample is all the school
districts, and another sample is the school districts that changed their desegregation policies.
Panel A presents the results measured using the all districts, and Panel B presents the results
measured using the districts that changed their desegregation policies (denoted as treated
districts). Two districts that changed their policies are excluded from the analysis only using the
treated districts due to data issues. One is Muscogee School District in Georgia that does not
have any observations before the policy change. Another is Fresno Unified School District in
California that changed the policy in 2012 thus only has one observation after the policy change.
Thus, 48 districts are used in analysis that only uses the districts with desegregation policy
change.
2.6.1. Primary Results
Table 2-3 presents estimated effects of desegregation policy changes on the ninth grade
repetition rates. Policy effects are computed using the regression (2) which controls for district
fixed-effects, district-specific time-trends, and court circuit-by-year fixed effects. Even
numbered columns present the results estimated without demographic controls, and odd
numbered columns present the results estimated with demographic controls.
The results presented in Table 2-3 suggest that the desegregation policy changes increase
the ninth grade repetition rates. The estimated effects indicate that the changes in school
desegregation plans increase the ninth grade repetition rates by 2.2 to 3.8 percentage points.
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When up to 10 years of observations around the policy change year are used, the estimated
effects measured using all districts (Panel A) are 9 to 26 percent larger than the effects measured
using the policy change districts (Panel B). In contrast, when up to 5 years of observations are
used, the estimated effects measured using all districts (Panel A) are 19 to 21 percent smaller
than the effects measured using the policy change districts (Panel B). Despite these differences,
the results using either all districts or only treated districts consistently show that the removal of
school desegregation plans increases the ninth grade repetition rates. In general, the impact
estimates measured using observations up to 5 year years are smaller than the impact estimates
measured using observations up to 10 years. The estimated effects are not sensitive to the
inclusion of demographic controls.
In addition, I estimate a regression model which includes an interaction term between the
policy change indicator (D) and the time counter variable (T), which allows the changes in the
district-specific trends after the desegregation policy changes.13 Table 2-4 presents the results.
Even numbered columns present the results estimated without demographic controls, and odd
numbered columns present the results estimated with demographic controls. The results
estimated with the inclusion of the trend shift interaction term also indicate that the changes in
school desegregation plans increase the ninth grade repetition rates. The impact estimates with
the trend shift interaction term are slightly larger than the main results presented in Table 2-3,
and all the estimates statistically significant at the 5 or 10 percent level. When up to 5 years of
observations are used, the impact estimates measuring with and without the interaction term are
most different from each other. When up to 10 years of observations are used, the impact
estimates measuring with and without the interaction term are similar to each other.

13

The equation estimated is: Ninth Grade Repetition Rateict = а1 Dict + а2 Dict Tt + Zictꞌψ + θi + δi Tt + ct +ɛict
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Depending on the analytic model and sample used, the impact estimates range from 0.023
to 0.041. The magnitude of impacts is 12 to 22 percent of the baseline mean of the ninth grade
repetition rates and 13 to 23 percent of the baseline standard deviations of the repetition rates.
2.6.2. School Segregation and Ninth Grade Repetition Rates
In this section, I examine whether the impact on the ninth grade repetition rate is driven
by the school districts where school segregation was substantially increased due to the changes in
desegregation policies. I explore this possibility by estimating the impact on the ninth grade
repetition rates across three subsets of districts which are divided by the impact of the
desegregation policy change on school segregation. To do so, I measure the impact of the policy
change on non-white to white school segregation by estimating equation (2) for each policy
change district, without the district fixed effects and the court by year fixed effects. Dependent
variables used are three different school segregation measures presented in 2.4.4. I denote each
subset as districts in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd tertile by the impact on school segregation.
Table 2-5 presents the estimated effects of desegregation policy changes on the ninth
grade repetition rates for each subset of districts. Policy impacts on the ninth grade repetition
rates are computed using equation (2) with up to 10 years of observations, and the districts that
did not change desegregation policies are used as the control districts. The results presented in
Table 2-5 suggest that, using any school desegregation measures, the impact on the ninth grade
repetition rates is largest among the 3rd tertile districts that had the largest impact on school
segregation. Among the school districts in the 1st tertile, there is no significant impact on the
ninth grade repetition rates. Among the school districts in the 2nd tertile, the estimated effects
indicate a 5 to 6 percentage point increase in the ninth grade repetition rates using the
dissimilarity and exposure index. The estimated effects of the 2nd tertile districts using the
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dissimilarity index and the exposure index are larger than the main estimated effect presented in
Table 2-3. When using the segregation measure of the percent non-white students attending a
school with 90 percent or more minorities, the impact estimates of the 2nd tertile districts are
similar to the effect estimates of the 1st tertile districts and statistically insignificant. Among the
3rd tertile districts, the impact estimates on the ninth grade repetition rates indicate that
desegregation policy changes increase the ninth grade repetition rates by 7 percentage points,
which is almost twice as large as the main estimated effects. In short, the increase in the ninth
grade repetition rates is largest in the districts where school segregation increased the most. The
results presented in Table 2-5 suggest that the negative impact on the student outcome can be the
result of the increase in racial school segregation.
2.6.3. Ruling out Alternative Explanations
Because the measurement of the ninth grade repetition rates used in this study can be
influenced by several factors, this section examines each of the factors that may have affected by
the desegregation policy changes to conclude that the measurement used in this study captures
the ninth grade repetition rates. The main factors are student transfers from other districts,
dropout rates, and student transfers from private schools.
First, I examine whether the desegregation policy changes affected student transfers from
other districts. Because data on student transfers are not available, I estimate the policy impact
on the log of total, white, and non-white student enrollment. If the desegregation policy changes
affect student transfers, it is likely to affect student enrollment. Table 2-6 presents the results on
student enrollment. The effects are estimated using equation (2) without demographic controls.
I find no effect on both total enrollment and enrollment by race. The estimated effects are
virtually zero and statistically insignificant. In addition, the results estimated for the three tertiles
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by the impact on school segregation (not presented) indicate no effects on student enrollment.
The results on total enrollment and enrollment by race presented in Table 2-6 indicate that
student movements from other districts are not affected by the desegregation policy changes.
Second, I examine the eighth and ninth grade enrollment. This analysis is another way to
examine student transfers from other districts. It can also test whether the desegregation policy
changes increased the eighth and ninth grade dropouts. Because I compare the ninth grade
enrollment in a particular year to the eighth grade enrollment in its previous year, the dropout of
the eighth graders can affect the outcome measure if the eighth grade enrollment was measured
before a large number of eighth graders dropped out. The policy change could have also
increased the ninth grade dropouts. If the ninth grade enrollment was measured after a large
number of ninth graders dropped out, the main findings of this paper would underestimate the
impact on the ninth grade repetition rates. In fact, the pre-tenth grade dropout rates are not
substantial due to compulsory school attendance rules that requires students under the certain age
(ranging from 16 to 18 depending on the state) to enroll in and attend public school or some
equivalent education program. According to Heckman and LaFontaine (2007), pre-tenth grade
dropout rates in the U.S. are about 4 percent. Nonetheless, to address these concerns related to
the eighth and ninth grade dropout rates, I estimate the impact on the natural log of the eighth
and the ninth grade enrollment.
Table 2-7 presents the results of the policy impact on student enrollment by grade. The
effects are estimated using equation (2) without demographic controls. I find no effect on the
eighth and ninth grade enrollment. The estimated effects on the log of eighth grade enrollment
are virtually zero and statistically insignificant, which suggests that dropout rates of the eighth
graders are not affected by the desegregation policy changes. The results on the log of ninth

71

grade enrollment suggest that the enrollment increases by 1 or 2 percent which is expected if the
share of the ninth graders who repeated the grade increases by the policy change, but the
estimates are statistically insignificant. It is still impossible to rule out the potential impact of the
policy change on the dropout rates of the ninth graders, because the potential policy impact on
the increase in the ninth grade dropout rates (a decrease in the ninth grade enrollment) could
have been offset by the potential policy impact on the increase in the net transfers of the ninth
graders (an increase in the ninth grade enrollment). However, because of compulsory school
attendance requirements, the main findings on the ninth grade repetition rates are not likely to be
affected by the changes in the ninth grade dropout rates.
Third, I examine student transfers from private schools. The results of the log of the total
enrollment and enrollment by race and grade presented in Tables 2-6 and 2-7 address some of the
concerns about the potential changes in the net transfers, but it may not fully capture student
transfers from private schools. Thus, I additionally examine the impact of the policy change on
the eighth and the ninth grade enrollment of private schools. The data on private school
enrollment come from the Private School Survey of the CCD. The survey provides biannual data
on private school enrollment by grade since 1989 and enrollment by race since 1993. Because
private schools are not in the public school district system, I measure the policy impact at the
county level. That is, I measure the impact of the desegregation policy changes of a district on
the changes in enrollment of private schools that are located in the same county of the district.
Because only biannual data are available, for this analysis, I use observations that are 10 or fewer
years prior to or 10 or fewer years following the implementation of the desegregation policy
change. For the enrollment analysis by race, I restrict the sample to the districts that changed
their desegregation policies after 1997 to have sufficient observations to control for the district-
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specific trends. Two counties contain multiple districts of the sample. Los Angeles County in
California contains three districts (Los Angeles, Long Beach, and Pasadena), and New Castle
County in Delaware contains four districts (Brandywine, Christina, Colonial, and Red Clay). In
New Castle County, all the four school districts changed their assignment policies, so the earliest
year of the policy change was used for analysis.
Table 2-8 presents the results of the private school enrollment analysis. None of the
coefficients on the log of total enrollment, white enrollment, minority enrollment, the eighth
grade enrollment, and the ninth grade enrollment of private schools are statistically significant.
The coefficients on the minority enrollment are 0.06 or 0.08 depending on the analytic sample
used. These coefficients suggest that the desegregation policy changes increased minority
enrollment of private schools by 6 to 8 percentage points, but the results are statistically
insignificant. The estimate effects on the log of the ninth grade enrollment are small (0.02) and
statistically insignificant. Based on the results presented in Table 2-8, there is no evidence that
the desegregation policy change caused student movements between public and private schools.
In addition to analyzing the impact on private school enrollment, I examine whether the
impact on the ninth grade repetition rates is larger in the districts with a large number of public
schools. It is possible that, in the districts with school desegregation plans, families may have
selected into the neighborhoods where they have better chances of sending their children to the
public schools that they prefer. This potential sorting into preferred neighborhoods should be
more substantial in districts with a large number of public schools than districts with a small
number of public schools. In the districts with a small number of public schools, families might
have to send their children to private school because such neighborhood selection is limited.
Thus, if the main findings of this study are driven by the net transfers from private schools, the
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impact of the desegregation policy changes would be larger in small districts. I explore this
possibility by estimating the impact on the ninth grade repetition rates across three subsets of
districts which are divided by the number of public schools. I denote each subset as districts in
the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd tertile by the number of schools.
Table 2-9 presents the estimated effects of desegregation policy changes on the ninth
grade repetition rates for each subset of districts. Policy effects on the ninth grade repetition
rates are computed using equation (2) with up to 10 years of observations, and the districts that
did not change desegregation policies are used as the control districts. The results presented in
Table 2-9 suggest that the magnitude of the impact on the ninth grade repetition rates is similar
across the three subsets of the districts. The impact estimates indicate that desegregation policy
changes increase the ninth grade repetition rates by 4 to 5 percentage points in all subsets, which
is similar to the size of the main estimated effects. Based on the results presented in Table 2-9, I
conclude that the main results of this paper are not driven by the net transfers from private
schools.
Finally, I test whether other events have affected grade repetition rates. The
accountability policy change in the early 2000s and the Gun-Free School Act (GFSA) of 1994
apply to all public schools across the nation, but there can be regional variations in responding to
the policies. In addition, differential responses to the 1999 Columbine school shooting across
districts could have affected grade repetition rates independently from the changes in school
desegregation policies. In principal, school desegregation plans were removed at several
different years in districts, so the interrupted time series design with staggered replications
(introduction of a policy change at the different points of time) could address the effects of most
confounding factors. Other events can only threaten causal inferences if they occurred at the
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same time of the removal of desegregation plans. In addition, because the above events would
affect all the school districts, estimating the effects using several control districts can address
potential biases caused by the events. Court circuit-by-year fixed effects also control for
differential responses to the events across different geographic areas because court circuits have
smaller geographic boundaries (11 court circuits in the U.S.). Nonetheless, it is possible that the
estimated effects presented in Table 2-3 can be overestimated due to the effect of other major
events, because the sample of this study includes the districts that modified their desegregation
plans in the years around the events.
I examine potential biases caused by the events by re-estimating the policy impact on the
ninth grade repetition rates after dropping the school districts that removed desegregation plans
around 1994 and 1999. The GFSA was enacted in October, 1994 and requested states to
establish a relevant law by October 1995, so the earliest school year that was affected by the
GFSA was 1995. The Columbine school shooting occurred in April, 1999, so the earliest school
year that was affected by the event was 1999. The left-hand side columns under the subtitle of
“Without 1995 & 1999” of Table 2-10 present the estimated effects measured without seven
districts that modified desegregation policies in either 1995 or 1999, and the right-hand side
columns under the subtitle of “Without 1995, 1996, 1999, & 2000” present the estimated effects
measured without 16 districts that modified desegregation policies in either 1995, 1996, 1999, or
2000. With the exclusion of a number of districts that can be most susceptible to other external
events, I still find the effect of the desegregation policy changes on the ninth grade repetition
rates. The estimated effects measured without the seven districts that changed their policies in
either 1995 or 1999 are larger than the main estimated effects, but these results are not
comparable to the results presented in Table 2-3 because different samples are used in analysis.
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With the exclusion of additional districts that changed their policy in either 1996 or 2000 (one
year after the events), impact estimates are smaller in general. The results presented in Table 210 suggest that the external events are not the main reason that the ninth grade repetition rates
were increased.
2.7. Conclusion
Over the last two decades, a large number of school districts were released from court
desegregation orders and replaced their school desegregation policies with alternative student
assignment policies. Scholars have found that the release from school desegregation orders
increased school racial segregation (Clotfelter et al., 2006; Lutz, 2011; Oh, 2015; Orfield &
Eaton, 1996; Reardon et al., 2012). Evidence also suggests that these changes negatively affect
high school test scores, high school graduation, four-year college attendance, and crime rates
(Billings et al., 2014; Lutz, 2011).
This paper examines whether these desegregation policy changes in the 1990s and 2000s
affected the ninth grade repetition rate which is closely related to high school dropout and
completion rates (Hauser et al, 2004; Jimerson, 1999; Jimerson et al., 2002; Neild et al., 2008).
Because the year that a district changed its school desegregation policy is often substantially
different from the year that the district was released from court desegregation orders, this paper
uses the year of actual policy changes of approximately 100 school districts. I find that the
changes in school desegregation policies caused a statistically significant increase in the ninth
grade repetition rates of about 0.2 standard deviations. I also find that the increase in the ninth
grade repetition rate is greatest in the districts where the policy change increased school
segregation the most.
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The findings of this study have several policy implications. First, when school districts
were released from court desegregation orders, choosing student assignment policies that can
maintain racially integrated schools will help to minimize potential negative impacts of the
policy changes on student outcomes. Scholars have found that replacing race with
socioeconomic factors (e.g., family income) in student assignment policies is an effective way to
maintain school integration (Chaplin, 2002; Frankenberg, 2011; Kahlenberg, 2001; HolleyWalker, 2010; Reardon et al., 2006). Certain controlled school choice programs can be also
effective with free transportation provisions. Second, when school districts modify their
desegregation policies, schools with more minority and/or economically disadvantaged students
may need additional educational resources. There are still substantial educational disparities
along racial lines. When many schools become racially isolated after removing school
desegregation plans, educational outcomes of the students who attend a racially isolated school
will be negatively affected without substantial district efforts to help the students.

77

References
Alexander, K. L., Entwisle, D. R., & Dauber, S. L. (2003). On the Success of Failure: A
Reassessment of the Effects of Retention in the Primary School Grades. Cambridge
University Press.
Anderson, G. E., Jimerson, S. R., & Whipple, A. D. (2005). Student ratings of stressful
experiences at home and school: Loss of a parent and grade retention as superlative
stressors. Journal of Applied School Psychology, 21(1), 1-20.
Ashenfelter, O., Collins, W. J., & Yoon, A. (2006). Evaluating the role of Brown v. Board of
Education in school equalization, desegregation, and the income of African Americans.
American Law and Economics Review, 8(2), 213-248.
Aud, S., Fox, M. A., & KewalRamani, A. (2010). Status and Trends in the Education of Racial
and Ethnic Groups. NCES 2010015. National Center for Education Statistics.
Aud, S., KewalRamani, A., & Frohlich, L. (2011). America's Youth: Transitions to Adulthood.
NCES 2012026. National Center for Education Statistics.
Autor, D. H., Katz, L. F., & Kearney, M. S. (2008). Trends in U.S. wage inequality: Revising the
revisionists. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2), 300-323.
Bifulco, R., Fletcher, J. M., & Ross, S. L. (2011). The effect of classmate characteristics on postsecondary outcomes: Evidence from the Add Health. American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy, 25-53.
Bifulco, R., Fletcher, J. M., Oh, S. J., & Ross, S. L. (2014). Do high school peers have persistent
effects on college attainment and other life outcomes?. Labour Economics, 29, 83-90.
Billings, S. B., Deming, D., & Rockoff, J. (2014). School segregation, educational attainment,
and crime: Evidence from the end of busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 435-476.
Chaplin, D. (2002). Estimating the impact of economic integration of schools on racial
integration. In The Century Foundation Task Force on the Common School (Eds.),
Divided We Fail: Coming Together through Public School Choice (pp. 87–113). New
York: The Century Foundation Press.
Clotfelter, C. T. (2004). After Brown: The Rise and Retreat of School Desegregation. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Clotfelter, C. T., Vigdor, J. L., & Ladd H. F. (2006). Federal oversight, local control, and the
specter of “Resegregation” in Southern schools. American Law and Economics Review,
8(2), 347-389.
Cobb-Clark, D. A., Kassenboehmer, S. C., Le, T., McVicar, D., & Zhang, R. (2015). Is there an
educational penalty for being suspended from school?. Education Economics, 23(4), 376395.
Duncombe, W., & Yinger, J. M. (2008). Measurement of cost differentials. In H. F. Ladd & E.
Fiske (Eds.) Handbook of Research in Education Finance and Policy (pp. 203-221).
Laurence Erlbaum Associates.

78

Guryan, J. (2004). Desegregation and black dropout rates. The American Economic Review,
94(4), 919-943.
Frankenberg, E. (2011). Integration after Parents Involved: What does research suggest about
available options? In E. Frankenberg, & E. DeBray (Eds.), Integrating schools in a
changing society: New policies and legal options for a multiracial generation (pp. 5374). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Hauser, R. M., Frederick, C. B., & Andrew, M. (2007). Grade retention in the age of
accountability. In A. Gamoran (Ed.), No Child Left Behind and the Poverty Gap (pp.
120–153). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Hauser, R. M., Pager, D. I., & Simmons, S. J. (2004). Race-Ethnicity, Social Background, and
Grade Retention. In Walberg, H. J., Reynolds, A. J. & Wang, M. C. (Eds.), Can Unlike
Students Learn Together? Grade Retention, Tracking, and Grouping. Greenwich (pp. 97114). Connecticut: Information Age Publishing.
Heckman, J. J., & LaFontaine, P. A. (2007). The American high school graduation rate: Trends
and levels. IZA Discussion Paper Series (IZA DP No. 3216).
Heckman, J. J., & LaFontaine, P. A. (2010). The American high school graduation rate: Trends
and levels. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(2), 244-262.
Holley-Walker, D. (2010). After unitary status: Examining voluntary integration strategies for
Southern school districts. North Carolina Law Review, 88, 877.
Jimerson, S. R. (1999). On the failure of failure: Examining the association between early grade
retention and education and employment outcomes during late adolescence. Journal of
School Psychology, 37, 243-272.
Jimerson, S. R. (2001). Meta-analysis of grade retention research: Implications for practice in the
21st century. School psychology review, 30(3), 420-437.
Jimerson, S. R., Anderson, G. E., & Whipple, A. D. (2002). Winning the battle and losing the
war: Examining the relation between grade retention and dropping out of high school.
Psychology in the Schools, 39, 441-457.
Jimerson, S. R., Woehr, S. M., Kaufman, A. M., & Anderson, G. E. (2003). Grade retention and
promotion: Information and strategies for educators. National Association of School
Psychologists, S3, 61-64.
Johnson, R. C. (2011). Long-run impacts of school desegregation & school quality on adult
attainments (No. w16664). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kahlenberg, R. D. (2001). All Together Now: The Case for Economic Integration of the Public
Schools. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Kena, G., Aud, S., Johnson, F., Wang, X., Zhang, J., Rathbun, A., Wilkinson-Flicker, S., &
Kristapovich, P. (2014). The condition of education 2014 (NCES 2014-083.) National
Center for Education Statistics.
Kinsler, J. (2013). School discipline: A source or salve for the racial achievement gap?.
International Economic Review, 54(1), 355-383.

79

Lavy, V., Paserman, M. D., & Schlosser, A. (2012). Inside the black box of ability peer effects:
Evidence from variation in the proportion of low achievers in the classroom. The
Economic Journal, 122(559), 208–237.
Losen, D., & Gillespie, J. (2012). Opportunities suspended: The disparate impact of disciplinary
exclusion from school. Los Angeles, CA: The UCLA Civil Rights Project/Proyecto
Derechos Civiles.
Losen, D. J., & Skiba, R. J. (2014). Suspended education: Urban middle schools in crisis. Los
Angeles, CA: The UCLA Civil Rights Project/Proyecto Derechos Civiles.
Lutz, B. (2011). The end of court-ordered desegregation. American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy, 3(2), 130–168.
Neild, R. C., Stoner-Eby, S., & Furstenberg, F. (2008). Connecting entrance and departure the
transition to ninth grade and high school dropout. Education and Urban Society, 40(5),
543-569.
Neiman, S., & Hill, M. R. (2011). Crime, violence, discipline, and safety in US public schools:
Findings from the school survey on crime and safety, 2009-2010. National Center for
Education Statistics, Institute of Education Sciences, US Department of Education.
Oh, S. J. (2015). The end of school desegregation plans: Policy changes and school segregation.
Working Paper (Unpublished)
Oreopoulos, P. (2007). Do dropouts drop out too soon? Wealth, health and happiness from
compulsory schooling. Journal of Public Economics, 91(11), 2213-2229.
Orfield, G. & Eaton, E. (1996). Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v.
Board of Education. NY: The New Press.
Reardon, S. F., Grewal, E. T., Kalogrides, D., & Greenberg, E. (2012). Brown fades: The end of
court-ordered school desegregation and the resegregation of American public schools.
Journal of Policy Management and Analysis, 31(4), 876-904.
Reardon, S. F., Yun, J. T., & Kurlaender, M. (2006). Implications of income-based school
assignment policies for racial school segregation. Educational Evaluation and Policy
Analysis, 28(1), 49-75.
Reber, S. J. (2005). Court-ordered desegregation successes and failures integrating American
schools since Brown versus Board of education. Journal of Human Resources, 40(3),
559-590.
Rouse, C. E. (2007). Quantifying the costs of inadequate education: Consequences for the labor
market. In C. R. Belfield & H. M. Levin (Eds.), The Price We Pay: Economic and Social
Consequences of Inadequate Education (pp. 99-124). Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press.
Shaddish, W. R., Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (2001). Experimental and Quasi-experimental
Designs for Generalized Causal Inference. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Walker, B. L. T. (2014). Suspended animation: A legal perspective of school discipline and
African American learners in the shadows of Brown. The Journal of Negro Education,
83(3), 338-351.

80

Warren, J. R., Hoffman, E., & Andrew, M. (2014). Patterns and Trends in Grade Retention Rates
in the United States, 1995–2010. Educational Researcher, 43(9), 433-443.
Warren J. R., & Saliba J. (2012). First- through eighth-grade retention rates for all 50 states: A
new method and initial results. Educational Researcher, 41, 320–329.
Weiner, D. A., Lutz, B. F., & Ludwig J. (2009). The effects of school desegregation on crime
(Working Paper No. 15380). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Welch, F., & Light, A. L. (1987). New evidence on school desegregation. U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights Clearinghouse. Washington D.C. Publication 92.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2003). Introductory Econometric: A Modern Approach (2E). Cincinnati, OH:
South-Western Publishing.

81

Table 2-1. List of Sample Districts and Major Policy Changes since 1990
St.
AL
AL
AR
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CO
CT
DE
DE
DE
DE
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
GA
GA
IL
IL
IN
IN
IN
KS
KS
KY
KY
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
MD
MD

County Name
Jefferson
Mobilec
Pulaski
Fresno
Los Angeles
Los Angeles
Los Angeles
Contra Costa
Sacramento
San Bernardino
San Diego
San Franciscoc
Solano
Denverc
Fairfield
New Castle
New Castle
New Castle
New Castle
Brevardc
Browardc
Dadec
Duvalc
Hillsboroughc
Leec
Orangec
Palm Beachc
Pinellasc
Polkc
Volusiac
Doughertyc
Muscogeec
Cook
Winnebago
Allen
Marion
St. Joseph
Wyandotte
Sedgwick
Fayettec
Jefferson
Caddoc
Calcasieuc
East Baton Rougec
Jeffersonc
Rapidesc
Terrebonnec
Baltimore Cityc
Harfordc

School District Name
Desegregation
Jefferson County
1971
Mobile County
1971
Little Rock
1971
Fresno Unified
1978
Long Beach Unified
1980
Los Angeles Unified
1978
Pasadena Unified
1970
West Contra Costa (Richmond)
1969
Sacramento City Unified
1976
San Bernardino City Unified
1978
San Diego Unified
1977
San Francisco Unified
1971
Vallejo City Unified
1975
Denver
1974
Stamford
1970
Brandywine
1978
Christina
1978
Colonial
1978
Red Clay Consolidated
1978
Brevard
1969
Broward County
1970
Miami-Dade County
1970
Duval County
1971
Hillsborough County
1971
Lee County
1969
Orange County
1972
Palm Beach County
1970
Pinellas County
1970
Polk County
1969
Volusia County
1969
Dougherty County
1980
Muscogee County
1971
City of Chicago
1982
Rockford
1973
Fort Wayne
1971
Indianapolis
1973
South Bend
1981
Kansas City
1977
Wichita
1971
Fayette County
1972
Jefferson County (Louisville)
1975
Caddo Parish
1969
Calcasieu Parish
1969
East Baton Rouge Parish
1970
Jefferson Parish
1971
Rapides Parish
1969
Terrebonne Parish
1969
Baltimore City
1974
Harford County
1965

Unitary
1997
2007
1979
1998
2005
1995
1996
1996
1996
1996
1978
1996
2001
2001
2001
1999
2010
1979
2000
2000
1970
1997
2009
2001
1998
1997
2000
2003
2006
-

Policy Change
1999
1998
2012
1996
1999
1996
2002
2002
2001
1995
1995
1991
2004
1998
1996
2000
2003
1992
1993
1999
1997
2008
1991
2006
1996
2009
2006
-

82
MD
MA
MA
MA
MI
MI
MN
MO
MO
NE
NV
NJ
NY
NY
NY
NC
NC
NC
NC
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OK
OK
OK
OR
PA
PA
SC
SC
SC
TN
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
VA
VA
VA
VA
WA
WA
WI
c

Prince George'sc
Suffolk
Bristol
Hampden
Kent
Ingham
Hennepin
Jackson
St. Louis Cityc
Douglas
Clarkc
Hudson
Erie
Monroe
Westchester
Cumberlandc
Gastonc
Mecklenburgc
New Hanoverc
Summit
Hamilton
Cuyahoga
Franklin
Montgomery
Lorain
Lucas
Comanche
Oklahoma
Tulsa
Multnomah
Philadelphiac
Allegheny
Charlestonc
Greenvillec
Richland
Davidsonc
Travis
Tarrant
Tarrant
Harris
Lubbock
McLennan
Arlingtonc
Norfolk Cityc
Pittsylvaniac
Roanoke Cityc
King
Pierce
Milwaukee

Prince George’s County
Boston
New Bedford
Springfield
Grand Rapids
Lansing
Minneapolis
Kansas City
St. Louis City
Omaha
Clark County
Jersey City
Buffalo City
Rochester City
Yonkers City
Cumberland County
Gaston County
Charlotte-Mecklenburg
New Hanover County
Akron City
Cincinnati City
Cleveland Municipal
Columbus City
Dayton City
Lorain City
Toledo City
Lawton
Oklahoma City
Tulsa
Portland
Philadelphia City
Pittsburgh
Charleston County
Greenville County
Richland County 01
Metropolitan Nashville
Austin Independent
Dallas Independent
Fort Worth Independent
Houston Independent
Lubbock Independent
Waco Independent
Arlington County
Norfolk City
Pittsylvania County
Roanoke City
Seattle
Tacoma
Milwaukee

1973
1974
1976
1974
1968
1972
1974
1977
1980
1976
1972
1976
1976
1970
1986
1969
1970
1970
1969
1977
1973
1979
1979
1976
1985
1980
1973
1972
1971
1974
1978
1980
1970
1970
1970
1971
1980
1971
1973
1971
1978
1973
1971
1970
1969
1970
1978
1968
1976

2002
1987
2003
1999
1984
1995
2001(02)
1978
n.a.
2002
1983
1991
1998
1988
2002
1994
1991
1983
2009
1994
1985
n.a.
1998
1983
2003
1990
1983
1991
1989
1985
n.a.
-

indicates counties that are coterminous with a school district
New Castle School District, DE, was subdivided into four school districts listed above.

2001
2000
2005
2001
1999
1999
2003
2004
2002
2007
1993
1996
2002
1996
2002
2008
2000
1994
1998
1998
2001
1997
1998
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Table 2-2. Baseline Statistics of Sample Districts
Group
Variable
9th grade repetition rates
Non-white/white dissimilarity index
Non-white/white exposure index
% non-white students in 90-100% non-white school
Total student enrollment
% white students
% black students
% Hispanic students
Total number of districts

All

Change

No Change

0.19
(0.18)
0.35
(0.15)
0.43
(0.19)
0.16
(0.21)
59,957
(76,668)
0.51
(0.20)
0.37
(0.17)
0.12
(0.02)

0.20
(0.16)
0.32
(0.12)
0.43
(0.17)
0.13
(0.16)
58,658
(38,732)
0.50
(0.17)
0.39
(0.16)
0.11
(0.02)

0.18
(0.20)
0.38
(0.16)
0.43
(0.21)
0.19
(0.25)
61,311
(102,771)
0.52
(0.22)
0.35
(0.18)
0.13
(0.02)

98

50

48

T-statistic
0.57
-2.12**
-0.02
-1.55
-0.17
-0.40
1.28
0.93

Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation in parentheses) are measured using the Public
Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey.
Means are computed using the value in 1990 or the earliest year appeared in data.
T-statistics is based on two independent samples t-test comparing the means of a normally distributed variable for
both change and no change groups.
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Table 2-3. Estimated Effects on 9th Grade Repetition Rates
Ninth grade repetition rates
Observations used
Panel A: All districts
Policy change effect

Demographic controls
Observations
Number of school districts
Panel B: Treated districts
Policy change effect

Demographic controls
Observations
Number of school districts

±10 yrs

±5 yrs

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.036**
(0.016)

0.038**
(0.016)

0.022
(0.014)

0.023*
(0.014)

X
1,995
98
(9)

O
1,995
98
(10)

X
1,618
98
(11)

O
1,618
98
(12)

0.033*
(0.018)

0.030
(0.018)

0.027*
(0.015)

0.029*
(0.015)

X
834
48

O
834
48

X
467
48

O
467
48

Notes: “X” and “O” indicate the exclusion and the inclusion of demographic controls, respectively. Clustered
standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistically significant at the 0.10; ** indicates statistically significant
at 0.05; *** indicates statistically significant at 0.01.
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Table 2-4. Estimated Effects on 9th Grade Repetition Rates – Alternative Specification
With the trend shift interaction term
Observations used
Panel A: All districts
Policy change effect

Demographic controls
Observations
Number of school districts
Panel B: Treated districts
Policy change effect

Demographic controls
Observations
Number of school districts

±10 yrs

±5 yrs

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.035**
(0.016)

0.038**
(0.016)

0.026*
(0.014)

0.034*
(0.017)

X
1,995
98
(5)

O
1,995
98
(6)

X
1,618
98
(7)

O
1,618
98
(8)

0.041**
(0.020)

0.037*
(0.019)

0.033*
(0.017)

0.034*
(0.017)

X
834
48

O
834
48

X
467
48

O
467
48

Notes: “X” and “O” indicate the exclusion and the inclusion of demographic controls, respectively. Clustered
standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistically significant at the 0.10; ** indicates statistically significant
at 0.05; *** indicates statistically significant at 0.01.
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Table 2-5. Estimated Effects on 9th Grade Repetition Rates by School Segregation Impact
1st Tertile

2nd Tertile

3rd Tertile

Impact measured using the dissimilarity index
Policy change effect

-0.000
(0.026)

Demographic controls
X
Observations
1,409
Number of school districts
66
Impact measured using the exposure index
Policy change effect

0.003
(0.024)

-0.006
(0.026)

0.047*
(0.027)

0.050*
(0.027)

0.069**
(0.032)

0.071**
(0.032)

O
1,409
66

X
1,452
66

O
1,452
66

X
1,456
66

O
1,456
66

-0.004
(0.024)

0.054*
(0.029)

0.057**
(0.028)

0.069**
(0.031)

0.071**
(0.031)

X
1,452
66

O
1,452
66

Demographic controls
X
O
X
O
Observations
1,420
1,420
1,445
1,445
Number of school districts
66
66
66
66
Impact measured using percent non-white students in non-white-majority school
Policy change effect

Demographic controls
Observations
Number of school districts

0.023
(0.028)

0.025
(0.028)

0.025
(0.029)

0.022
(0.029)

0.073**
(0.029)

0.076**
(0.030)

X
1,440
66

O
1,440
66

X
1,431
66

O
1,431
66

X
1,446
66

O
1,446
66

Notes: The smaller the tertile, the smaller the impact on school segregation. “X” and “O” indicate the exclusion and
the inclusion of demographic controls, respectively. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates
statistically significant at the 0.10; ** indicates statistically significant at 0.05; *** indicates statistically significant
at 0.01.
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Table 2-6. Estimated Effects on Public School Enrollment by Race
Log of total
enrollment

Log of white
enrollment

Log of minority
enrollment

Observations used
Panel A: All districts

±10 yrs
(1)

±5 yrs
(2)

±10 yrs
(3)

±5 yrs
(4)

±10 yrs
(5)

±5 yrs
(6)

Policy change effect

-0.008
(0.007)

-0.005
(0.003)

-0.012
(0.009)

-0.000
(0.005)

-0.009
(0.009)

-0.007
(0.005)

2,016
98
(7)

1,633
98
(8)

2,016
98
(9)

1,633
98
(10)

2,016
98
(11)

1,633
98
(12)

-0.001
(0.007)

-0.004
(0.004)

-0.002
(0.009)

-0.001
(0.006)

-0.002
(0.011)

-0.003
(0.007)

842
48

469
48

842
48

469
48

842
48

469
48

Observations
Number of school districts
Panel B: Treated districts
Policy change effect

Observations
Number of school districts
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2-7. Estimated Effects on Public School Enrollment by Grade
Log of 8th grade enrollment

Log of 9th grade enrollment

Observations used
Panel A: All districts

±10 yrs
(1)

±5 yrs
(2)

±10 yrs
(3)

±5 yrs
(4)

Policy change effect

-0.007
(0.010)

0.004
(0.008)

0.016
(0.015)

0.009
(0.011)

2,016
98
(5)

1,633
98
(6)

2,016
98
(7)

1,633
98
(8)

-0.009
(0.010)

-0.001
(0.009)

0.010
(0.018)

0.007
(0.013)

842
48

469
48

842
48

469
48

Observations
Number of school districts
Panel B: Treated districts
Policy change effect

Observations
Number of school districts
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2-8. Estimated Effects on Private School Enrollment
Log of total Log of white Log of min.
enrollment
enrollment
enrollment

Log of 8th gr. Log of 9th gr.
enrollment
enrollment

Panel A: All districts

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Policy change effect

0.011
(0.025)

0.008
(0.039)

0.058
(0.053)

0.004
(0.032)

0.019
(0.043)

920
93
(6)

756
80
(7)

756
80
(8)

919
93
(9)

917
93
(10)

0.011
(0.036)

0.015
(0.053)

0.075
(0.086)

-0.012
(0.039)

0.020
(0.067)

388
45

300
32

300
32

388
45

387
45

Observations
Number of school districts
Panel B: Treated districts
Policy change effect

Observations
Number of school districts

Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Up to 10 years of observations are used due to the lack of annual data.
For the analysis of the log of white and minority enrollment, school districts that changed their desegregation plans
before 1997 were not used because the enrollment by race is only available from 1993

90

Table 2-9. Estimated Effects on 9th Grade Repetition Rates by the Number of Schools

Policy change effect

Observations
Number of school districts

1st Tertile

2nd Tertile

3rd Tertile

0.040
(0.025)

0.050*
(0.028)

0.043
(0.028)

1,453
66

1,431
66

1,433
66

Notes: The smaller the tertile, the smaller the impact on school segregation.
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistically significant at the 0.10; ** indicates statistically
significant at 0.05; *** indicates statistically significant at 0.01.
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Table 2-10. Estimated Effects on 9th Grade Repetition Rates – Tests of Bias by Other
Events
Without 1995 & 1999
Observations used
Panel A: All districts
Policy change effect

Demographic controls
Observations
Number of school districts
Panel B: Treated districts
Policy change effect

Demographic controls
Observations
Number of school districts

±10 yrs
(1)

±5 yrs
(2)

(3)

0.046*** 0.047*** 0.028*
(0.016)
(0.016) (0.015)
X
1,867
91
(9)

Without 1995, 1996, 1999 & 2000

O
1,867
91
(10)

X
1,548
91
(11)

(4)
0.030*
(0.015)
O
1,548
91
(12)

±10 yrs
(5)
(6)

±5 yrs
(7)
(8)

0.030* 0.032* 0.016 0.017
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
X
1,706
82
(13)

O
1,706
82
(14)

X
1,458
82
(15)

O
1,458
82
(16)

0.050** 0.051*** 0.041** 0.043** 0.032 0.035* 0.048* 0.048
(0.019)
(0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.028) (0.029)
X
706
41

O
706
41

X
397
41

O
397
41

X
545
32

O
545
32

X
307
32

O
307
32

Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates statistically significant at the 0.10; ** indicates statistically
significant at 0.05; *** indicates statistically significant at 0.01.
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Chapter 3. Effects of school choice on student sorting by ability: Evidence from Seoul, Korea

3.1. Introduction
A large number of school districts in the U.S. have expanded school choice options.
Despite the potential benefits brought by school choice, evidence suggests that school choice
segregates the student body by student racial and family economic background (Bifulco & Ladd,
2007; Bifulco, Ladd, & Ross, 2009; Carnoy, 2000; Epple & Romano, 1998; Ladd & Fiske, 2001;
Levin, 1998). Most of the studies focus on the effect of school choice programs on school
segregation in the U.S., but a couple of studies examine school choice programs outside of the
U.S. For example, Ladd and Fiske (2001) examine school choice programs in New Zealand, and
Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) examine private school vouchers in Chile. Effects of school choice
on school segregation in Asian countries are largely unknown. This present study focuses on the
newly implemented school choice policy in Seoul, Korea (the Republic of Korea) and examines
whether the school choice policy in Seoul increases school segregation by student performance.
In addition, it examines school factors that families value in selecting schools.
In 2010, the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education in Korea drastically changed its
student assignment policy from a random student assignment based on neighborhood attendance
zones to a school choice policy. Since 2010, the Seoul High School Choice Policy has been
assigning entering high school students to any school of the students’ choice based on a lottery.1
Prior to the policy change, all students in Seoul were randomly assigned to a school in their
attendance zone. The transition to the school choice policy occurred without any phase-in or
trial period, and the details of the school choice program were unknown until August 2009. The
policy instantly affected all students in Seoul who progressed to high school in March 2010
1

The first grade of high school in South Korea is equivalent to the 10 th grade in the U.S.
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(School year in Korea starts in March). Exploiting the sudden change in the student assignment
policy in Seoul as a natural experiment, I examine the effect of the school choice policy in Seoul
on student sorting. Specifically, this paper focuses on student sorting by ability because one of
the main critiques of school choice is that high performing schools cream-skim educationally
advantaged students when school choice is introduced.
In addition to examining the policy effect on school segregation, this paper also examines
which school factors are valued in school selection. The implementation of the Seoul High
School Choice Policy provides unique opportunities to examine the effect of school factors on
school selection. First, because all the students must choose schools, school choice of all
students can be observed. Thus, the school selection results in Seoul are not influenced due to
the different characteristics between participants and non-participants of school choice.2 Second,
many observable school characteristics are very similar in Seoul, so it is possible to examine the
effects of a few school factors that have enough variation independently from the similar factors.
For example, schools in Seoul are nearly identical in terms of teacher characteristics, curriculum,
and class size which are considered to affect school selection. Student composition was also
identical until 2009. Due to unobservable school characteristics (e.g., school administration),
however, the average school performance of each school in Seoul is substantially different
despite the nearly identical initial performance of assigned students and homogenous school
factors. Using the variation in the average school performance and school popularity in the first
year of school choice, this paper explores whether school performance is an important
determinant of school choice.

It is well known that higher performing students’ families are more active in school choice than lower performing
students’ families because higher performing students’ families are better at getting information about school
quality, navigating school choice options, and providing transportation to school (See Levin, 1999).
2
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The main identification strategy for school segregation analysis is a pretest-posttest
design. Specifically, it compares school segregation prior to and following the implementation
of the high school choice policy in Seoul. Because students were equally distributed across
schools in every attendance zone prior to the policy change, the level of school segregation in
2009 is not driven by any school- or student-related characteristics. For the school preference
analysis, I analyze the association between school characteristics and school popularity.
I find that the Seoul School Choice Policy in 2010 caused a statistically significant
increase in school ability segregation by 0.04 which is equal to 33 percent of the dissimilarity
index sample mean and equal to 200 percent of the 2009 cross-sectional standard deviation of the
index. Because schools in Seoul were very integrated prior to the implementation of school
choice, the impact of school choice is very large in terms of the standard deviation increase. In
addition, the effect gets larger over time. I also find that students prefer schools with high
average performance levels of graduates.
Seoul is heavily segregated by income: Families living in the South of the Han River
have income twice as high as families living in the North of the Han River. Due to the
segregated neighborhoods in Seoul, policy makers in Seoul tried to integrate schools to mitigate
the geographical segregation of residents. The Seoul High School Choice Policy was introduced
to further integrate schools by allowing students to attend any school in Seoul regardless of their
residential location. However, despite the original political intention, schools became more
segregated after the implementation of school choice.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3.3
provides background on student assignment policies in Seoul. Section 3.4 describes the data.
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Section 3.5 explains the empirical strategy, Section 3.6 presents results, and Section 3.7
concludes.
3.2. Literature Review
There are several types of school choice. One type of school choice in the U.S. is open
enrollment which allows parents to rank preferences among public schools, and a district makes
efforts to assign students to their highest priority schools. Other types of school choice programs
are the use of alternative schools which provide school choice to students (e.g., charter and
magnet schools). Except specialized magnet schools that require certain skills to enter the
schools, students voluntarily apply to attend such alternative schools and are often selected to the
schools using a lottery. Providing private school vouchers is another form of school choice that
allows students to attend a private school without the financial burden of tuition.
School choice allows families to choose which school their children will attend, so it
could improve school-student match quality (Friedman, 1962; Hoxby, 2000). As a result of
students’ self-selection into schools, school choice is likely to affect the level of school
segregation. School choice can potentially integrate schools by breaking the link between
neighborhood segregation and school segregation. In contrast, it can also increase school
segregation by students self-selecting into a school. Scholars interested in the effect of school
choice on segregation have examined the impact of school choice programs in the U.S. and other
countries on school segregation. Several empirical studies have found that educational programs
which expand parental choice of schools increase school segregation (Bifulco & Ladd, 2007;
Bifulco, Ladd, & Ross, 2009; Cullen, Jacob, & Levitt, 2005; Hastings, Kane, & Staiger, 2005).
One explanation for the increase in school segregation is different characteristics of participants
and non-participants of school choice programs. For example, Long and Toma (1988), Coleman
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and Hoffer (1987), Levin (1998), and Bifulco, Ladd, and Ross (2009) document that parents who
select private schools or opt out of assigned public schools have higher socio-economic status
(e.g. higher parental education level) than parents who do not.
Most of the studies that examine the effect of school choice on school segregation focus
on school segregation by race and family economic backgrounds. There are several theories that
explain the increase in school racial and socioeconomic segregation following the
implementation of school choice. One theory posits that the preference for choice schools are
similar across different racial and income groups even though minority and low-income families
are less likely to participate in school choice due to their budget constraints. As a result of the
different income levels by race, school choice can increase racial segregation, even more so in
the districts without transportation provisions to choice schools. Another theory posits that
preference toward student composition may be different across different racial and income
groups. Several theories including Blumer’s group position theory posit that the dominant group
in terms of social status will distance themselves from subordinate groups to maintain their social
positioning (Blumer, 1958). Based on such theories, white or otherwise advantaged parents
would avoid schools with concentrations of minority or other disadvantaged populations. On the
other hand, theories on the preference toward homogenous groups posit that people seek out
environments that can allow them to interact with those similar to themselves. Studies looking at
the types of choices that families made often find that parents seek schools where the student
composition more closely resembles the student’s own background (Henig, 1996; Levin, 1999;
Weiher & Tedin, 2002). The theories on the preference toward homogenous groups imply
minority or less advantaged families are as likely to choose segregated over integrated
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environments as are white or more advantaged families, which explain why school choice may
lead to an increase in school segregation.
Not a large number of studies have examined the impact of school choice on school
segregation by student performance. Also, there are no clear theories for school segregation by
ability. Because students’ race and family economic backgrounds are very closely related to
academic performance, studies that looked at school segregation by ability in the U.S. cannot
analyze the effect of school choice on student ability independently from student race or
socioeconomic backgrounds. As a result, to the best of my knowledge, no study has provided
the causal effect of school choice on school segregation by academic performance levels.
Examining school choice in Seoul is advantageous in examining the impact of school
choice on school segregation by academic performance levels for two reasons. First, Korea is a
racially homogenous country, so it is possible to analyze the effect on school segregation by
ability independently from racial segregation. Second, prior to the implementation of school
choice, Seoul randomly assigned students based on academic performance in order to integrate
schools by student academic performance, so the impact of school choice on academic
segregation can be precisely measured.
3.3. Background
Seoul is the capital of Korea with over 10 million people in 234 square miles, and it has
over 200 high schools. The Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education has jurisdiction over 11
school districts, and a school district consists of two or three administrative districts. Due to the
centralized administration of the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education, however, the 11 school
districts are equivalent to neighborhood attendance zones in the U.S. That is, each student’s
school district is determined based on students’ home address, and students are primarily
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assigned to a school within their school district. Thus, I denote the 11 school districts in Seoul as
attendance zones throughout this paper. Figure 3-1 presents the map of 11 attendance zones.
Regular high schools are very homogenous in Korea.3 First, until 2009, there was no
student sorting within attendance zones because all students were randomly assigned to a school
within their attendance zone. Second, teacher characteristics are equally balanced across public
schools. In Korea, teachers cannot select the public school that they wish to work for, and public
schools must accept assigned teachers by the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education. The
Office of Education assigns newly hired teachers to each of their public schools and rotates
existing teachers every five years. In addition, teacher salary is also controlled by the
government, and each salary level is determined solely by a pay step based on the length of one’s
service. Third, the school curriculum is identical across all public schools as well as among
public and private schools. Both public and private schools in Korea are government-subsidized
so they closely follow the Ministry of Education’s guidelines and the national curriculum as
specified by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Therefore, all schools in Seoul
follow the same governmental regulations, and all students basically follow the same curriculum
and textbooks. Accordingly, school-related characteristics are similar in many important aspects.
This initial homogeneity of schools in Seoul started diverging for the following reasons.
First, Seoul introduced school choice in 1996 for the schools in the center of Seoul. This policy
was introduced because the city center was hollowing out so the schools in the center of Seoul
could not fill their enrollment only with the students who lived in the attendance zone (Seoul

3

There are several types of high schools in Korea: regular high schools, special high schools (gifted high schools),
and vocational or technical high schools. Special high schools select students based on merit, largely student
academic performance. Vocational or technical high schools are designed for students who want to develop
vocational skills to enter labor markets upon graduation or enter two year college. The Seoul High School Policy
only applies to regular high schools.

99

Metropolitan Office of Education, 2009). Seoul turned the schools located within the 5 km
radius of the Seoul City Hall and all schools in Yongsan-gu into “pre-choice post-assignment
schools” and has allowed any student in Seoul to voluntarily apply for the schools since 1996. I
denote these schools as non-random schools. These schools are located in the attendance zone
11 in Figure 3-1. School assignment to these non-random schools preceded the random
assignments of schools in other 10 attendance zones. When these non-random schools are
oversubscribed, students are selected using a lottery, but admission preference is given to the
students who live near the schools. If these non-random schools are undersubscribed, students
are randomly selected based on the student’s distance from the school to home during the
random assignments of schools in other attendance zones (“post-assignment”). In practice, until
2009, most of the students who lived in the center of Seoul chose these non-random schools,
because, if they didn’t choose these schools, they were likely to be assigned to a school far away
from their home. Thus, these schools provided school choice to the students who lived outside
of the attendance zones only if the schools couldn’t fill their enrollment with neighborhood
students. Even with this limited extent, student characteristics in the non-random schools
became different from other schools in that the non-random schools had the highest level of
school segregation in 2009 (See the last row of Table 3-5). After the implementation of the
Seoul High School Choice Policy in 2010, all high schools in Seoul become choice schools, so
there is no clear distinction between these non-random high schools and other high schools in
Seoul.
Second, the Seoul High School Choice Policy in 2010 introduced autonomous private
schools and autonomous public schools which are similar to private schools and charter schools
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in the U.S, respectively.4 Autonomous schools are able to set their own admission policies and
select students among applicants.5 Autonomous private schools are different from autonomous
public schools in application restrictions and tuition. Autonomous private schools, on average,
have tuition three times higher than regular schools, and students within the upper 50 percentile
ranks of middle school standing are eligible to apply for the schools.6 The upper 50 percentile
rank eligibility restriction and high tuition do not apply for autonomous public schools. Because
autonomous private schools are likely to be stratified by income, Seoul requires all autonomous
private schools to select 20 percent of the total students among low income students. In an
attempt to integrate students by family income, the upper 50 percentile performance rank
eligibility does not have to apply to the low income students. Low income students are selected
through application materials and interview, and their tuition is waived. 13 and 5 private schools
turned into autonomous private schools in 2010 and 2011, respectively. While autonomous
private schools are similar to private schools in the U.S, autonomous public schools focusing on
different curriculum are similar to the U.S. charter schools. All students who apply for
autonomous public schools are selected using a lottery. Two schools turned into autonomous
public schools in 2009 as a trial, and 5 and 12 public schools were turned into autonomous public
schools in 2010 and 2011, respectively. Autonomous schools attract students using specialized
curriculum, so these schools contribute to widening heterogeneity of schools.
Third, the Seoul High School Choice Policy changed regular high school assignments
from neighborhood-based random assignments to school choice. Until 2009, except for students

4

Public schools and private schools are very similar in Korea, so only autonomous private schools are equivalent to
private schools in the U.S.
5
Autonomous schools are also able to set 35 to 50 percent of their curriculum differently from the ones set by the
Ministry of Education.
6
This restriction of middle school standing was removed in 2015.
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who applied for the non-random schools, all students progressing to high school were randomly
assigned to a school using a computerized lottery system. The previous policy divided students
into three groups based on their middle school standing in order to equally distribute students by
school performance. See Figure 3-2 for student random assignment mechanisms used until
2009. According to Seoul Education Act, the distance from school to home is an important
factor in the random student assignment, so, until 2009, students in an attendance zone had an
equal chance of attending high schools around their homes. In contrast, the Seoul High School
Choice Policy allows students to choose regular high schools within and outside of their
attendance zones. Whether this third change increases school segregation is the focus of this
paper.
The Seoul High School Choice Policy utilizes three rounds of assigning students across
regular high schools.7 The first round assigns 20 percent of the total enrollment of each school,
the second and the third rounds assign 40 percent of the total enrollment. All students must
choose two schools for the first round and two schools for the second round. The first round
schools can be any schools in Seoul, but the second round schools must be the schools within
students’ attendance zone determined by home address. Students can rank the two schools (as
the first and second choice school) for the first and second round. At the first round, using a
computerized lottery system, 20 percent of students are randomly assigned to their first or second
choice school regardless of their attendance zone (40 percent for the schools in the attendance
zone 11). After assigning schools for the 20 percent of students at the first round, 40 percent of

7

The policy has two stages of school assignment, called pre- and post-stages. The post stage is relevant to regular
high schools, and it consists of three rounds. The pre-stage assigns students to autonomous public high schools and
science & arts focused high schools which is similar to special magnet schools in the U.S. At the pre-stage, students
are able to choose one autonomous public high school and one science & arts focused high school. School choice of
autonomous and science & arts focused high schools is not mandatory
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students are assigned to their first or second choice school of the second round which is in their
attendance zone (60 percent for the schools in the attendance zone 11). At the third round, the
remaining 40 percent of students are randomly assigned to a school in their greater attendance
zone which combines their attendance zone and adjacent attendance zones. If students only want
to choose their neighborhood schools, they can choose the exact same two schools in the first
and the second round.8
The main changes caused by the school choice program in Seoul are the availability of
high school choices within the attendance zones as well as outside of neighborhood attendance
zones. However, the percentage of students who chose a school outside of their attendance zone
for the first round is not large and declines over time. In the first year of the policy
implementation (2010), 14.4 percent of students chose schools outside. The rate is 10.3 percent
in 2011 and 8.6 percent in 2012.
3.4. Data
The sample for this study consists of all regular high schools in Seoul. For data analysis,
I only use regular high schools in Seoul which excludes non-random schools and autonomous
schools. I exclude non-random schools because students were not randomly assigned to the
schools, and I exclude autonomous schools because data on the schools are not available.
Descriptive statistics of non-random schools and autonomous schools are presented if relevant
information is available. Four sets of data were used. First, data to measure school segregation

8

Several systems are adopted to avoid gaming the school choice. First, student assignments of autonomous public
high schools and science & arts focused high schools precede at the pre-stage, so students can choose both regular
high schools and the two alternative types of schools. Second, because two schools at the first and the second rounds
can be exactly the same, students do not have to choose either schools within their attendance zone or schools
outside of their attendance zones. Third, students are entered into the lottery system for both the first choice school
and the second choice school at the same time, and if students are chosen for the both schools, they are assigned to
the first choice school. Thus, students have no incentives to write their second choice school as the first choice
school at each round.
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are each regular high school’s entering student distribution by middle school performance
percentile rank. The student distribution data were collected by the National Assembly of the
Republic of Korea from each high school in 2009, 2010, and 2011. Second, data on school
performance and other school characteristics are from both Ministry of Education and the Seoul
Metropolitan Office of Education. The performance outcome is based on the College Scholastic
Aptitude Test (CSAT) which is a high-stakes test offered to students only once at the end of their
third year of high school. The CSAT is similar to the SAT in the U.S., and a majority of students
take the CSAT. I use student-level test scores standardized at the national mean. Third, data to
measure school popularity (defined later) come from the Seoul Metropolitan Office of
Education. School popularity data of autonomous high schools were collected from newspaper
articles. Fourth, the local income tax data come from two sources. Data on the annual local
income tax revenues are obtained from the "Annual Local Tax Statistics Report" published by
the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs of Korea. I divide each year's
total local income tax revenues by the number of households to derive the amount of local
income tax paid per household. The data on the number of households come from the Korean
Statistical Information Service.
Table 3-1 presents the characteristics of 11 attendance zones in Seoul as of 2009, such as
the annual local income tax paid per household, the number of schools, the number of students,
and proportions of students in the top 10 percentile ranks by their middle school performance in
all high schools in each attendance zone. The non-random schools are in the center of Seoul
which are geographically located in several attendance zones.9 In 2009, Seoul had 173 regular

9

Because all the schools within the 5 km radius of the Seoul City Hall were turned into the non-random schools, the
schools can belong to several attendance zones. See Figure 3-1 for the intersection between the circle of the
attendance zone 11 and other attendance zones.
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high schools with 78,414 students and 39 non-random schools with 15,519 students. In terms of
the proportions of students in the top 10 percentile ranks, each attendance zone had
approximately 10 percent of students in the top 10 percentile ranks. I also present the
proportions of students in the top 10 percentile ranks by coeducational high school status. Even
though students were randomly assigned to either single-sex or coeducational high school in
2009, because average performance of female students is higher than male students,
coeducational schools had lower proportions of students in the upper ranked students than singlesex schools. The proportions of students in the top 10 percentile ranks are 0.06 in all-male high
schools which is less than a half of the mean of all-female high schools (0.13). Among all high
schools in each attendance zone, the standard deviations of the proportions of each attendance
zone are about 0.02 or 0.03, which is high if students were randomly assigned to high school by
ability. However, within the same types of schools (either coeducational schools or single-sex
schools), the standard deviations are nearly zero in all attendance zones, which supports the
random distribution of students across schools within attendance zones in 2009. Finally, the
local income tax paid per household of each attendance zone ranges from 111 to 2,169 (in
thousands Korean Won equivalent to one U.S. Dollar). Households in Gangnam paid almost 20
times more local income tax than households in North in 2009, which suggests that
neighborhoods in Seoul are very segregated by income.
The main outcome of interest of this paper is school segregation. I use two measures of
school segregation, a dissimilarity index and an exposure index. Because students were
randomly assigned within their attendance zones until 2009, I measure school segregation across
schools of each attendance zone. School segregation by student academic performance is
measured using the proportions of the first grade high school students (equivalent to the tenth
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grade in the U.S.) in the top 10 percentile ranks of middle school performance. The dissimilarity
index of the students in the top 10 percentile ranks to all other students below the top 10
percentile ranks10 (the elite to non-elite dissimilarity index) can be computed as:
1

eij

neij

Di = 2 ∑nj=1 | Ei − NEi |
where eij and neij refer to the number of students in the top 10 percentile ranks of academic
performance and the number of students below the top 10 percentile ranks in school j in
attendance zone i, respectively, and Ei and NEi refer to the total number of students in the top 10
and below the top 10 percentile ranks in the attendance zone, respectively. The dissimilarity
index measures the degree to which the elite and non-elite students are evenly spread among
schools. It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values representing more segregation and lower
values representing a more even distribution of students by performance across schools. More
generally, the dissimilarity index can be interpreted as the proportion of elite students who would
have to move from schools where they are overrepresented to schools where they are
underrepresented. The elite to non-elite dissimilarity index will be 0 if all high schools within an
attendance zone have 10 percent of elite students.
In addition to the dissimilarity index, I measure an exposure index which captures the
likelihood that a person from one group will encounter and interact with a person from another
group in a typical setting. This non-elite to elite exposure index can calculated as:
neij

eij

Ei = ∑ni=1 NEi (eij+neij)
where eij , neij , and NEi are defined as in the previous equation. This index can be interpreted as
the proportion of elite students in the typical non-elite student’s school. It ranges from 0 to 1,

10

The dissimilarity index can be computed with any two groups, but the percent students in the top 10 percentile is
the only one cutoff that was reported consistently over time.
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with higher values representing less segregation and lower values representing more segregation.
The non-elite to elite exposure index will be 0.1 if typical non-elite students attend schools that
have 10 percent of elite students.
Table 3-2 presents the mean of the dissimilarity indices of 10 attendance zones in 2009,
2010, and 2011. The number of high schools used to measure school segregation in 2010 and
2011 are less than 173 because, among the 173 schools, 12 and 13 schools turned to autonomous
schools in 2010 and 2011, respectively.11 Due to the random student assignment until 2009, it is
not surprising to see that schools were very integrated in 2009. The school segregation measured
by the dissimilarity index is 0.13 in 2009, which means 13 percent of the students in the top 10
percentile ranks in schools that they are overrepresented should transfer to the schools that they
are underrepresented within their attendance zone in order to perfectly integrate high schools by
performance levels. Despite the random student assignments in 2009, the dissimilarity index is
not zero because the share of high performing students is larger in female-only schools than
male-only schools and in coeducational schools. In 2009, the non-elite to elite exposure index is
0.1, which also suggests that schools were nearly perfectly integrated in terms of the typical
composition of elite students (0.1). The dissimilarity index is 0.17 in 2010 and 0.19 in 2011.
The dissimilarity index was increased by 30 percent from 2009 to 2010 and 12 percent from
2010 to 2011. The exposure index of 0.10 in 2009 decreased to 0.09 in 2010 and 0.08 in 2011.
I use oversubscription rates of each school at the first round assignment as an indicator of
school popularity. Oversubscription rates are the number of students who chose each school
divided by the number of the first grade enrollment of each school in 2010. Seven regular
schools were undersubscribed, and the number of students who chose the schools was not

11

Including non-random schools, 18 and 17 schools turned to autonomous schools in 2010 and 2011, respectively.
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reported. Thus, I recorded their oversubscription rates of the schools as 0. The oversubscription
rates of regular high schools range from 0 to 17. Table 3-3 presents the oversubscription rates by
school types. The rates of regular high schools are not comparable to the rates of autonomous
private schools which accept 80 percent of their students from the students in the upper 50
percentile ranks. 20 percent of the total enrollment of autonomous private schools are reserved
for low income students, so autonomous private schools have two separate oversubscription
rates, one for students in the upper 50 percentile ranks and another for low income students. The
oversubscription rate of autonomous private schools among the students in the upper 50
percentile ranks has the mean of 2.89 with the standard deviation of 2.33, and it ranges from 0 to
9.1. The rates among low income students are substantially lower than the regular applicants in
the upper 50 percentile ranks: It has the mean of 0.52 and ranges from 0 to 1.6. Only 5 out of 13
autonomous private schools had more low income applicants than their allotted slots for low
income students. Since the middle school performance eligibility restriction does not apply to
the students from low income families and their tuition is waived, the lower rate among low
income students is not due to their academic or financial restrictions. Finally, autonomous public
schools were less popular than regular schools in 2010.
3.5. Empirical Strategy
3.5.1. School Segregation
A pretest-posttest design compares the outcomes before and after an intervention. The
pretest-posttest design often cannot estimate the causal effect of the intervention because the
pretest provides weak information about the counterfactual, what might have happened had the
intervention not occurred (Shaddish, Cook, & Campbell, 2001). For example, if receiving an
intervention is determined by time-variant characteristics of the object(s), the posttest outcome is
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likely to be affected by the characteristics of the treated object(s). In addition, if the introduction
of the intervention was gradual, other events that occurred between the pretest and the posttest
period could have also affected the posttest outcome. Thus, the simple comparison of the pretest
and the posttest outcomes is not likely to capture the true effect of the intervention because the
posttest outcome is affected by the time-variant characteristics of the treated objects and effects
of other events.
The impact of the Seoul High School Choice Policy on school segregation can be
estimated using the pretest-posttest design because the introduction of the policy was immediate
and the policy implementation was not determined by attendance zone characteristics. In
addition, prior to the policy change, students were randomly assigned to regular high schools
within the same attendance zones, so the level of school segregation prior to the implementation
of the policy cannot be affected by student self-selection into a school. This random assignment
is crucial in measuring the causal effect of school choice on school segregation because, in the
absence of the random assignment, student self-selection into a school affects school segregation
which is the same mechanism that school choice affects school segregation. That is, in the
absence of the random assignment, the level of school segregation prior to the implementation of
school choice would be higher than the counterfactual segregation level, so the pretest-posttest
design will underestimate the effect of school choice on school segregation.
For the analysis using observations in 2009 and 2010, the pretest-posttest design can be
implemented by estimating the following equation:
Yit = β T2010 + θi + Income Taxit + it

(1)

where Yit is the dissimilarity or exposure index of attendance zone i in year t; T2010 is a dummy
variable equaling 1 for all attendance zones in 2010 or 0 for all attendance zones in 2009; θi
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indicates the attendance zone fixed effects; Income Taxit is the average local income tax paid per
household in attendance zone i in year t; and i is a random error term. β indicates the average
effect of school choice on school segregation.
For the analysis using observations in 2009, 2010, and 2011, the following equation (2) is
estimated:
Yit = β1 T2010 + β2 T2011 + θi + Income Taxit + it

(2)

where T2011 is a dummy variable equaling 1 for all attendance zones in 2011 or 0 for all
attendance zones in 2009 and 2010; and others are defined as in the previous equation. β1
indicates the average effect of school choice on school segregation in 2010 relative to the school
year 2009, and β2 indicates the average effect of school choice on school segregation in 2011
relative to the school year 2009.
3.5.2. School Preference
Families would select a school based on many factors. Let’s assume that school selection
is a function of average school performance, student composition, teacher characteristics,
curriculum, and other school factors such as coeducational school status and parental
involvement in school. F in the following equation denotes the unknown function of the
included variables that affect school selection.
School Selection = F(School Performance, Peer, Teacher, Curriculum, Other school factors)
One issue of estimating independent effects of each variable on school selection in the
above function is that the variables are closely related to each other. For example, student and
teacher characteristics are known to affect average school performance, so it would be difficult
to analyze whether school performance independently affects school selection. Seoul is a unique
place where many important factors in the above school selection function are homogenous. In
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particular, teacher characteristics and curriculum are very similar across schools. Due to the
random assignment of students within the same attendance zones, peer characteristics were
homogenous until 2009. Despite many commonalities, due to unobservable factors such as
school administration, average school performance levels are different across schools within the
same attendance zones. Using the variation in a few school factors, I analyze the impact of the
school factors on school selection. Specifically, I estimate the following regression:
Rsi = Zsiꞌψ + θi + si

(3)

where Rsi is the oversubscription rate of each school s in attendance zone i in 2010; the vector of
Zsi includes pre-determined school characteristics such as the standardized CSAT test scores of
2009 graduates and the School Development Contribution Funds of each school s in attendance
zone i in 2009; θi indicates the attendance zone fixed effects; and si is a random error term.
Standard errors are clustered at the attendance zone levels. Coefficients in the vector ψ indicate
the associations between the relevant school factor and school selection.
3.6. Results
This section has four sub-sections, and each presents results of within-attendance zone
balance tests in student distribution in 2009, attrition of elite students to autonomous schools,
school segregation, and school selection analysis.
3.6.1. Test of Within-Attendance Zone Balance in Student Distribution in 2009
Before presenting main results on school segregation, I first test for the validity of the
research design used for this school segregation analysis by examining balance in student
distributions across subsets of schools. If students sorted into certain schools that they preferred
prior to the introduction of school choice, the pretest-posttest design cannot provide the causal
estimates of the choice policy on school segregation. For example, if high performing students
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selected into the high schools where previous graduates had high average CSAT scores, the
pretest-posttest design would understate the impact of school choice on school segregation.
Even though the nearly zero standard deviations of the proportions of students in the top 10
percentile ranks presented in Table 3-1 suggest that schools within the same attendance zones are
almost identical in the student distribution, I test balance in several student distributions across
subsets of schools.
These tests are conducted using the three groups of schools within the same attendance
zones divided by their average school performance because high performing schools are found to
be preferred among students (results presented in Section 3.6.4.). Independent variables are
three dummy variables which indicate whether each school in the same attendance zone belongs
to the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd tertile of the CSAT English tests score distribution12 of 2008 graduates (the
smaller the tertile, the higher the average CSAT scores). That is, the 1st tertile dummy takes the
value of 1 for the schools in the 1st tertile within the same attendance zone or 0 otherwise. The
2nd and the 3rd tertile dummies are created similarly. Then, I run a regression of each of the
seven school-level variables which reflect student distribution by performance and family
backgrounds on each tertile dummy. The variables reflecting student distribution by school
performance are the share of students whose middle school percentile ranks below 9.99 (upperranked), between 10.00 to 49.99 (middle-ranked), and 50.00 or above (lower-ranked). Four
other variables reflecting student distribution by family economic backgrounds are the share of
students whose family receives the government basic livelihood assistance, the share of students
with a single parent, the share of students receiving any form of tuition support, and the share of

12

High school students must take the two same tests, Korean and English. Because standardized English test scores
have more variations (0.30) than standardized Korean test scores (0.23), I use English test scores to divide schools
into three groups.
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students receiving lunch support at school. All the school-level variables are measured using the
characteristics of the first-year high school students of each school in 2009. I only use
coeducational schools for the tests because the number of single sex schools is small to divide
into three subsets. The total number of coeducational schools in 2009 is 77. Because the
variables used in the balancing tests are missing for some schools, schools with missing values
were excluded from the relevant analysis.
Table 3-4 present the results of balance tests. The coefficients of the variables related to
the student distribution by performance are nearly zero and statistically insignificant. If high
performing schools (schools in the 1st tertile) had more elite students than other schools in the
same attendance zones, the coefficients of the share of upper-ranked students should be positive
and statistically significant. As can be expected from Table 3-1, the shares of upper-, middle-,
and lower-ranked students are almost identical between the three subsets of schools. These
results support that students were randomly assigned to schools by middle school performance
ranks within the same attendance zones in 2009. In addition, there are no systematic differences
in student economic backgrounds across three subsets of schools. The coefficients of the percent
of students by their family economic backgrounds are larger than the coefficients of the percent
of upper-, middle-, and lower-ranked students, but none of the coefficients are statistically
significant. The results of the balancing tests presented in Table 3-4 show that baseline student
characteristics are reasonably balanced across schools.
3.6.2. Effects of Autonomous School Opening on Elite Students’ Movement
This section examines the changes in the proportions of students in the top 10 percentile
ranks between 2009 and 2010. Autonomous schools are not included in segregation and
preference analysis, but the establishment of autonomous schools are likely to affect the
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movement of high performing students. It is important to examine the movement of elite
students because their movement can affect school segregation.
Table 3-5 presents the mean of the proportions of the upper-ranked students of each
attendance zone in 2009 and 2010. In all attendance zones, the proportions of the upper-ranked
students remained constant or decreased by one or two percentage points from 2009 to 2010.
These results suggest that 10 to 20 percent of the upper ranked students (one to two percentage
points of the top ten percentile ranks) may have moved to autonomous schools. The decrease in
the proportions of the upper-ranked students suggests that high-performing students chose
schools that have high performing peers (Recall the restrictions of upper 50 percentile ranks for
the autonomous private schools). Due to the lack of data on autonomous schools, I cannot
analyze whether the proportions actually increased in the autonomous schools in 2010, but, a
large number of news released in 2010 reported that autonomous private schools recruited large
proportions of high performing students.
The last column of Table 3-5 presents the changes in the means and standard deviations
(in brackets) of the proportions of the upper-ranked students between 2009 and 2010. The
changes in the standard deviations are an indicator of changes in school segregation within
attendance zones. The standard deviations of 10 attendance zones remained constant or
increased by 0.01 or 0.02, which implies the increase in school segregation across schools within
the same attendance zones. In contrast, school segregation and the share of the upper-ranked
students of the non-random schools in the attendance zone 11 decreased from 2009 and 2010.
When all schools became available to school choice in 2010, school segregation of the nonrandom schools decreased. The decrease in school segregation in the areas where school choice
was available before 2010 suggests that, when students became able to select nearby schools,
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some of the high performing students applied to the nearby schools in their attendance zones
instead of applying for the schools in the center of Seoul.
3.6.3. School Segregation
This section presents the results of the impact of the Seoul High School Choice Policy on
school segregation. The policy effects on school segregation are computed using the regressions
(1) and (2). Panel A presents the estimated effects measured using observations in 2009 and
2010, and Panel B presents the estimated effects measured using observations in 2009, 2010, and
2011. Even numbered columns are estimated without the local income tax control, and odd
numbered columns are estimated with the control.
The results estimated using the elite to non-elite dissimilarity index presented in Table
3-6 suggest that school choice in Seoul increased the elite to non-elite dissimilarity index by
0.042 to 0.043 points in 2010 which is an increase of about 2 standard deviations of the index.
The estimate effects of the policy change in 2011 are 0.069 when measured without the local
income tax control and 0.76 when measured with the control. All the coefficients are statistically
significant at the 1 percent level. The results measured using the dissimilarity index indicate that
an additional four to eight percentage point of students in the top 10 percentile ranks (10 percent
of the total students) would have to transfer to other schools to perfectly integrate schools in
Seoul by academic performance levels compared to the segregation level prior to the policy
change.
The estimated effects measured using the exposure index also suggest that schools
became segregated by academic performance. The impact estimate is -0.007 in 2010 and -0.014
or -0.015 in 2011 depending on the inclusion of the local income tax control in analysis. The
coefficients suggest that the share of elite students in a typical non-elite school decreased by
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more than one percentage point in 2010. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1
percent level. However, because the total share of the elite students decreased by one percentage
point (See Table 3-5) in 2010 possibly due to the openings of autonomous schools, the estimated
effects measured using the exposure index are likely to be affected by the compositional changes
(Recall autonomous schools are not included in analysis due to the lack of data). That is, the
share of elite students decreases when elite students move to autonomous schools, so the
exposure index also decreases due to the student composition changes. In contrast, the effects
estimated using the dissimilarity index are not biased by the compositional change, because the
dissimilarity index measures school segregation conditional on the student composition (thus
controlling for the effect of the compositional changes). In sum, the results presented in Table 36 suggest that, using both the dissimilarity index and the exposure index, the school choice
program increased school segregation by student performance in Seoul. In addition, the
segregation effects became larger over time.
I also analyze school segregation using segregation indices measured at two different
geographical units.13 First, I use greater attendance zones because, at the third round of school
assignments, 40 percent of students are randomly assigned to a school in their greater attendance
zone which combines their attendance zone and adjacent attendance zones. Second, I use
administrative districts because administrative districts are smaller attendances zones (Recall that
one attendance zone has two or three administrative districts). It is possible to gauge what is the
geographical scope of student movements by comparing the results using the segregation indices
measured at two different geographical units.

13

The impact on school segregation measured at the entire district level is very similar to the impact measured at the
attendance zone level.

116

Table 3-7 presents results of school segregation estimated using the segregation indices
measured at the greater attendance zone levels. I use three greater attendance zones, one
combining the attendance zone 1, 2, 3, and 4 (North of the Han River which divides Seoul),
another combining the attendance zone 5, 6, and 7 (Southeast of the Han River), and the other
combining the attendance zone 8, 9, and 10 (Southwest of the Han River). In general, the
estimated effects on school segregation at the greater attendance zone level are 4 to 14 percent
smaller than the main estimated effects presented in Table 3-6. The estimated effect measured
using the exposure index is only significant when 2009, 2010, and 2011 data are used for data
analysis. The coefficients of the non-elite to elite exposure index estimated using 2009 and 2010
data are similar to the coefficient (-0.007) estimated using the same index measured at the
attendance zone. Due to the decrease in the number of observations, however, the coefficients
are statistically insignificant.
Table 3-8 presents the results estimated using segregation indices measured at smaller
attendance zones. In general, the estimated effects on school segregation at the smaller
attendance zone levels are 5 to 29 percent larger than the main estimated effects. The estimated
effects on the elite to non-elite dissimilarity index in 2011, however, are 20 to 28 percent smaller
than the main estimated effects. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
The comparison of the results of Tables 3-7 and 3-8 with the main results of Table 3-6 suggests
that students in Seoul choose schools nearby their home under the school choice policy. Since
Seoul does not provide transportation to school, students are likely to prefer to attend a school
which is close to their home.
In addition to school segregation by student performance, I examine school
socioeconomic segregation. I computed the dissimilarity index by replacing the number of
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students in the top 10 percentile ranks with the number of free-lunch eligible students14 and
replacing the number of students below the top 10 percentile ranks with the number of students
who are not eligible for a free lunch. The number of free-lunch eligible students by grade is only
available in 2009, so I use the information on the free-lunch eligible students of each high school
(including the first, second, and third graders of high school) to compute segregation measures in
2010. This is not very problematic because the second and third graders of each high school
were randomly assigned and students were evenly distributed by free lunch status across schools
(See Panel B of Table 3-4). Using the school-level free lunch information instead of the grade
specific information, however, would underestimate the impact on school socioeconomic
segregation, so I also compute the dissimilarity index in 2012 when all students in the first,
second, and the third grades of high school were admitted through school choice.
Table 3-9 presents the results. The results are estimated using the regression (1) because
only two observations per attendance zone were used for this analysis (The dummy T2010 takes
the value of 1 for the observations not measured in 2009). Columns (1) and (2) present the
results estimated using the dissimilarity indices in 2009 and 2010, and columns (3) and (4)
present the results estimated using the dissimilarity indices 2009 and 2012, respectively. The
exposure index was not used for this analysis because the proportions of students eligible for free
lunch differs by school year. I find no effect of school choice on school socioeconomic
segregation. The estimated coefficients presented in Table 3-9 are nearly zero and statistically
insignificant. These results also support that students may have chosen schools within their
attendance zones. Because attendance zones are segregated by income, school socioeconomic

14

Similar to the U.S. system, students from families with incomes below 130 percent of the poverty level are
eligible for free lunch.
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segregation is likely to increase if school choice affects student movement across attendance
zones.
Finally, in all the Tables 3-6 to 3-9, the results estimated with and without the local
income tax control are very similar, and the coefficients on the control variable (not presented)
are nearly zero. One explanation of these results is the tax variable in each attendance zone does
not substantially vary over time. I also find no systematic relation between the changes in school
segregation and the average local tax paid. These results suggest that the effects on school
segregation do not depend on the average income level of attendance zones, which cannot be true
if schools in affluent attendance zones attracted more high performing students than schools in
poor attendance zones.
3.6.4. School Preference
Some of the results presented in the Section 3.6.3 suggest that the distance from home to
school is an important factor in school selection. In this section, I explore what other school
factors are preferred in school selection. I use school-level oversubscription rates for this
preference analysis. Analyzing preference using school-level oversubscription rates requires two
conditions. First, every student must utilize choice because, if the participation in school choice
is voluntary, oversubscription rates will reflect the different ability and motivation to utilize
choice among participants and non-participants. In Seoul, the participation in school choice is
mandatory so that the first concern is irrelevant. Second, there should be enough variation in
school factors, and the school factors should be constant over time.
In Table 3-10, I present the variation in school-level characteristics such as average class
size, pupil/teacher ratio, and proportions of the certified regular teachers, the CSAT English test
scores in 2009, and per-pupil school development contribution funds (the private funds) of each
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attendance zone. The average class size is 36.55, the average pupil/teacher ratio is 18.66, and the
average proportions of certified regular teachers are 0.95. The means of the average class size,
pupil/teacher ratio, and proportions of the certified regular teachers presented in Table 3-10 are
very similar across 10 attendance zones. In addition, the standard deviations of each variable is
small, which suggest that schools within the attendance zones are similar in terms of the
characteristics. In contrast, the CSAT English test scores and the school development
contribution funds show relatively large differences across and within attendance zones. The
CSAT English test scores are standardized at the national student mean, so, if the average
performance of students in each school is identical, both the mean and standard deviation of each
attendance zone should be zero. However, the mean of each attendance zone ranges from -0.27
to 0.25, and the standard deviation of each attendance zone also ranges from 0.12 to 0.23, which
suggests that there is enough variation in the test scores.15 The per-pupil school development
contribution funds are also different across and within the attendance zones. The funds are based
on voluntary contributions from non-profit sectors including parents, and the funds should be
used to educational purposes such as extracurricular activities. The means of the per-pupil funds
range from 31.53 to 127.97 (in thousands Korean Won equivalent to one U.S. Dollar), and the
standard deviations of each attendance zone range from 28.50 to 246.83.16 In short, in contrast to
the three educational inputs controlled by the Korean government, average school performance
levels and the school development contribution funds are different across schools.

15

I also tested whether school factors are constant over time by examining whether school performance of a specific
school is predictable based on previous performance. I calculated each school’s differences between the school’s
CSAT English test score mean and the attendance zone mean for the same test in 2008 and 2009. I regressed the
2008 deviation on the 2009 deviation with the attendance zone fixed effects. The coefficient of the 2008 deviation
is 0.85 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This result suggests that the 2008 test scores predicts 2009
test scores, so the school performance level is stable in a school.
16
The total per-pupil spending (including teacher salaries) was 7,900 (in thousands Korean Won) in 2010.
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Using the variation in the test scores and the development funds, Table 3-11 presents the
association between school oversubscription rates and several school factors. The column (1)
presents the results estimated using the regression (3), and the column (2) presents the results
estimated using the regression (3) with three additional governmental input variables. The
coefficients of the CSAT English test scores range from 4.8 to 5.9, which means that a school
with a 0.5 standard deviation higher test scores would have two or three more students applied
for each slot of the first grade of high school. Because the mean of school oversubscription rates
is 4.44 in 2010, the effect of the average school performance is large in magnitude. The school
development funds are also positively associated with the increase in the oversubscription rates,
and the coefficients suggest that schools with approximately $120 more private funds per pupil
(a one standard deviation increase) would have about one more student apply to the school. The
results presented in Table 3-11 suggest that the average school performance is important in
parental school selection. In addition, the different school performance levels are likely to be the
results of unobservable school factors (e.g., school administration) because observable school
inputs are similar across all schools in Seoul.
3.7. Conclusion
Seoul started implementing the Seoul High School Choice Policy in 2010 that allows
students to attend any school in Seoul regardless of their residential location. Because
neighborhoods in Seoul are very segregated by income, policy makers in Seoul tried to integrate
schools to mitigate the geographical segregation of residents. This paper examines the impact of
school choice on school segregation. Specifically, this paper examines school segregation by
student performance levels.
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Despite the political intention to promote school integration, I find that school choice in
Seoul increased school segregation by student performance. In addition, I find that, in the
attendance zone where school choice was adopted in 1996 (Jungbu), school segregation
decreased when all schools in Seoul become available to school choice. The attendance zone
(Jungbu) was one of the most segregated attendance zones in Seoul. Several findings of this
paper suggest that students mainly choose neighborhood schools within their own attendance
zones. Contrary to the increase in school segregation by student performance, I find no effect of
the same policy change on school socioeconomic segregation.
In addition to the increase in school segregation by student performance, I find that
parents prefer schools with high average test scores of previous graduates. Due to the lack of
data, I cannot directly test whether all types of students prefer high performing schools.
However, if every student equally prefers high performing schools, there would not be an
increase in school segregation by student ability. I also find suggestive evidence that
autonomous private schools that accept a majority of students from the upper and middle
performance percentile ranks were not popular among low income students who tend to have low
academic performance. Combining these results, my results suggest that high achievers prefer to
attend high performing schools more than low achievers.
Many scholars have argued that school choice programs have allowed high performing
schools to cream-skim educationally advantaged students. This critique applies to Seoul. The
findings of this study are not generalizable because educational settings in Seoul are unique in
many aspects. Despite this limitation, the results of this study contributes to the current debates
on the effect of school choice on school segregation by student ability in the U.S. Studies
evaluating the school choice policies in the U.S. cannot clearly argue that school choice increases
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student sorting by performance levels because student performance is closely related to race and
family income. However, I find that, even in a racially homogenous country, school choice
increases school segregation by student performance. This result may suggest that school choice
increases school segregation by ability through differential individual selection processes.

123

References
Bifulco, R., & Ladd, H. F. (2007). School choice, racial segregation, and test‐score gaps:
Evidence from North Carolina's charter school program. Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management, 26(1), 31-56.
Bifulco, R., Ladd, H. F., & Ross, S. L. (2009). The effects of public school choice on those left
behind: Evidence from Durham, North Carolina. Peabody Journal of Education, 84(2),
130-149.
Blumer, H. (1958). Race prejudice as a sense of group position. Pacific Sociological Review, 3-7.
Carnoy, M. (2000). School choice? Or is it privatization?. Educational Researcher, 29(7): 15–20.
Coleman, J. S., & Hoffer, T. (1987). Public and Private High Schools: The Impact of
Communities (p. 213). New York: Basic Books.
Cullen, J. B., Jacob, B. A., & Levitt, S. D. (2005). The impact of school choice on student
outcomes: an analysis of the Chicago Public Schools. Journal of Public Economics,
89(5), 729-760.
Epple, D., & Romano, R. E. (1998). Competition between private and public schools, vouchers,
and peer-group effects. American Economic Review, 33-62.
Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago press.
Hastings, J. S., Kane, T. J., & Staiger, D. O. (2005). Parental preferences and school
competition: Evidence from a public school choice program (Working Paper No. 11805).
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Henig, J. R. (1996). The local dynamics of choice: Ethnic preferences and institutional
responses. In B. Fuller, & R. F. Elmore (Eds.) Who Chooses? Who Loses? Culture,
Institutions, and the Unequal Effects of School Choice (pp. 95-117). New York, NY:
Teachers College Press
Hsieh, C. T., & Urquiola, M. (2006). The effects of generalized school choice on achievement
and stratification: Evidence from Chile's voucher program. Journal of Public Economics,
90(8), 1477-1503.
Hoxby, C. M. (2000). Does competition among public schools benefit students and taxpayers?.
American Economic Review, 90(5), 1209-1238.
Ladd, H. F., & Fiske, E. B. (2001). The uneven playing field of school choice: Evidence from
New Zealand. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 20(1), 43-64.
Levin, H. M. (1998). Educational vouchers: Effectiveness, choice, and costs. Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management, 17(3), 373-392.
Levin, H. M. (1999). The public-private nexus in education. American Behavioral Scientist,
43(1), 124-137.

124

Long, J. E., & Toma, E. F. (1988). The determinants of private school attendance, 1970-1980.
Review of Economics and Statistics, 70(2), 351-357.
Shaddish, W. R., Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (2001). Experimental and Quasi-experimental
Designs for Generalized Causal Inference. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Weiher, G. R., & Tedin, K. L. (2002). Does choice lead to racially distinctive schools? Charter
schools and household preferences. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 21(1),
79-92.

125

Figure 3-1. School and Administrative Districts in Seoul (2009)
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Figure 3-2. Student Random Assignment Mechanisms (2009)
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Table 3-1. List of Attendance Zones in Seoul and High School Characteristics in 2009
Upper-ranked students of random schools
No.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Name

Num. of schools Num. of students
All Coeducational Male Female
[Number of non- [Num. of students in
Schools
Schools
Schools Schools
random schools] non-random schools]
West
266
12 [7]
5,524 [2,869]
0.11
0.11
0.07
0.14
(0.03)
(0.00)
(0.00) (0.00)
Seongbuk
239
10 [1]
4,413 [465]
0.10
0.10
0.08
0.12
(0.01)
(0.00)
(n.a)
(0.00)
North
111
23 [0]
10,884 [0]
0.10
0.10
0.06
0.14
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.01) (0.01)
East
145
13 [2]
5,415 [791]
0.11
0.10
0.07
0.14
(0.03)
(0.00)
(0.00) (0.00)
Seongdong 148
7 [6]
2,954 [2,593]
0.12
0.11
0.08
0.15
(0.02)
(0.00)
(n.a)
(0.00)
Gangdong 330
22 [0]
11,455 [0]
0.09
0.09
0.06
0.12
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.00) (0.00)
Gangnam 2,169
26 [0]
12,120 [0]
0.09
0.09
0.06
0.12
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.00) (0.00)
Dongjak
165
16 [0]
6,158 [0]
0.10
0.10
0.06
0.14
(0.03)
(0.00)
(0.00) (0.00)
South
819
19 [1]
7,644 [291]
0.10
0.09
0.05
0.14
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.00) (0.01)
Gangseo
280
25 [0]
11,847 [0]
0.10
0.10
0.06
0.14
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.01) (0.01)
Jungbu
n.a.
0 [22]
0 [8,510]
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
(Central)
Total

Tax

173 [39]

78,414 [15,519]

173

77

49

47

Notes: Schools are restricted to regular high schools in Seoul. n.a. signifies that a standard deviation is not available
because there is only one boys’ school in an attendance zone.
The 39 non-random schools include 37 pre-choice and post-selection schools and two trial autonomous public high
schools (Wonmook and Guhyun high schools). The non-random schools are geographically located in several
attendance zones in the center of Seoul.
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Table 3-2. Changes in School Segregation
Measure

2009

2010

2011

Elite to non-elite
dissimilarity index

0.13
(0.02)

0.17
(0.03)

0.19
(0.04)

Non-elite to Elite
exposure index

0.10
(0.01)

0.09
(0.01)

0.08
(0.01)

Note: Means are cross-sectional sample means, standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 3-3. Average Oversubscription Rates of Each Attendance Zone by School Types (2010)
Name

No.

Regular
Schools

Autonomous Private Schools
Regular
Low-Income

Autonomous
Public Schools

1

West

4.09

1.45

0.00

n.a.

2

Seongbuk

3.66

2.10

1.60

n.a.

3

North

5.35

n.a.

n.a.

0.80

4

East

4.53

2.00

1.20

3.50

5

Seongdong

3.16

3.60

1.50

n.a.

6

Gangdong

4.40

1.80

0.00

n.a.

7

Gangnam

5.75

4.30

0.00

n.a.

8

Dongjak

5.07

n.a.

n.a.

2.00

9

South

4.16

1.20

0.00

7.50

10

Gangseo

5.07

9.10

1.10

2.90

11

Jungbu (Central)

1.75

2.10

0.47

1.90

4.44

2.89

0.52

2.77

Mean
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Table 3-4. Tests of Within-Attendance Zone Balance in Baseline Achievement (2009)

Dependent variable

% Upper-ranked students
(ψ < 0.10)
% Middle-ranked students
(0.10 < ψ < 0.50)
% Lower-ranked students
(ψ ≥ 0.50 )
% Gov’t financial aids
% Single parent
% Tuition support
% Lunch support

1st Tertile Number of 2nd Tertile Number of 3rd Tertile Number of
(1 = yes) Observations (1 = yes) Observations (1 = yes) Observations
Panel A. Student distribution by middle school performance
0.001
69
-0.001
69
-0.000
69
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.000
69
-0.001
69
0.000
69
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
-0.001
69
0.001
69
0.000
69
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
Panel B. Student distribution by family economic backgrounds
-0.051
76
-0.026
76
0.077
76
(0.039)
(0.051)
(0.083)
0.063
76
-0.026
76
-0.037
76
(0.096)
(0.126)
(0.204)
-0.001
72
0.003
72
-0.002
72
(0.018)
(0.023)
(0.037)
-0.004
77
-0.008
77
0.012
77
(0.017)
(0.021)
(0.035)

Notes: Regressions are conducted using the coeducational school sample. I estimate all coefficients by running a
regression of each dependent variable on a dummy variable indicating each school belongs to the 1 st tertile, 2nd
tertile, or 3rd tertile of the 2008 CSAT English test score distribution conditional on attendance zones. The smaller
the tertile, the higher the average CSAT test scores. Schools with a missing value were excluded from the relevant
analysis. Standard errors are in parentheses. Ψ denotes middle school graduate standing percentile rank. Attendance
zones with missing values were excluded from analysis.
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Table 3-5. Changes in Proportions of the Upper-ranked Students between 2009 and 2010

No.
1

Attendance zone
West

Num. of schools
12

2

Seongbuk

10

3

North

23

4

East

13

5

Seongdong

7

6

Gangdong

22

7

Gangnam

26

8

Dongjak

16

9

South

19

10

Gangseo

25

11

The Center of Seoul
(Non-random schools in 2009)
Seoul Mean

39

2009
0.11
(0.03)
0.10
(0.01)
0.10
(0.03)
0.11
(0.03)
0.12
(0.02)
0.09
(0.02)
0.09
(0.02)
0.10
(0.03)
0.10
(0.03)
0.10
(0.03)
0.11
(0.04)
0.10

2010
0.09
(0.03)
0.09
(0.03)
0.09
(0.04)
0.10
(0.05)
0.10
(0.04)
0.08
(0.03)
0.09
(0.03)
0.10
(0.04)
0.09
(0.04)
0.09
(0.04)
0.09
(0.03)
0.09

∆ Change
-0.02
[+0.00]
-0.01
[+0.02]
-0.01
[+0.01]
-0.01
[+0.02]
-0.02
[+0.02]
-0.01
[+0.01]
-0.00
[+0.01]
-0.00
[+0.01]
-0.01
[+0.01]
-0.01
[+0.01]
-0.02
[-0.01]
-0.01

Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses, and the difference of standard deviations between 2009 and 2010 are
presented in brackets.
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Table 3-6. Estimated Effects on School Segregation by Student Academic Performance
Elite to non-elite
dissimilarity index
Panel A : 2009, 2010

Non-elite to elite
exposure index

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

School choice effect in 2010

0.042***
(0.011)

0.043***
(0.011)

-0.007***
(0.002)

-0.007***
(0.002)

Control variable
Observations
Number of attendance zones
Panel B: 2009, 2010, 2011

X
20
10
(5)

O
20
10
(6)

X
20
10
(7)

O
20
10
(8)

School choice effect in 2010

0.042***
(0.012)
0.069***
(0.012)

0.043***
(0.012)
0.076***
(0.013)

-0.007***
(0.002)
-0.014***
(0.002)

-0.007***
(0.002)
-0.015***
(0.002)

X
30
10

O
30
10

X
30
10

O
30
10

School choice effect in 2011

Control variable
Observations
Number of attendance zones

Notes: “X” and “O” indicate the exclusion and the inclusion of the control variable, respectively. Standard errors are
in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.01.
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Table 3-7. Estimated Effects on School Segregation using Greater Attendance Zones
Elite to non-elite
dissimilarity index
Panel A: 2009, 2010

Non-elite to elite
exposure index

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

School choice effect in 2010

0.036**
(0.007)

0.045*
(0.008)

-0.006
(0.002)

-0.008
(0.003)

Average income tax control
Observations
Number of attendance zones
Panel B: 2009, 2010, 2011

X
6
3
(5)

O
6
3
(6)

X
6
3
(7)

O
6
3
(8)

School choice effect in 2010

0.036*
(0.013)
0.061*
(0.013)

0.037*
(0.015)
0.073*
(0.025)

-0.006**
(0.002)
-0.013***
(0.002)

-0.006**
(0.002)
-0.017**
(0.003)

X
9
3

O
9
3

X
9
3

O
9
3

School choice effect in 2011

Average income tax control
Observations
Number of attendance zones

Notes: “X” and “O” indicate the exclusion and the inclusion of the control variable, respectively. Standard errors are
in parentheses. * indicates statistically significant at the 0.10; ** indicates statistically significant at 0.05; ***
indicates statistically significant at 0.01.
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Table 3-8. Estimated Effects on School Segregation using Smaller Attendance Zones
Elite to non-elite
dissimilarity index
Panel A: 2009, 2010

Non-elite to elite
exposure index

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

School choice effect in 2010

0.044***
(0.008)

0.044***
(0.008)

-0.008***
(0.002)

-0.009***
(0.002)

Average income tax control
Observations
Number of attendance zones
Panel B: 2009, 2010, 2011

X
40
20
(5)

O
40
20
(6)

X
40
20
(7)

O
40
20
(8)

School choice effect in 2010

0.044***
(0.008)
0.055***
(0.010)

0.045***
(0.010)
0.055***
(0.011)

-0.008***
(0.002)
-0.017***
(0.002)

-0.008***
(0.002)
-0.019***
(0.003)

X
60
20

O
60
20

X
60
20

O
60
20

School choice effect in 2011

Average income tax control
Observations
Number of attendance zones

Notes: “X” and “O” indicate the exclusion and the inclusion of the control variable, respectively. Standard errors are
in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.01.
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Table 3-9. Estimated Effects on School Segregation by Free Lunch Eligibility
Free lunch to non-free lunch dissimilarity index
Data used

School choice effect

Average income tax control
Observations
Number of attendance zones

2009 and 2010

2009 and 2012

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.014
(0.021)

0.015
(0.023)

0.000
(0.015)

0.001
(0.016)

X
20
10

O
20
10

X
20
10

O
20
10

Notes: “X” and “O” indicate the exclusion and the inclusion of the control variable, respectively. Standard errors are
in parentheses. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 3-10. School Characteristics by High School Attendance Zones in Seoul (2009)

No.

Name

1

West

2

Seongbuk

3

North

4

East

5

Seongdong

6

Gangdong

7

Gangnam

8

Dongjak

9

South

10

Gangseo

Governmental Inputs
Class size Pupil-teacher % Regular
ratio
Teachers
36.94
18.44
0.93
(0.05)
(1.46)
(1.59)
35.97
18.42
0.93
(0.05)
(1.81)
(1.08)
36.55
18.66
0.94
(0.02)
(1.48)
(1.02)
35.89
18.28
0.95
(0.01)
(1.22)
(1.14)
38.23
18.49
0.93
(0.06)
(1.25)
(1.54)
37.67
19.39
0.95
(0.01)
(1.21)
(0.90)
36.72
18.84
0.95
(0.01)
(2.05)
(1.11)
34.95
17.94
0.94
(0.03)
(2.39)
(0.88)
34.75
17.75
0.94
(0.02)
(3.38)
(1.14)
37.77
19.46
0.94
(0.05)
(1.53)
(1.16)

Outcome
Performance
(CSAT)
-0.02
(0.18)
-0.19
(0.23)
0.02
(0.18)
-0.22
(0.18)
-0.15
(0.12)
0.03
(0.14)
0.25
(0.16)
-0.10
(0.15)
-0.27
(0.22)
0.01
(0.23)

Non-govtal input
Private Funds
72.91
(57.81)
46.84
(26.49)
31.53
(33.26)
83.58
(110.26)
107.04
(99.31)
96.79
(246.83)
127.97
(144.70)
59.50
(64.48)
41.61
(28.50)
42.97
(35.70)

Notes: The performance is based on the 2008 CSAT standardized English test scores. Means of each attendance
zone are presented, and standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 3-11. Estimated Effects on Oversubscription Rates

Performance (Standardized CSAT score)
School development funds
Coeducational school

Oversubscription rates

Oversubscription rates

(1)

(2)

5.879***
(1.047)
0.015***
(0.003)
-0.634
(0.502)

4.777***
(0.952)
0.011***
(0.002)
-0.388
(0.448)
0.726***
(0.175)
0.249
(0.306)
0.196
(10.875)

11
168

11
168

Class size
Pupil/teacher ratio
% regular teachers

Number of attendance zones
Observations

Notes: 11 attendance zones were used for oversubscription analysis. Standard errors clustered at the attendance zone
levels are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.01.

138

Appendix A. Bibliography and Details of Changes in School Desegregation Plans
AL, Mobile County: Neighborhood in 1999
Duke, B. A. (2009). The strange career of Birdie Mae Davis: A history of a school desegregation
lawsuit in Mobile, Alabama, 1963-1997 (Master’s thesis). Auburn University. Auburn, AL.
“In the fall of 1999, the school system limited the number of crosstown busing routes for
the purpose of integration by two-thirds, leaving only twenty routes. The opening of three
schools, Howard Elementary School, Calloway-Smith, and Ella Grant Elementary, all in
inner-city locations, allowed for students who had been previously bused up to fourteen
miles to attend the newest schools in the district, in their own neighborhood” (p. 150).
“The thirty-four years of litigation that comprised the Birdie Made Davis case has a
significant impact on Mobile County Schools. In total, the board created seven magnet
schools to attract white students into previously majority black schools. As of 1997, the
school system bused about 2,800 students…” (p. 148).
Davis v. Mobile, CIVIL ACTION NO: 98-0419-RV-C (1999, May)
"Pursuant to that policy, the Mobile County Public School System will not transport
students who live within a two-mile radius of the school unless they meet certain
exceptions.” Those exceptions are special education students, students in an unsafe
situation, and students who live near bus stops that were in existence prior to the strict
implementation of the two-mile rule that have been grandfathered.

AR, Little Rock: Choice in 1987, Neighborhood in 1998
Little Rock v. Pulaski, 237 F. Supp. 2d 988 (2002)
In 1987, “LRSD proceeded to develop a ‘controlled choice’ desegregation plan, which
was approved by Judge Woods on February 27, 1987 (docket no. 739). Under this plan,
LRSD was divided into two attendance zones of approximately equal racial balance.
Students were assigned to schools so that each grade at each school reflected the racial
balance within that attendance zone. After a student was assigned to a school, the
student's parents could request reassignment to another school within their attendance
zone. That request would be granted so long as each school would remain within a range
of plus or minus 12.5% of the black student population at the school. The plan also
provided for eight magnet schools (four elementary, two junior high, and two high
schools), with seats reserved for students of each of the three Pulaski County school
districts. The target racial composition of the magnet schools was 50%-50%... The
controlled choice plan was implemented beginning with the 1987-88 school year (docket
no. 670).”
In 1998… “a federal judge's approval of a revised plan authoriz(ed) less busing and more
neighborhood schools in Little Rock.” The newly approved 24-page consent decree
replaced 1989 accord. It authorized administrators to stop assigning students to schools
across town, except in the unlikely event that such busing was needed to prevent a school
from becoming more than 80 percent white.
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CA, Fresno: Neighborhood in 2012
The Initiative in Spatial Structures in Social Sciences (S4) project at Brown University
(Desegregation Court Cases & School Demographic data section). Retrieved from
http://www.s4.brown.edu/schoolsegregation/schoolsegdatapage/codes/schoolseg.asp
Fresno implemented desegregation plans by HEW action. “HEW/OCR action pending
since 1968; notice of intention to initiate formal enforcement proceedings, 1975; ESAA
funds denied, 1977; antibusing amendments preclude further desegregation (per 1978
supplement)”
Fresno Unified School District. (n.d.). Facilities master plan-Final report [PDF documents].
Retrieved from
http://www.fresnounified.org/dept/planning/masterplan/Shared%20Documents/fusd%20master%
20plan-2009-0423.pdf
The district relied on magnet schools and minor non-contiguous zoning (changing middle
school feeder patterns). Elementary and high school students were already assigned to
neighborhood schools. Based on Facilities Master Plan adopted in 2009, Fresno changed
feeder patterns and adjusted school attendance zones in 2012. This change involved grade
reconfiguration of schools as well as new school construction and school closure.

CA, San Diego: SES in 1996
Board of Education v. Superior Court (Carlin), 61 Cal. App. 4th 411; 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562
(1998)
“For over two decades, the superior court has supervised San Diego Unified School
District's voluntary integration plan. In August 1996, the court fixed January 1, 2000,
as the date court supervision would end. A year later the court modified its order to end
supervision on July 1, 1998…” A voluntary integration plan (Voluntary Ethnic
Enrollment Program: VEEP) and the school choice program were implemented under a
desegregation court order. The VEEP program had been renamed to the Voluntary
Enrollment Exchange Program and took a broader view of integration, focusing on
economic disadvantage. In 1996, the district Superintendent Bertha “Pendleton declared
no student is denied classroom placement within a school based solely on race [61 Cal.
App. 4th 417] or ethnicity and no school boundaries have been ‘gerrymandered’ for racial
or ethnic balance purposes.” Later, the district supplemented the VEEP and magnet
programs with a statewide open enrollment program (named ‘Choice’ in California with
no provision of free transportation).
Koedel, C., Betts, J. R., Rice, L. A., & Zau, A. C. (2010). The social cost of open enrollment as a
school choice policy. Working paper No. 0906. University of Missouri. Retrieved from
http://economics.missouri.edu/working-papers/2009/WP0910_koedel.pdf
“The VEEP program was originally designed with the goal of mixing students to make
within-school student populations more representative of the district’s overall racial
diversity. It originated as part of the district’s response to the 1977 Carlin v. Board of
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Education decision, where the California Supreme Court determined that 23 San Diego
schools were racially segregated and ordered the district to integrate them. After
California passed Proposition 209 in 1996, it became illegal to provide programs that
gave racial preferences. The VEEP program continued, but took a broader view of
integration, focusing on economic disadvantage. District-provided busing is available to
students who participate in the VEEP program, and the busing pattern is designed to
move students between less affluent and more affluent neighborhoods. Schools in less
affluent areas are matched to schools in more affluent, predominantly white areas, in
what are called allied patterns. Although any student of any race can apply to attend any
school in the VEEP busing pattern, the pattern is such that student-movement through the
VEEP program should have an integrating effect on the district.
The magnet program was also part of the district’s response to the 1977 court decision,
and it was also designed with integration as an explicit objective. At its inception, the
magnet program typically sought to attract students from primarily white to primarily
non-white areas by offering specialized curricula and additional resources. A few
magnets were established in relatively affluent areas in the hope of attracting students
from less affluent areas. Similarly to VEEP, transportation is provided by the district for
magnet students. Again, while any student can apply to any magnet school, the design of
the magnet program is such that it should also integrate the district” (pp. 2-3).

CA, San Francisco: Neighborhood in 1999; SES in 2001
Asimov, N. (2000, Jan. 7). District oks race-neutral school plan. San Francisco Chronicle.
Retrieved from http://www.sfgate.com/education/article/S-F-District-OKs-Race-Neutral-SchoolPlan-2785679.php
“(B)oard members said they had rejected a plan designed to achieve at least some
integration by considering students’ poverty level, test scores and English language skills.
Instead of using that so-called diversity index, the board decided that children will be
assigned using the same method as for the 1999-2000 school year. Priority will be given
to children who live near a school, have a sibling enrolled at a campus or who live in
certain ZIP code... Until a year ago, school enrollment was governed by ethnic quotas
stemming from the NAACP suit.”
Hendrie, C. (1999, Feb. 24). San Francisco desegregation decree to end. Education Week.
“San Francisco school officials agreed last week to stop using race and ethnicity as
determining factors in assigning students to school... The district will also drop racialbalance guidelines that limit the proportion of students from any single racial or ethnic
group to 40 percent at ‘alternative’ or magnet schools that draw students from around the
city, and to 45 percent at other public schools.”
Kahlenberg, R. D. (2007). Rescuing Brown v. Board of Education: Profiles of twelve school
districts pursuing socioeconomic school integration. NY: Century Foundation.
“In April, 2001, the San Francisco School Board adopted a new student assignment plan,
which replaced a racial desegregation scheme with one that seeks socioeconomic
diversity. Under the new plan, the district began using a seven-part definition, including
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socioeconomic status (has the student participated in free/reduced lunch, Calworks, or
public housing?); academic achievement (has the student scored below the thirtieth
percentile on Stanford 9?); mothers educational background (has she had post–high
school education?); student’s language status (limited English or not proficient?); quality
of students prior school (lowest ranking in California Academic Performance Index?);
students home language (other than English?); and residence in different geographic area.
…San Francisco has a 100 percent choice system, and students apply to schools at the
beginning of elementary, middle, and high school, rather than being assigned based on
the neighborhood in which they live… At the same time, 81 percent of families get
receive one of their choices of schools, 63 percent their first choice…”
CO, Denver: Neighborhood in 1996
McQuillan, P. J., & Englert, K. S. (2000). Return to neighborhood schools, concentrated poverty,
and educational opportunity: An agenda for reform. Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 28,
739-770.
“In Denver, Colorado federal courts declared the city school system unitary in 1996 after
busing students for over twenty years. Busing was halted for elementary schools that year
and for secondary schools the following year” (p. 739).
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, 902 F. Supp. 1274 (1995)
“The Colorado Constitution does not prohibit all busing. What is prohibited is assignment
and transportation of public school pupils according to a preconceived plan of racial
mixture.”

DE, Brandywine: SES in 2002
Delaware State Board of Education (2002, March 28). Decision. In Re: Neighborhood School
Plans of Delmar, Seaford, Appoquinimink, Colonial, Christina, Red Clay Consolidated and
Brandywine School Districts.
“The boundaries of the attendance areas in the Brandywine Plan continue to be primarily
a function of existing school capacity and of the neighborhoods in which the schools sit.
(Brandywine X- 36-37). The boundaries have also been adjusted to account for poverty.
Using household income data, students living in the District’s poorest neighborhoods are
assigned to attend schools in wealthier, usually suburban, areas. (Brandywine X-36-37).
Because poverty within the District is concentrated in the City of Wilmington, City
students in grades K-3 are assigned to attend schools in the suburbs. (Id.; Voter’s Guide
at page 14.) Two of the District’s three intermediate schools are located in the City. As a
result, most City students are assigned to their neighborhood school in grades 4-6;
students in the District’s north-west suburbs attend school in the City for these grades.
Middle and high school assignments follow a similar pattern, with students from the
City’s low-income neighborhoods attending schools in the suburbs. (Id.) Adjusting
attendance areas for poverty allows the District to maintain the FRL percentage in each of
its schools to a range of 16 to 47% of the school’s student population” (p. 51).
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Kahlenberg, R. D. (2007). Rescuing Brown v. Board of Education: Profiles of twelve school
districts pursuing socioeconomic school integration. NY: Century Foundation.
"In 2000, however, the Delaware State legislature passed the Neighborhood Schools Act,
mandating neighborhood school assignments and prohibiting student assignment based
on race. Brandywine responded by proposing to the state board, in November 2001, that
the school district be allowed to use a flexible student assignment plan which would keep
all schools between 16 percent and 47 percent low income, as opposed to a neighborhood
assignment plan which would have increased ranges from 6 percent to 73 percent low
income… In March 2002, the Delaware State Board of Education approved
Brandywine’s non-neighborhood assignment plan as a justified exception to a state law
generally favoring neighborhood schools."

DE, Christina: SES in 2002; Neighborhood in 2008
Delaware State Board of Education (2002, March 28). Decision. In Re: Neighborhood School
Plans of Delmar, Seaford, Appoquinimink, Colonial, Christina, Red Clay Consolidated and
Brandywine School Districts.
"As part of its plan, Christian replaced a June 1996 policy that balanced student
population by racial compositions with revised Student Enrollment Guidelines that
require school populations to be within plus or minus 20% of the district's average
socioeconomic status ratio for the grades offered at the school" (p. 27).
Delaware State Board of Education (2003, March 20). Decision and Order: Appoquinimink,
Christina School Districts Resubmitted Neighborhood School Plans. In Re: Neighborhood
School Plans of Delmar, Seaford, Appoquinimink, Colonial, Christina, Red Clay Consolidated
and Brandywine School Districts.
“There is no indication that the Preferred Plan assigns any student to school on the basis
of race, or considers the racial composition of the schools in making student assignments.
The Preferred Plan does modify student assignment policies to create school populations
that are within plus or minus 20% of the District’s average socioeconomic status ratio for
the grades offered at the school (p. 15).”
Delaware State Board of Education (2008, Feb. 21). Decision: In Re: Neighborhood School
Plans of the Christina School Districts.
“Christina’s proposed attendance zones for assigning students to its elementary schools
are a function of geographic distance, natural neighborhood boundaries, and capacity of
the schools. Where, however, to do so would result in overcrowding or under-utilization,
the District has attempted to balance enrollment to take into consideration these concerns
and allow some space for growth at each site. If all students were assigned to the
elementary school closest to their home, for example, Leasure and Marshall Elementary
Schools would be at 155% and 215% of capacity respectively while McVey and Jones
would be at 41% and 48% respectively” (pp. 10-11).

DE, Colonial: Neighborhood in 2001
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Delaware State Board of Education (2002, March 28). Decision. In Re: Neighborhood School
Plans of Delmar, Seaford, Appoquinimink, Colonial, Christina, Red Clay Consolidated and
Brandywine School Districts.
"The Plan’s K-5 grade configuration and attendance areas were implemented this school
year, in September 2001, with the opening of Southern Elementary” (p. 20). “Once target
enrollments were set for each school, the District began drawing attendance areas,
beginning with schools where closest-to-home assignments and neighborhood boundaries
were easily identifiable” (p. 21). “The District’s Plan eliminates bus rides for some
students, and reduces it for others” (p. 22).

DE, Red Clay Consolidated: Choice in 1995
Delaware State Board of Education (2002, March 28). Decision. In Re: Neighborhood School
Plans of Delmar, Seaford, Appoquinimink, Colonial, Christina, Red Clay Consolidated and
Brandywine School Districts.
"(T)he District's existing choice program guarantees every student a seat in their feeder
pattern school, yet is still able to accommodate the school preferences of most students
filing choice applications” (p. 43). “Red Clay's Neighborhood School Plan relies entirely
on a choice system to decide where students will go to school. Geography plays a role in
the process, but it is geography based on feeder patterns rather than a closest-to-home
analysis… the District would only ‘assign’ students to schools when they do not submit a
choice application. Choicing students are guaranteed only that they will receive a seat in
their feeder pattern school: by definition, this will not be the closest school to their homes
for at least some grades" (p. 44).
Other sources (Summary of several articles of Delaforum). Retrieved from
http://www.delaforum.com/ARCHIVE/Archive%20contents.htm
Students have been required to choose high schools since 1995, and no one has been
denied his or her first choice. At the high school level, where enrollment has been under
the choice plan for several years, all students who apply on time get their first choice. The
choice programs has also applied to elementary students since 2001. The General
Assembly in DE in the 1990s enacted a law which permits students and parents to attend
any public school in the state.

FL, Broward County: Neighborhood in 1995
Hirschman, B. (1995, July 4). School busing in court’s hands, Attorneys ask judge to evaluate
district’s desegregation efforts. Sun Sentinel. Retrieved from http://articles.sunsentinel.com/1995-07-04/news/9507040023_1_district-s-desegregation-desegregation-lawsuitdesegregation-policies
“The motion rejects the School Board's June 20 vote to stick with a plan that would take
three years to eliminate all starbursting - the practice of busing black children from one
neighborhood to as many as eight different schools to further desegregation. Starbursting
affected 5,454 children in 19 neighborhoods being bused to 64 schools, school records
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show… The School Board in recent months took steps to bring about 1,700 of the
starburst children home to neighborhood schools next year.”
Talalay, S. (1995, Dec. 6). Finally, a plan to end Starbursting, Groups: Black students should get
to choose schools. Sun Sentinel. Retrieved from http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1995-1206/news/9512060023_1_neighborhood-schools-new-middle-school-school-board
“For the first time in a quarter of a century, all black children in Broward County would
be allowed to return to neighborhood schools next year, under recommendations by
community groups released on Tuesday. The school boundary recommendations would
end starbursting, the practice of scattering black children from one neighborhood to
desegregate several far-flung schools. The proposals, which are in line with a School
Board promise to end the practice known as starbursting, would allow black students to
attend their assigned schools or to return to their neighborhood schools.”
Citizens concerned about Our Children v. Broward, 966 F. Supp. 1166 (1997)
“The School Board claims that it has ended both the practice of starbursting and the
practice of assigning children to magnet programs on the basis of race...”
Hendrie, C. (1998, June 10). New magnet school policies sidestep an old issue: Race.
Education Week.
After a federal judge unexpectedly ended the 224,000-student district's desegregation
order in 1996, officials scrambled to devise a less race-conscious policy for magnet
schools that they felt would stand up in court. They came up with a plan in which half
the slots in programs with more applicants than seats are filled through a strictly
random lottery. Then a second drawing is held in which students from groups that
were underrepresented in the first lottery are given extra chances. The categories
considered include not just race and ethnicity, but also socioeconomic background,
special needs, and English fluency.

FL, Duval County: Neighborhood in 1991
Jim Saunders, J. & MacDonaldm M. (1997, July, 22). Schools, NAACP: Opening shots. The
Florida Times-Union. Retrieved from http://jacksonville.com/tuonline/stories/072297/2b1deseg.html
“Former Superintendent Larry Zenke is expected to testify that the school system has
made progress by using magnet schools, which offer specialized programs that try to
attract students to schools outside their neighborhoods. The magnet schools, part of the
1990 agreement, replaced Duval County's former system of involuntary busing.”
NAACP v. Duval, Case No. 85-316-Civ-J-10C (1999)
“The District shall be administratively divided into seven zones. In zones I-V, the parties
agree that, commencing with the 1991-92 school year, each school shall have as its
desegregative goal the enrollment of at least 20% black students and 45% white students
[that is, a black student enrollment of 20% to 55%]. In zones VI and VII, the district
plans to operate each school within +/- 10% of the zone-wide racial composition at its
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grade organizational level. The district shall take steps to the maximum extent practicable
to achieve these goals. (Doc. 86, P 3, 4).
Zones I through V, as configured by the Board pursuant to this mandate, comprise the
majority of the geographic area of Duval County and contain the most schools. Zones VI
and VII are located in the outer geographic areas of the County -- the beaches area and
the far west section. The Board created and implemented all seven attendance zones at
the beginning of the 1990-91 school year, and they remain in use today. The zoning
requirement of the Agreement has therefore been met.
In addition to establishing attendance zones, the parties agreed to define percentage goals
for the racial composition of the student body at each elementary school. Specifically, for
schools located in Zones I through V, the Agreement set a goal of at least 20% and no
more than 55% black enrollment. In the 1990-91 school year, the first year of the
Agreement's operation, 88 elementary schools were located in Zones I through V. Of
these schools, 27 enrolled a student population that was more than 55% black. See Def.
Exh. 96. The following school year, in accordance with the Agreement, the Board
eliminated its system of mandatory busing and implemented its magnet programs. That
year, the number of elementary schools located in Zones I through V with a black student
enrollment in excess of 55% increased from 27 to 30, a circumstance that must surely
have been within the contemplation of the parties as a natural consequence of the
elimination of mandatory busing.”

FL, Hillsborough County: Choice in 2004
Ave, M. (2003, Nov. 15). School choice debuts. St, Petersburg Times. Retrieved from
http://www.sptimes.com/2003/11/15/Hillsborough/School_choice_debuts.shtml
“The choice plan, an alternative to assigning children to neighborhood schools, will
eventually end three decades of busing for desegregation. It begins next fall, in the 20042005 school year, but families must make their choices in the next two months if they
want to participate. Its main purpose? To keep schools racially diverse without busing.
Applications and 11-page booklets will be mailed next week to the 50,000 students
eligible to participate in the choice plan's inaugural year, about one-third of the county's
180,000 enrollment. Though most students don't have to choose, thousands are eligible.
Most students can stay at their current schools without filling out an application. The only
ones who must indicate whether they are staying or going elsewhere are the 14,000 who
are bused for desegregation. If they don't, school officials will pick one for them. The
goal is for black children to pick schools in white neighborhoods and white children to
attend schools in black neighborhoods because of special course offerings such as magnet
programs. The plan pairs seven regions, which are large, mostly suburban and rural areas,
with corresponding zones - urban areas from which minority children have been bused in
the past. The plan offers school choice to students of neighborhood schools in zones if
they are entering kindergarten, sixth and ninth grades. And it lets students of all grades
choose if they live in urban ‘zones’ and attend neighborhood schools or live in satellite
areas and have been bused for desegregation… Students are not guaranteed their first
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choice, but will be assigned by a computerized lottery based on where they live and space
available in their chosen schools. Race will not be a consideration, but preference will be
given to students who live in regions who apply to zone schools and zone students who
apply to region schools.”
Ave, M. (2005, June 23). Board broadens school choice. Tampa Bay Times. Retrieved from
http://www.sptimes.com/2005/06/23/Hillsborough/Board_broadens_school.shtml
“Until now, the opportunity to choose a school within a certain region was available only
to incoming suburban kindergarteners, sixth-graders, ninth-graders and all students living
in urban neighborhoods. The expanded plan goes into effect in 2006-07, but can only be
used at schools with available space. The application period will run from Oct. 3 to Dec.
12. A random computerized lottery will assign children to schools.”
FL, Lee County: Choice in 1998; Neighborhood in 2005
Willie, C. V., Edwards, R., & Alves, M. J. (2002). Student diversity, choice and school
improvement. Greenwood Publishing Group.
“Lee County launched a comprehensive Controlled Choice plan in 1998… The student
assignment plan is designed to give parents the opportunity to make selections from a
wide range of school offerings. The plan is phased in through kindergarten in elementary
school, grade 6 in middle school, and grade 9 in high school. The Lee county School
District is organized into three large geographic choice zones: West Lee County, South
Lee County, and East Lee County. Each zone contains several elementary schools, two to
four middle schools, and two to three high schools… Parents and students list their
preferences, in rank-order within their choice zone and for district-wide magnet schools.
Students are assigned to schools where space exists and according to racial and ethnic
diversity guidelines, sibling and proximity preferences are honored” (pp. 9-10).
St. Petersburg Times. (2005, Jan. 29). Reflecting on Choice. Retrieved from
http://www.sptimes.com/2005/01/29/news_pf/Opinion/Reflecting_on_choice.shtml
“Lee County, which began its choice plan before Pinellas, was removed from court
supervision this year… Lee's choice zones were further subdivided in an attempt to
reduce busing costs and give families more choices close to home. Lee will have nine
subzones... Lee also gives a neighborhood preference to every family within roughly two
miles of a school... Most significantly, Lee will continue to use racial ratios in
assignment… Says Lee planning director Mike Smith: ‘There is nothing legal or illegal
about it. If we're challenged, we'll deal with it then.’”
The School Board of Lee County. (n.d.). Plan for student assignment.
“The Plan continues to use choice as the heart of the student assignment method. It
responds to the clear desire of some Lee County families to have more school options
closer to home and to avoid being required to have their child attend a school distant from
home. By dividing the large Choice Zones into smaller sub-zones, The Plan responds to
the desires of many families to reduce the ride time for their children… The District
began implementation of The Plan in the Fall of 2005 for the 2005-06 school year. As
required, the District has reviewed the success of The Plan in each year of
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implementation. For example, changes made in the implementation of The Plan for 200607 provided the possibilities for waiving the non-contiguous sub-zone assignment
principle under certain circumstances and implemented the sub-zone preference as an
additional assignment factor” (pp. 9-10).
St. Petersburg Times. (2005, Jan. 29). Reflecting on Choice. Retrieved from
http://www.sptimes.com/2005/01/29/news_pf/Opinion/Reflecting_on_choice.shtml
“Lee also gives a neighborhood preference to every family within roughly two miles of a
school; Pinellas' preference is a fraction of that. Most significantly, Lee will continue to
use racial ratios in assignment. Pinellas, at the instruction of its board attorney, will not.”

FL, Orange County: Neighborhood in 1996
Orlando Sentinel. (2014). Orange County desegregation timeline.
“(1996) Orange County wins court approval in July to stop busing more than 3,700
students, many of them black. The move makes four schools essentially all-black again.
About 2,000 students continue to be bused under court order.”
Sneed, M. (2008, May). Unitary status: A process, Orange County Public Schools Governance
Committee [PowerPoint slides]. Hogan & Hartson LLP. Retrieved from
https://www.ocps.net/sb/Documents/May%2014%20OCPS%20Unitary%20Status%20Presentati
on.pdf
“June 1996 order approved rezoning to reduce busing and island zones (slide 8).”
“In 1996, OCPS informed the Court of initiatives that would be implemented as four
schools impacted by rezoning (slide 28).”
Hobbs, E. (2010, Jan. 26). Historic moment: Orange school board approves desegregation
settlement. Orlando Sentinel.
“The agreement leaves many desegregation-era practices -- such as cross-town busing -in place and focuses heavily on upgrading the technology and buildings of old schools in
black neighborhoods… Under the plan, the School Board will agree to rush the
renovations of 17 schools, most of them in low-income black neighborhoods, and vow
not to close them unless an emergency situation warranted it. The board also promised to
set new recruitment goals for hiring minority teachers, while actively ensuring equal
access to all of its extracurricular activities.”
FL, Palm Beach County: Choice in 2000
Edwards, K. I., Hudnell, I. E., Newton, M. S. & Raing, D. G. R. (2004). Historical timeline of
black education in Palm Beach County Florida. The Ipet-Isut Historical Preservation
Foundation. Retrieved from
http://www.palmbeachschools.org/sc/AfricanAmericanStudies/documents/BrownvBoardPBCTi
meline.pdf
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“(1989) Palm Beach County creates magnets at S.D. Spady Elementary and Atlantic High
schools in Delray Beach, Suncoast High in Riviera Beach and the School of the Arts in
West Palm Beach.
(1990) The Supreme Court rules that districts may end forced busing... It gives the county
two years to fix the problem, then extends the deadline to 1995. The Office for Civil
Rights notifies the Palm Beach County School District that it was ‘in violation of Title VI
as it relates to the assignment of students to schools and the provision of educational
services at predominantly Black schools.’ Magnet programs are established to correct the
violation.
(1991) Palm Beach County School officials unveil programs to create integrated
neighborhoods so schools can become racially balanced without busing.
(1999) The Office for Civil Rights stops monitoring schools in Palm Beach County,
saying the district had taken appropriate steps.
(2000) The District’s open enrollment plan was implemented as the ‘Riviera Beach
Community Choice’ Plan.
(2002) Palm Beach County school district stops busing Black students from Delray
Beach and Boynton Beach into the suburbs, eliminating the last remnant of the 1970s
desegregation efforts."
Barszewski, L. (1994, Nov. 18). ‘Controlled choice' school plan debated. Linking West Boca,
Delray students could give area required black percentage. Sun Sentinel. Retrieved from
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1994-11-18/news/9411171059_1_choice-program-palm-beachcounty-school-district
“If ‘controlled choice’ comes to Palm Beach County schools, children in the Delray
Beach and Boca Raton areas could be choosing from among schools up to 20 miles from
their homes. The choice would give parents a range of options about where to send their
children, but there is no guarantee they would get their first - or even fifth - choice. The
school district is considering creating a controlled choice program over the next five
years to satisfy a 1990 desegregation agreement with the federal Office for Civil
Rights… Palm Beach County is not under a court order, and it buses only about 6,000 of
its 126,000 students for integration reasons… The current proposal would divide the
county into four or five geographic zones, each having black student populations of
between 18 percent and 38 percent. By linking schools west of Boca Raton with those in
Delray Beach, the district would just barely clear the 18 percent hurdle. The 22 schools in
the Delray Beach-Boca Raton area have 5,163 black students and an overall student
population of 27,745, which makes the area's student population 18.6 percent black. One
of the ideas behind controlled choice is to improve programs at all schools as they
compete for students, Zabik said… The proposal calls for an International Baccalaureate
program at Glades Central High School, which officials said would draw white students
from the Wellington-Royal Palm Beach area.”
Travis, S. (2014, March 8). Palm Beach County schools consider full choice. Sun Sentinel.
Retrieved from http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2014-03-08/news/fl-palm-school-choice20140305_1_choice-programs-choice-schools-palm-beach-county-schools
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“The district's choice programs, formerly known as magnet programs, were created in the
1980s specifically for desegregation… Students are assigned to neighborhood schools but
can also apply to more than 52 other schools, including the high-performing Nova
schools; College Academy, which offers all college-level courses; and Dillard High,
which offers arts and finance academies.”

FL, Pinellas County: Choice in 2003; Neighborhood in 2007
Hegarty, S. & Oppel, S. (1998, Aug. 16). Federal oversight tough to end. St. Petersburg Times.
Retrieved from http://www.sptimes.com/SouthPinellas/81698/Federal_oversight_tou.html
"If oversight ends, the School Board has said it will end busing for desegregation. But
that doesn't mean all busing would end. About 42 percent -- or 45,851 -- of Pinellas
students in pre-kindergarten through 12th grade are bused to school. But only 14 percent
of them, or 6,419, are bused to meet race ratios; the majority ride for other reasons, such
as distance or hazardous walking conditions..."
Bennett, K. (2003). Pinellas school desegregation: A chronology. St. Petersburg Times.
Retrieved from http://www.sptimes.com/2003/05/21/Tampabay/Pinellas_school_deseg.shtml
“Oct. 25, 2000: The School Board approves a choice plan that will end traditional school
zoning in the 2003-04 school year. It votes to split the county into four areas for
elementary schools, three areas for middle schools and one for high schools. Students
will apply to attend a school in their area.”
Logan, M. (2004, April 2). District pleased with school choice result. But only a fraction of those
eligible for the controlled choice program decide to attend new schools. St. Petersburg Times.
Retrieved from http://www.sptimes.com/2004/04/02/Hillsborough/District_pleased_with.shtml
“Hillsborough's choice plan, unlike the one in Pinellas County, does not ask students to
apply to attend the school near where they live.”
St. Petersburg Times. (2005, Jan. 29). Reflecting on Choice. Retrieved from
http://www.sptimes.com/2005/01/29/news_pf/Opinion/Reflecting_on_choice.shtml
“Pinellas, by contrast, has almost twice the number of students and only one zone for
high schools. Lee also gives a neighborhood preference to every family within roughly
two miles of a school; Pinellas' preference is a fraction of that. Most significantly, Lee
will continue to use racial ratios in assignment. Pinellas, at the instruction of its board
attorney, will not.”
St. Petersburg Times. (2007, June 29). Racial Integration in Pinellas and Hillsborough Schools.
Retrieved from http://www.sptimes.com/2007/06/29/Southpinellas/Racial_integration_in.shtml
“(2003) The choice plan begins. For the first four years, it will be very much like the old
busing plan, with a rule that no school is more than 42 percent black. The first four years
are called ‘controlled choice.’
(2007) Controlled choice ends in May, and for the first time since 1971, the district will
not use race when assigning students to schools. School officials begin work on a new
plan.”
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FL, Polk County: Choice in 1992
Bridges, C. (n.d.). Polk County Schools Magnet/Choice Enrollment Plan [PowerPoint slides].
Office of Magnet, Choice and Charter Schools. A Magnet School Assistance Program (MSAP)
Project. Retrieved from http://www.polkfl.net/districtinfo/departments/schoolbased/schoolchoice/documents/SiblingOptions120611.pdf
In the 1980s, the district used fixed attendance zones within municipal areas (slide A3).
Since the 1990s, the district has expanded magnet and choice schools using large
attendance zones and implemented controlled open enrollment (slide A3). According to a
1992 consent order (slide A5), eight magnet schools were created in four Polk County
geographic areas. Students were admitted to magnet schools by choice within larger
attendance zones, but student selection was controlled to achieve desegregation.
Admission was determined via lottery, and there were no prerequisite admission
requirements. The district practiced limited neighborhood priority to maximize minority
student school choices. Student transportation was provided by school district to support
diverse enrollment. By the 2000 final order, the district opened new middle and
elementary schools in Winter Haven and completed permanent arts facilities at Jewett
School of the Arts (slide A6).
Dunn, A. (2004, May 17). Historic school ruling issued 50 years ago. The Ledger. Retrieved
from http://www.theledger.com/article/20040517/NEWS/405170379?p=4&tc=pg
“Today, Polk County tries to maintain racial balance with a goal of keeping black
enrollment at each school between 15 percent and 40 percent.”

GA, Muscogee County: Neighborhood in 1992
Lockett v. Muscogee, 111 F. 3d 839 (1997)
“Toward the end of the 1970s, the school board began reducing the number of student
reassignments and attendance zone adjustments… By the mid-1980s, the racial
compositions within many of the schools were disproportionate with the county-wide
student racial composition, and by 1991, several racially identifiable schools existed…
(T)he school board implemented a neighborhood-school plan that eliminated crossdistrict busing and called for students to be assigned to local neighborhood-schools. The
school board also proposed magnet programs and majority-to-minority transfer programs
to off-set any negative impact that the neighborhood assignment plan might have on
racial composition within the schools… (T)he school board implemented a majority to
minority transfer program in 1992 to offset any racial impact that the neighborhood
assignment plan could have.”

IN, Fort Wayne: Choice in 1988
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U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. (1979). Equal opportunity in Fort Wayne Community Schools:
A reassessment. Retrieved from
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/cr12sch625.pdf
“The settlement provided that no children would be involuntarily bused although optional
elementary school transfers would be encouraged. In addition, magnet schools would be
created… some aspects of the settlement agreement have been implemented, in particular
the voluntary transfer plan” (p. 5). “In a December 1977 settlement agreement, the FWCS
agreed not to transfer involuntarily any student to a school outside his or her usual
attendance area for the purpose of achieving racial balance in the elementary grades, but
did agree to open magnet schools in the central city” (p. 15).
Parents for Quality Education with Integration Incorporated v. Fort Wayne, 728 F. Supp. 1373
(1990)
“The racial balance plan will rely primarily on voluntary methods... In establishing
and maintaining magnet schools, FWCS will retain neighborhood attendance areas
for the purpose of giving priority in admission into a magnet school to children of
that attendance area. Such priorities are subject, however, to the dominant concerns
of affording parents choices based on interest and maintaining racial balance in the
magnet schools. Any child displaced by creation of a magnet school will be given
priority into any other magnet school or program. FWCS will provide aggregate
openings in its magnet schools to black students at least proportionate to the number
of black students in the elementary schools… No admission requirements will be
imposed for entrance to magnets, other than interest and racial balance
considerations…
The system-wide racial balance goal is 15 percent to 45 percent black (and 55
percent to 85 percent white) but full compliance and performance will be deemed to
exist so long as no school falls below the 10 percent black range and no more than
three schools fall into the 45 percent to 50 percent black range…
Fall 1988: MAP 1. Croninger and Young converted to magnet schools; magnet
programs instituted at Waynedale and Franke Parke; Memorial Park closed.
Fall 1989: MAP 2. Irwin converted to magnet school, and magnet programs
instituted at Price, Holland and Washington Center schools.
Fall 1990: MAP 3. Bunche or Ward converted to a magnet school, and three magnet
schools or programs instituted at predominantly white schools.
Fall 1991: MAP 4. Remaining predominantly black school, Ward or Bunche,
converted to magnet school, and additional magnet programs instituted at remaining
predominantly white schools, as necessary to meet the racial balance goals specified
in Section 6.”
IN, Indianapolis: Neighborhood in 1999
Wilma L. M. (2011). Indianapolis public schools desegregation case collection, 1971-1999.
Collection #0749. William Henry Smith Memorial Library. Retrieved from
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http://www.indianahistory.org/our-collections/collection-guides/indianapolis-public-schoolsdesegregation-case.pdf
“In June 1998 a settlement was reached between IPS, suburban township schools, and
government agencies when Dillin approved an agreement that would phase out busing of
inner city black students to township schools by 2017… Within the school systems in
townships with an African American population of 20% or more, the phase-out would
begin in the fall 1999. School systems in townships less than 20% African American
would begin phase-out in the school year, 2004–05.”
Hendrie, C. (1998, July 8). In Indianapolis, Nashville, a new era dawns. Education Week.
“In Indianapolis, the busing of some 5,500 black students from the inner city to nearby
suburbs will be phased out one grade per year under the deal approved by U.S. District
Judge S, Hugh Dillin… For at least one of the six suburban districts involved in the
transfer program, the 13-year phaseout will start in the fall of 1999.”

KS, Kansas City: Neighborhood in 1997
United States v. Kansas City, 974 F. Supp. 1367 (1997)
In 1997, Kansas City adopted redistricting and district improvement plans. The
redistricting plan eliminated the three sets of paired elementary schools so that students in
those attendance areas could attend their neighborhood schools. It also eliminated middle
and high school non-contiguous attendance boundaries in the northeast area so that
students assigned to ‘pure’ feeder patterns from elementary to middle to high school. It
eliminated racial balance transfers at the middle school level and changed eligibility
standards for such transfers for elementary students. New magnet schools were also built.
“1. Designates the Wyandotte High School cluster (Wyandotte High School,
Central and Northwest middle schools, and Banneker, Chelsea, Douglass, Fairfax,
Hawthorne, Mark Twain, M.D. Pearson, Roosevelt, and Whittier Elementary
Schools) as the first set of schools for implementation of First Things First and a
project emphasizing mathematics, science, and technology. Other schools, by
cluster, will follow over a three-year period. The Wyandotte High School science
lab, along with science labs in the other high schools in the district, will also be
remodeled to meet the rigorous standards of a revised curriculum.
2. Transforms Banneker Elementary School into a magnet school emphasizing
science and technology in order to attract a more diverse student body.
3. Establishes, by the year 2000, a magnet program at Northwest Middle School.
This program is designed to supplement the magnet properties of the Banneker
magnet program and, together with Wyandotte High School, provides an integrated
science and technology curriculum from K-12, Banneker through Wyandotte.
4. Eliminates the three sets of ‘paired’ elementary schools - Banneker and M.E.
Pearson; Douglass and Frances Willard; and Grant and John Fiske. Students in
those attendance areas will now attend their neighborhood schools. Banneker will
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be transformed into a science and technology neighborhood/magnet school.
Douglass will continue its participation in the Basic Schools program, enhancing
the educational opportunities for those students. Through redistricting, Grant will
become an integrated, and indeed racially balanced, neighborhood school.
5. Eliminates middle and high school non-contiguous attendance boundaries in the
northeast area. Throughout the District, students will be assigned to ‘pure’ feeder
patterns from elementary to middle to high school…
8. Eliminates racial balance transfers at the middle school level and changes
eligibility standards for such transfers for elementary students.”
KS, Wichita: Neighborhood in 2008
Wegbreit, D. (2008, Apr. 1). Wichita, Kan., to end desegregation busing. School Transportation
News. Retrieved from http://www.stnonline.com/resources/government/related-governmentarticles/1674-wichita-kan-to-end-desegregation-busing
“Starting this fall, students formerly bused out of the predominately African-American
area in the northeast part of the city will be assigned to new schools in their
neighborhood. The district will also dismantle a lottery system that bused some white
students to the predominantly African-American area for one year of elementary school.
Both groups will be allowed to continue attending their original schools — with
transportation — for the remainder of their time in the district. Darren Mucci, division
director of operations, said the district decided to end the program it had voluntarily
established in 1971 after hearing the Supreme Court ruling in the Seattle and Jefferson
County, Ky., school assignment cases…
Under the tentative plan, 16 of the 27 magnets are ‘neighborhood magnets,’ meaning they
allow all students to attend but reserve as many as half of seats for neighborhood
students. Of these, four are in the predominantly African-American area. According to
the district spokesman Susan Arensman, the district has no plan to redraw these
boundaries as part of their post-desegregation plan. But if the district does not look at
either redrawing boundaries or giving all students equal access to all the magnet schools,
Myles said future generations of Wichita students could have segregated educational
experiences like the ‘hyper-segregated’ Cleveland schools he attended.
According to Wendy Johnson, a district spokeswoman, desegregation busing was a small
part of the district’s transportation operation. Of the 19,500 daily riders, fewer than 2,100
students — 1,570 African American and 500 Caucasian — were bused this year due to
the desegregation plan. Far more — 6,200 — were bused to magnets. Proponents of the
plan say these magnets will be the main tool in the diversity that existed under the old
program.”

KY, Jefferson County (Louisville): Rezoning/Pair in 1975; Neighborhood in 1991; SES
2008
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Orfield, G. (2014). Foreword. In Niemeyer, A. (2014). The courts, the legislature, and
Delaware’s resegregation. A report on school segregation in Delaware, 1989-2010. Report. The
Civil Rights Project. Retrieved from http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12education/integration-and-diversity/courts-the-legislature-and-delawaresresegregation/niemeyer-courts-legislature-delaware-school.pdf
“..one of the only two states where the federal courts ordered a district merger and full
desegregation of what had been separate school districts in a large metropolitan area,
Wilmington [in Delaware] became a test of the possibility and durability of city-suburban
desegregation policies… This happened in only one other major metropolitan area—
Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky… In fact, the district and community remain so
committed to desegregation that they recently came up a new plan when the Supreme
Court overturned the former one” (p. 6).
Hampton v. Jefferson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 753 (1999)
“In 1991, the Board eliminated the alphabet plan and mandatory busing entirely and
instituted a student choice system. See Stipulated Exhibit # 19, Detailed Description of
the District's Managed Choice Student Assignment Plan, at 1 (not dated). In 1996, the
Board adopted the current plan… A lengthy process of expert consultation and public
input shaped formulation of the 1996 ‘managed choice’ plan.
The 1996 ‘managed choice’ plan which allowed students to choose from schools near
their homes subject to the receiving school's capacity, as long as such assignment would
not cause the school's percentage of black students to fall below 15% or rise above 50%.
The racial guidelines influence several points of the student assignment process. First, the
guidelines shape attendance boundaries that determine ‘resides’ areas. Each student has a
‘resides school’ serving his or her home address. This school is the default school for
assignment purposes. The Board assigns a student to the resides school unless: (1) the
student gains admission to another school through the application process, (2) the student
has a special programmatic need, (3) the student's resides school is at capacity, or (4) the
‘student's placement would cause the resides school to be out of compliance with the
District's racial composition guidelines.’”
Day, R. (2012, Aug. 21). No JCPS neighborhood school ruling today. The Courier-Journal.
Retrieved from http://theprincipal.blogspot.com/2012/08/no-jcps-neighborhood-school-rulingtoday.html
“The board adopted a new plan in 2008 that looked at race, income, and education levels
of students' neighborhoods when assigning children to schools. But it has spent the past
four years making changes to that plan after hearing numerous complaints from parents
over long bus rides and the lack of access to neighborhood schools.”
Maxwell, L. A. (2014, May 14). Ky. district 'keeps faith' on school desegregation. Education
Week.
“The goal in Jefferson County is to ensure that all 155 schools hit a mark that falls within
the district's diversity index, which means, ideally, that no school will be filled with too
many children from a Category 1 census block, which has higher-than-average numbers
of nonwhites, poor families, and adults who didn't graduate from high school or go on to
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college. Currently, 95 percent of schools fall within the diversity index set by the school
board, Mr. Rodosky said.”

LA, Caddo Parish: SES-Voluntary in 2006
Cavalier v. Caddo, 403 F.3d 246 (2005)
The use of race in magnet school admission decision was ruled unconstitutional. The
district did not achieve unitary status in terms of other student assignment (such as
voluntary majority-to-minority transfer) but achieved unitary of magnet schools in 2000.
Hendrie, C. (2005, March 23). Appeals court rejects district's magnet policy. Education Week.
“A federal district court had ended its oversight of the magnet school in 1990, the
appellate majority found, even though the district as a whole was not declared ‘unitary,’
or free of the remnant of its segregated past.”
Caddo Parish School Board. (n.d.). Student assignment processes and policies.
Caddo removed race consideration in magnet admission but started considering
socioeconomic factors beginning at Oct. 2005. Race is still used for the majority-tominority voluntary transfer.

LA, East Baton Rouge Parish: Neighborhood in 1996; SES in 2007
Stone, F. A. (1992). Public school desegregation/redesign: A case study in East Baton Rouge
Parish, Louisiana. Urban Education Reports Number Fourteen. Connecticut University.
“(T)he cluster system was established by Judge John Parker's 1981 court order. It created
ten clusters made up of thirty-five schools in EBRP. The clusters are groups of three or
four schools that have been brought together. The aim is to get white students to attend
predominantly black schools, and blacks to go to formerly all-white institutions. A black
child in Eden Park, for example, could be bused to Broadmoor, a school in a white
neighborhood. Travel in the reverse direction could also be mandated” (p. 70).
Watson, J. E. (2002). Quest for unitary status: The East Baton Rough Parish School
Desegregation Case. Louisiana Law Review, 62(3), 953-989.
“On August 2, 1996, the district court approved the 1996 Consent Decree after both the
Board and the plaintiffs agreed to the provisions of the new plan... the new plan contained
eight major provisions, including provisions addressing community sensitive attendance
zones and facility enhancements at ‘racially identifiable schools’” (p. 956). “Under the
1996 Decree, the Board has a duty to open and maintain thirty-three magnet schools,
advertise these magnet schools, increase their minority enrollment, and fund this program
with a minimum of 5.7 million dollars” (p. 974).
Cowen Institute. (2010). Louisiana desegregation case studies: East Baton Rough, West Carroll,
and Tangipahoa. Tulane University. Retrieved from http://www.coweninstitute.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/08/Louisiana-Desegregation-Case-Studies.pdf
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“1981-1996: Desegregation through mandatory busing… This plan remained in effect
until 1996… In 2003, both the Baker and Zachary communities split from EBRPSS to
form their own school systems. Likewise, the Central Community left the EBRPSS to
form its own school system in 2007. The new Central Community School District took a
sizeable proportion of EBRPSS’s white students, decreasing the percentage of white
students in EBRPSS to 11% in the fall of 2007. And, since the district is no longer under
a desegregation order, the remedies available to the district to maintain racial balance are
limited. By law, a district no longer under a desegregation order is prohibited from using
racial quotas or any other racial criteria to maintain desegregation (EBRPSS had been
using racial criteria to ensure diversity within its magnet schools). However, in an effort
to maintain diversity, the district currently uses socioeconomic status in magnet school
admissions criteria. Additionally, although the school board freed itself from the federal
court’s restrictions, the state of Louisiana has found the board’s management of the
district to be unsatisfactory. Currently, the state runs seven charter schools within the
district, has management agreements with four schools, and has memoranda of
understanding with another three schools” (pp. 2-4).

LA, Jefferson Parish: Choice in 2009
Jefferson Parish Public Schools. (2008, September). Proposed plan for schools for advanced
study; Jefferson Parish Public Schools. (2008, October). Proposed amendment to the elementary
school portion of the magnet school plan.
In July 2008, JPPSS school board created a policy consistent with the expectations
outlined in the Dandridge Court Order, and the Compliance Office mirrored the same
actions by aligning its operating procedures with the policy.
Some schools were gradually transformed into magnet schools (Hazel Park, Rupple, and
Metairie) beginning from 2009 school year. In deciding admission to magnet schools,
students' race was considered. The school district's east bank and west bank had different
racial composition, so building schools in either side altered school attendance zones.
Some changes in grade reconfiguration were accompanied. At the end of 2008 school
year, the school district decided students' attendance zones (domicile) based on parent
driver’s license.
Dandridge v. Jefferson, Civil Action No. : 64-14801 (2009)
“(T)he school system was authorized to continue to utilize its existing magnet schools,
and students attending those schools were allowed to continue in them through the
schools’ terminal grade, regardless of where in the Parish they resided. As part of the
operation of magnet programs prior to approval and implementation of the Magnet Plan,
the JPSB also seeks the Court’s approval of new arts and Montessori magnet programs at
Washington, Ames, Clancy, and Lincoln elementary schools, all racially-identifiable
black schools. See New Magnet Programs Motion. The new Magnet Plan was submitted
on October 30, 2008. The plan requires students on the respective banks of the
Mississippi to attend a magnet school on their home bank and equalizes the offerings on
each side of the river. Under the proposal, magnet students on the West Bank in grades
K-5 will be served by Gretna No. 2 and Ruppel elementary schools. Magnet students in
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grades 6-8 will be housed at Thomas Jefferson Middle School. Magnet students in grades
9-12 will be housed at the site of the former Archbishop Blenk school. All of these
programs are either new or existing programs. On the East Bank, magnet students in
grades K-6 will be housed at Hazel Park and Metairie Academy elementary schools,
while magnet students in grades 7-12 will be housed at Haynes Academy. Metarie and
Haynes Academy are existing magnet programs, but Hazel Park is an existing elementary
school that, under the plan, would be converted into a magnet school.”

LA, Rapides Parish: SES-Voluntary in 2006
Rapides Parish School Board. (2006, July 6). Proposed majority to minority transfer policy.
Retrieved from http://ww2.rpsb.us/agendas/06-07/070706/Item_28.pdf
“When unitary status is achieved, transfers based solely on racial criteria will no longer
be granted... For magnet transfers, a race-neutral student selection process will be used to
select a diverse student population in all magnet schools. The process will ensure
diversity by selecting students from different socio-economic backgrounds and
career/academic interests.”
Rapides Parish School Board. (n.d.). Student transfer and withdrawal. Retrieved from
http://ww2.rpsb.us/agendas/07-08/080707/Item_18.pdf
In July 2006, the district revised student transfer and withdrawal policies by replacing
race consideration in magnet school admissions with socioeconomic factors.
MD, Prince George’s County: Choice in 1985; Neighborhood in 2001
Eaton, S. E., & Crutcher, E. (1996). Magnets, media, and mirages: Prince George's County's
"miracle" cure. In G. Orfield & E. Eaton (Eds.), Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal
of Brown v. Board of Education, 265-289. NY: The New Press.
“Prince George’s County has operated under a court-ordered desegregation plan since
1972… Judge Frank Kaufman ordered a desegregation plan that reassigned huge
numbers of students and included mandatory busing… By 1985, the two parties in the
suit had worked out a compromise centered around Murphy’s magnet school concept…
In July 1994, school officials announced that they would try to get out of their remaining
mandatory busing requirements, which currently affects less than 10 percent of county
students. For now, the court order requires that magnet schools and programs do nothing
more than meet numerical racial quotas” (pp. 267-270).
Johnston, R. C. (2000, Nov. 29). Md. district plans return to neighborhood schools. Education
Week.
“Beginning next August, about 4100 students will be moved from the high schools they
are now attending to schools in their neighborhoods, under a rezoning plan ratified this
month by the board... The change will affect only 9th and 10th graders--a decision that
seeks to minimize the impact on the school careers of 11th and 12th graders. And only a
small portion of the 13,000 students in the county who are bused outside their
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communities will be affected by this stage of a long-term plan that will be phased in over
several years. By approving the new student-assignment plan Nov. 16, Prince George's
County joins dozens of other districts nationwide that are adjusting to the end of
mandatory-busing orders by returning students to neighborhood schools.”
Ayscue, J. B., Flaxman, G., Kucsera, J. & Siegel-Hawley, G. (2013). Settle for segregation or
strive for diversity? A defining moment for Maryland’s public schools. The Civil Rights Project.
Retrieved from http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-anddiversity/settle-for-segregation-or-strive-for-diversity-a-defining-moment-for-maryland2019spublic-schools/MARYLAND_4-17-13_POST.pdf
"When the court-ordered desegregation plan was lifted in 2002, the school board of
Prince George’s County divided the district into three subdistricts that were relatively
balanced in terms of racial and socioeconomic composition. Within a subdistrict, students
could choose to attend any magnet school. The hope was that integrated schools would
result naturally from the students’ choices combined with the fact that each subdistrict
was racially and socioeconomically balanced, but this goal was never fully achieved. At
the beginning of the 2004-2005 school year, Prince George’s County eliminated 33
magnet programs due to state funding cuts, thus drastically reducing the strategy that was
originally intended to achieve integration" (pp. 3-4).

MA, Boston: Choice in 1989; 2000 SES-Voluntary
Boston’s Children First v. Boston, 375 F.3d 71 (2004)
“BPS adopted an assignment system known as the Controlled Choice Student
Assignment Plan, (the ‘Old Plan’), which went into effect for the 1989-90 academic
year… BPS assigns students to schools at the transition grades during students' public
school careers, each of which corresponds to a student's advancement to a new type of
school: kindergarten 1 (programs for 4-year-olds), kindergarten 2 (programs for fiveyear-olds), first grade (elementary school), sixth grade (middle school), and ninth grade
(high school). While high school assignments are made on a citywide basis, Boston is
divided into three Attendance Zones--the North, East, and West Zones--for purposes of
the elementary and middle school assignments at issue in this case. These zones were
drawn by the district court as part of its desegregation orders, and the lines largely hew to
major transportation routes to keep traditional neighborhoods intact as much as possible.
Students are eligible to attend any of the schools located in the Attendance Zone in which
the students reside. As part of the assignment process, students rank their preferences for
the schools within their Attendance Zone, as well as for the few schools that accept
students from any part of the city without regard to Attendance Zone lines. Students
whose siblings attend a school receive a preference for that school during the assignment
process. Similarly, students who live within the walk zone of a given school receive a
preference for seats at that school. Finally, every student receives a randomly assigned
lottery number, with the lower numbers being considered more advantageous. Under the
Old Plan, BPS assigned students to schools using the following criteria: the student's rank
preference for the school; whether a sibling already attended the school; whether the
student lived within the school's walk zone; whether the student had already matriculated
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at the school on a temporary basis; and, as a tie-breaker, the student's random number,
with a lower random number winning out over higher numbers. Assignments under the
Old Plan operated with one additional constraint--the ‘ideal racial percentage’ for each
grade's population, as calculated by the racial and ethnic composition of the student
population in that grade within each of the three Attendance Zones. If admitting a student
would cause a deviation of more than 15% from the ‘ideal racial percentage,’ that student
would not be admitted. The Old Plan operated largely without change for ten years, from
1989 through 1999.”
In 2000, the district stopped its use of race (replaced with lottery), and reduced the
percentage of available seats allocated for students within a school's walk zone from
100% to 50%. “(T)he Boston School Committee, at the recommendation of
Superintendent Payzant, voted to remove the racial guidelines from the assignment
system on July 14, 1999… BPS adopted a facially race-neutral assignment plans in
November 1999...”
Caroline, H. (1999, Aug. 4). Boston board votes to end era of race-based assignment. Education
Week.
“(T)he school board voted 5-2 last month to adopt a race-blind admission policy starting
in September 2000.”

MA, Springfield: Choice in 1990; Neighborhood in 2005
Schneider, R. E. (2013, June 13). Springfield student assignment plan – Jurisdiction of Board
and Commissioner of Education [A letter from Rhoda E. Schneider, General Counsel to David P.
Driscoll, Commissioner of Education]. Mass.gov. Retrieved from
http://www.doe.mass.edu/lawsregs/news05/springfield_memo.html
“In 1990, the School Committee adopted a controlled choice student assignment plan,
which the Board approved as an amendment to all previously approved Springfield
desegregation plans. Since 1990, Springfield has adopted and the Commissioner of
Education has approved several minor modifications to the plan, most recently in 2004.”
Goldberg, M. (2007, June 28). Many lament court’s desegregation ruling. The Republican
Newsroom. Retrieved from
http://blog.masslive.com/breakingnews/print.html?entry=/2007/06/many_lament_courts_desegre
gati.html
“In 2005, Springfield adopted a ‘boundary school plan,’ which assigns children to
schools based primarily on home address, Burke said. However, address zones were
clustered ‘in a way to improve the racial balance in the schools.’ The boundary school
plan probably meets the new legal standard, and no major reshuffling of students is
anticipated…”
Arbulu, N. E. (2005, April 3). Neighborhood schools are back. The Republican Newsroom.
Retrieved from http://unit-e.com/urbancompass/boundarymap1.jpg; http://unite.com/urbancompass/boundarymap2.jpg; http://unit-e.com/urbancompass/boundarymap3.jpg
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“District officials next September will begin returning students to their neighborhood
school, 31 years after busing was first used for desegregation. The School Committee last
week approved the controversial ‘boundary’ plan, which assigns most students to their
closest elementary and middle school or one they can walk to based on drawn
boundaries. Some students still will be bused based on where they live, or if there is no
‘safe path’ for them to get to school. Students may choose to attend one of five magnet
schools that have specialized programs funded through the U.S. Magnet Schools
Assistance grant. These schools are open to all students as required by the grant… The
move to neighborhood schools affects at least 4,000 students next September… The
desegregation plan created six education districts and bused 5,800 students to achieve
racial balance at a time when the city was predominately white and blacks were
segregated in Mason Square area schools.”
Springfield Public Schools. (1993). Springfield Public Schools: Schools of choice. Retrieved
from http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED365772

MN, Minneapolis: Choice in 2001
Kahlenberg, R. D. (2007). Rescuing Brown v. Board of Education: Profiles of twelve school
districts pursuing socioeconomic school integration. NY: Century Foundation.
“In March 2000, the parties settled the suit, reaching an agreement on a four-year
experiment beginning in the fall of 2001 to encourage greater socioeconomic integration
of schools in a number of ways. Building on the state’s interdistrict transfer law, the state
agreed to make transportation available for low-income students (up to $500 per year) to
attend suburban schools. Eight suburbs agreed to set aside a total of at least 500 seats for
low income city students each year. Within Minneapolis, magnet schools that were
wealthier than the city average were required to set aside up to 20 percent of kindergarten
seats for low income students, and up to 50 percent of seats that open up in first through
fifth grades. Students attending schools with two continuous years of low performance
were given a right to transfer to other public schools. The agreement came on top of an
earlier commitment from the state legislature to build a K–12 Minneapolis magnet to
draw from eight surrounding suburban districts, and an interdistrict school in suburban
Roseville, open to students from North St. Paul and St. Paul” (p. 38).
Frankenberg, E. (2011). Integration after Parents Involved: What does research suggest about
available options? In E. Frankenberg, & E. DeBray (Eds.), Integrating schools in a changing
society: New policies and legal options for a multiracial generation (53-74). Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press.
“Minneapolis may offer a promising race-neutral interdistrict model. The program, called
The Choice Is Yours, began in 2001-2 in response to a city-suburban segregation lawsuit.
Unlike the other interdistrict programs profiled here, Minneapolis’s effort bases student
eligibility on family socioeconomic status. By 2006-7, nearly 2,000 students placed in
nine suburban districts were participating, and the program was voluntarily continued”
(p. 65).
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MO, Kansas City: Choice in 1986; Neighborhood in 1999
Hendrie, C. (1998, Fe. 25). Falling stars. Education Week.
“Next fall, under a restructuring plan largely approved this month by a federal judge, well
over half the district’s nearly 60 separate magnet programs are slated for extinction.
While only a dozen of the district’s nearly 60 separate schools are now typical
neighborhood schools, that number should climb to nearly 40 by this time next year…
The root of Kansas City’s unusually extensive magnet program extend back to 1984,
when a federal judge laid the task of remedying the ills of the city’s past system of
racially segregated schools on both the district and the state. .. The result: a plan to
convert all of the district’s middle and high schools and most of its elementary schools to
magnets. The twin goals were to promote racial mixing and upgrade educational quality
and achievement. Over a seven-year period that began in 1986, dozens of schools
developed specialized themes... Most of the schools losing their themes will have
traditional attendance zones and become known as ‘comprehensive community schools.’
A central goal of this plan is to curtail busing.”
Parker, W. (1998). Supreme Court and public law remedies: A tale of two Kansas cities,
Hastings Law Journal, 50, 475-571.

NE, Omaha: Neighborhood in 1999
Omaha Public Schools. (n.d.). Student assignment plan summary. Retrieved from
http://district.ops.org/Portals/0/StudentCommunityServices/StudentPlacement/Student%20Assig
nment%20Plan%20Summary.pdf
“On November 16, 2009, the Board of Education approved a revision to the Student
Assignment Plan that had been in operation since 1999. The changes were implemented
beginning in the 2010-2011 school year. The changes incorporated innovative
modifications that better serve the district's students and ensure alignment of school
choice processes with those of the Learning Community's Diversity Plan. The prior
Student Assignment Plan replaced the district’s desegregation plan that had been in
operation since 1975.
The revised Student Assignment Plan's biggest change was the adjustment in eligibility
by residence to eligibility by socio-economic status at the student level and integrative
priorities. Choices are designed by school organizational levels: elementary schools,
middle schools and high schools. Choices include attending one’s home attendance area
school or voluntarily applying to attend any one of the district’s schools in the
appropriate grade range. Priority is given to siblings first, and then those students who
increase the socio-economic diversity of the school. Socioeconomic status determined by
eligibility to participate in the federal free or reduced-price lunch program establishes
whether a student has priority for acceptance… To further promote integration magnet
schools exist, four in the western portion of the district and four in the eastern portion,
geographically evenly distributed.
Elementary students who reside more than 1.5 miles driving distance from their home
attendance area school are provided transportation to that school by the district. Students
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who live more than 1.0 mile from the school of choice they attend (that is not their home
attendance school) and who (1) bring socioeconomic diversity to the school, or (2) are
eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, receive transportation. The district continues to
provide transportation to students who selected options under the former Student
Assignment Plan.”
White, K. A. (1999, May 19). Omaha voters approve $254 million bond measure. Education
Week.
“Omaha voters last week approve the biggest school-construction-bond issue in Nebraska
history, a measure that is a crucial step toward ending mandatory busing and returning to
neighborhood schools… And it will allow the district to open three new magnet
schools… the bond issue also paved the way for leaders of the 45,000-sutdent district to
move forward with a plan to abandon mandatory, race-based busing and provide parents
and students a number of new options of schooling.”
Omaha Public Schools. (1999, April). The student assignment plan.

NY, Buffalo City: Choice in 2003
Fahey, J. (2009, October 19). Buffalo Public Schools PK-08 student assignment plan review
[Issue Brief].
“1976 – 2003
o ‘Deseg’ era
o Citywide magnet schools
o ECC/Academic pairing (Pk-02 and 3-8)
o Some neighborhood schools
o Steady walk/bussed ratio of one third walkers and two thirds bussed
o 0.75 mile walk boundary for transportation eligibility established
o Unitary status granted 1996, student assignment plan unchanged through 2002-03
2003-04
o Three zones (A, B, & C) with choice schools in each zone
o City wide schools remained
o Plan only lasted one year
2004-05 to present
o 100% open enrollment – full choice
o Attendance possible at any school from any address
o Enrollment based on parent selection of schools with placement priorities granted for
sibling preference, proximity preference and availability” (p. 1)
NY, Rochester City: Choice in 2004
By the People America in the World. (2005). Equal educational opportunities (Rochester issues).
Deliberation Week.
“In 2004, the Rochester City School District adopted a policy called ‘managed choice’
that would allow parents to select which elementary school their child would attend. It
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would replace the current system that automatically sends a child to the closest
elementary school. With the managed choice policy... Rochester city schools are divided
into three zones... Northeast - Northwest - and South. Parents are asked to choose three
schools within the zone they live in and rank them. A lottery system determines which of
their three chosen schools their child attends. The new policy sets neighborhood school
boundaries to families within a half-mile radius of the school... and 70 percent of those
families are guaranteed a spot for their child. The policy has created some controversy
because it does not include an absolute guarantee that kids can attend their neighborhood
school if parents choose that.”
Rochester School Board. (n.d.). Rochester school board policy manual parent
preference/Managed choice policy 5153.
“Assigning students to Zone schools of choice by a computerized lottery, which requires
that the District program the computer to assign students to their first-choice school in
accordance with the following priorities: (a) Sibling Preference when there is one child
enrolled at a school already; (b) a 0.50 Proximity Preference for 60% of the available
seats; and (c) socioeconomic fairness guidelines (determined by Free or Reduced Lunch
ratios at the school level).”

NC, Charlotte-Mecklenburg: Neighborhood in 2002
Clotfelter, C. T., Ladd, H. F. & Vigdor, J. L. (2013). Racial and economic diversity in North
Carolina’s schools: An update. Sanford Working Paper Series SAN13-01.
“(T)he school board adopted a new assignment plan in 2002 that, like the one in WinstonSalem/Forsyth, put greater emphasis on neighborhood schools and offered parents greater
choice about which schools their children would attend” (p. 4).
Weinstein, J. M. (2013). The impact of school racial compositions on neighborhood racial
composition: Evidence from school redistricting. Unpublished Paper.
“In Fall 2001, CMS was ordered to dismantle the race-based student assignment plan that
had been in effect for 30 year. Under this plan, school assignment zones were typically
drawn to capture non-contiguous areas with vastly different racial compositions to
achieve racial balance in schools. A district-wide public school choice plan was approved
for the 2002-2003 school year, with school assignment zones dramatically redrawn to
give each student a guaranteed seat at a school close to her residence, typically the closest
(students could gain admission to other schools in the district through a lottery process).
Approximately half of families were reassigned to different schools…” (p. 2).
Kahlenberg, R. D. (2007). Rescuing Brown v. Board of Education: Profiles of twelve school
districts pursuing socioeconomic school integration. NY: Century Foundation.
“In 2001… the Charlotte Board of Education voted to drop its longstanding racial
desegregation plan and implement a public school choice plan. The choice plan allowed
parents to rank preferences among schools, and gave special consideration to students
who are eligible for free and reduced price lunch and currently attend schools whose free
and reduced lunch numbers are thirty percentage points above the district average.
Priority was also given to low-income students whose choice to transfer ‘would enhance
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the free and reduced lunch status but not create a concentration of free-reduced lunch
status above 50 percent in the receiving school.’ Beginning in 2004–05, a priority was
also given where the student reads below grade level and the home school performs ten
percentage points below the district average for reading… The plan was deeply flawed,
however. It provided a guarantee of admissions to a neighborhood school, and lowincome students were provided choice to higher performing schools only if seats were
available” (p. 35).

NC, New Hanover County: Neighborhood in 2007
McGrath, G. (2008, Sep. 23). Crowd at meeting favors neighborhood schools. StarNews.
Retrieved from http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20080923/ARTICLES/809230147/1/SPORTS08?template=printpicart
“Option 4, as it is dubbed, also would continue the policy of neighborhood schools…
Two years ago during a much larger elementary school redistricting, the school board
largely avoided the political and social minefield by adopting the principle of
neighborhood schools.”
New Hanover County Schools. (2006, July 11). Regular Meeting Minutes. Retrieved from
http://www.nhcs.k12.nc.us/board/2006/min071106.pdf
“Mr. Cox moved approval of the minutes of the Public Forum on Redistricting, May 30,
2006… Ms. DeShield seconded the motion, which carried unanimously… Dr. Morris
gave a report on redistricting for clarification. He pointed out that redistricting is not for
this upcoming year, but will be effective for the 2007-2008 school year… Dr. Morris also
stated that the Redistricting Committee has made some minor adjustments to the map
regarding Murrayville, Alderman, Blair and Forest Hills. Adjustments made included
changing students who were within walking distance of a school and students living in
cul-de-sacs who were split between two different schools.”

OH, Cleveland Municipal: Neighborhood in 1993
Reed v. Cleveland, 179 F.3d 453 (1999)
“‘Vision 21’ plan developed by the parties in 1993, a plan based on parental choice
favored overwhelmingly by the populace of Cleveland, including the African American
community… Racial balance in Cleveland is difficult to achieve because the city is to a
great extent divided racially along a North-South axis... In order to comply with the
plus/minus 15% test, the school system was first divided into 190 residential zones.
Students were then assigned and bussed to schools across town to achieve the requisite
racial balance in each individual school. When imbalances resurfaced, they were
corrected by administrative orders and students were reassigned as needed. Annually, as
many as 4,000 students were reassigned and bussed to satisfy the court order… Vision
21's parental choice program was designed to be phased in over four years. Dr. Foster and
Dr. Darden noted that particular attention had to be paid to the three corners of the
triangular school district, where schools persistently fell outside the 15% limits due to
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changing demographics and the long distance students were forced to travel. The school
district thus proposed that the three corners no longer be paired with any other region but
instead remain as autonomous regions not subject to the school district's 15% limitation.
The district court approved Vision 21 on July 21, 1993... During the 1993-94 school year,
the first year of Vision 21's implementation, 41 schools fell outside the 15% limitation.
This was the result of treating the three corner regions as autonomous areas, altering the
grade structure of schools in those corners (changing to K-5, 6-8, and 9-12), providing
new choice options to community elementary schools in those regions, and suspending
the annual assignment adjustments.”

OH, Columbus City. Neighborhood in 1996
Bush, B. (2009, Nov. 8). Columbus school lines to be redrawn, Changes in building assignment
will affect thousands. The Columbus Dispatch. Retrieved from
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2009/11/08/reassign.ART_ART_11-0809_B1_3NFJU56.html
“The roots of Columbus' current school-assignment plan go back to the 1970s and courtordered busing, said Steve Tankovich, the district official in charge of designing a new
assignment plan. There are more than 450 ‘elementary attendance zones,’ or EAZs, that
form the basic building blocks of school assignments. During desegregation, the zones
allowed officials to assign neighborhoods of black and white students to schools to
achieve racial balance. After busing for racial balance ended in 1996, EAZs were
reassigned as many schools closed and many students left for charter schools, making
some assignments less geographically logical today than they were years ago…”
Tebben, G. (2012, Sep. 6). Columbus Milepost| Sept. 6, 1979: First day of school busing
accomplished quietly. The Columbus Dispatch. Retrieved from
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/09/06/first-day-of-school-busingaccomplished-quietly.html
“The busing of students to achieve racial balance in Columbus schools continued until
1996… In 1985, when the school district was released from federal court control,
enrollment stood at 67,000. The school board continued busing on its own for 10 more
years before returning to neighborhood schools in 1996, which brought resegregation.”

OH, Dayton City: Neighborhood in 2002
Hannah, J. (2002, April 16). Judge ends racial busing in Dayton. Cincinnati.com. Retrieved from
http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2002/04/16/loc_judge_ends_racial.html
“A federal judge on Monday lifted a desegregation order, a move that will end more than
25 years of cross-town busing designed to achieve racial balance in the city's public
schools… ‘We're pleased that we've reached a settlement agreement,’ said Steve Puckett,
assistant superintendent of the Ohio Department of Education. ‘It's time to move on from
the remedies of the past — such as busing — and focus on improving academic
achievement of all students in all schools.’ Because Judge Rice has ordered busing to
end, the district will receive $32.3 million that the state promised to pay in settlement.”

166

OK, Oklahoma City: Neighborhood in 1985
Dowell v. Oklahoma, 606 F. Supp. 1548 (1985)
“Thereafter, on December 17, 1984, the Oklahoma City Board of Education unanimously
adopted the Student Reassignment Plan which is to go into effect at the commencement
of the 1985-86 school year. The fundamental elements of the plan, admitted into evidence
as plaintiffs' Exhibit #1 and incorporated by reference in these findings of fact, are as
follows:
(a) The Plan calls for K-4 neighborhood schools throughout the district. This eliminates
compulsory busing of young black children, grades 1-4, to elementary schools outside
their immediate neighborhood;
(b) An equity officer is to monitor all schools to insure the equality of facilities,
equipment, supplies, books and instructors in all schools. An equity committee is to assist
the equity officer and recommend ways to integrate students at any racially identifiable
elementary schools several times each year;
(c) A ‘majority to minority’ transfer policy will allow elementary students assigned to a
school where their race is in the majority to obtain a transfer to a school in which their
race will be in the minority. The transfer option is encouraged through district-provided
transportation;
(d) All faculties and staff will remain integrated at all schools in the district; and
(e) Fifth year centers will be located in all sections of the school district. All fifth year
centers, middle schools, and high schools in the school district will continue to be racially
balanced with the aid of busing.”

PA, Pittsburgh: Neighborhood in 1996; SES-Voluntary in 2010
Chandler, L. (1997). Forced busing: A staff report of the Allegheny Institute for Public Policy.
PA: Allegheny Institute for Public Policy.
“In Pittsburgh, the financially-strapped Board of Education recently backtracked from a
proposal to reduce busing and save almost 10 million dollars in transportation costs, and
instead adopted a plan that would keep busing essentially intact while costing the district
an additional 10 million dollars… (T)he board, in Spring 1995, began a study to see what
would take to make the schools more attractive, an a new organization plan, called The
Redistricting Plan… This system-wide plan would re-establish neighborhood schools by
keeping students as close to their homes as possible while maintaining a substantial
number of students in racially balanced schools by expanding the use of magnet schools
and open enrollments… The plans… managed to re-ignite many of the passions on both
sides of the busing issue, and a result it was met with predictable opposition with some
arguing that it would lead to resegregation… The board… bowed to public pressure, and
came up with a revised plan with a slowed implementation schedule. The revised plan…
‘strikes a balance between the twin goals of creating more neighborhood schools and
maintaining diversity.’”
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Craig, R. (1996, May 15). News roundup: Update. Education Week.
“The Pittsburgh school district has adopted a revised redistricting plan that scales back an
earlier proposal to eliminate most busing but will still allow more children to attend
school closer to home. The two-year plan, which presents a compromise between
advocates of neighborhood schools and supporters of busing to promote racial balance,
calls for opening six new schools, redraw boundaries, and changes the number of grades
served at several schools. The changes are to be phased in over two years, starting this
fall.”
Chute, E. (2007, June 28). Schools’ racial balancing rejected. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. Retrieved
from http://www.post-gazette.com/news/nation/2007/06/28/Schools-racial-balancingrejected/stories/200706280277
“Pittsburgh has dismantled some elements of its desegregation plan, including forced
busing across the rivers, and the district is no longer required by the consent decree to do
the remainder.”
Chute, E. (2013, June 9). Magnet schools in Pittsburgh lose their racial balance. Pittsburgh PostGazette. Retrieved from http://www.post-gazette.com/news/education/2013/06/09/Magnetschools-in-Pittsburgh-lose-their-racial-balance/stories/201306090213
“Beginning in 2010-11, the district discontinued considering race in magnet admission as
a result of a U.S. Supreme Court ruling on race-based admissions in Seattle and
Jefferson, KY, in 2007. In addition, population has dropped, and school closing--many in
2006 and later--have led to reassignments, including assigning students in feeder patterns
based on street address to schools that had admitted students only through the magnet
process… Until 2010-2011, admission to most magnet schools was by race -- divided
into black and other. In the early years, parents waited in line at their school of choice,
but in more recent years, for schools where there are too many applicants, a lottery has
been done by computer. The current lottery does not consider race but gives extra weight
for various factors, such as eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch and living within the
geographic region where the school is located... However, the neighborhood preference,
driven at least in part by busing costs, weights the lotteries toward who live nearby. .. For
many years, magnet schools had a goal of 50 percent black 50 percent other… Some
schools are called magnet schools but also serve as assigned feeder schools for at least
some of their students… Students take the same program whether they entered via the
magnet lottery or were assigned because of where they live.”

SC, Greenville County: SES-Voluntary in 2002
Kahlenberg, R. D. (2002). Economic school integration: An update [Issue Brief]. NY: Century
Foundation.
“In late 2001, the Greenville school board voted to adopt a new student assignment
scheme which eliminated the use of race but sought to reduce the ‘concentration of low
income students’ and the ‘concentration of low-achieving students.’ The board rejected,
however, a more aggressive plan to ensure that no school has more than 50% of its
students eligible for free or reduced price lunch” (p. 3).
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TN, Metropolitan Nashville: Neighborhood in 1998; Neighborhood in 2008
Smrekar, C. & Goldring, E. (2013, Oct. 15). Rethinking magnet school policies and practices.
Retrieved from https://lcrm.lib.unc.edu/voice/works/w/rethinking-magnet-school-policies-andpractices/s/1
“On September 28, 1998 the Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools (MNPS) district was
declared unitary. The new plan reorganized student assignment into eleven cluster feeder
patterns designed to reduce the distance between home and school, and to limit the
number of schools a student attends during their entire time in the school district (to
three). The plan also provided increased choice options, including magnet schools. In this
particular district, a new student assignment plan was immediately implemented that
included neighborhood schools—schools that were closer to home and thus a shorter bus
ride away than during the court order… The plan does not include any ‘specific ratios’
for schools, although redrawn attendance zones reflect ‘a consideration given to
demographic diversity.’”
Maxwell, L. A. (2013, Oct. 15). Nashville student assignment case turned down by Supreme
Court [School Law Blog]. Education Week. Retrieved from
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/District_Dossier/2013/10/nashville_student_assignment_c.html?
qs=Nashville+Student+Assignment+Case+Turned+Down+by+Supreme+Court
“The 1998 plan was largely based on where students lived, with clusters of high schools
and feeder middle and elementary schools. The plan included a number of so-called
noncontiguous attendance zones that generally involved busing black students from poor
neighborhoods to racially diverse schools in higher-income neighborhoods. But that plan
led to an underuse of some schools and overcrowding at others.
The 2008 plan changed the noncontiguous zones to ‘choice zones.’ Under the plan,
students from the noncontiguous zones could either begin attending their neighborhood
school or continue to be bused to a school in the same cluster where they had been bused
before, but not necessarily to the same racially diverse schools they had attended under
the 1998 plan.”
Spurlock v. Fox, No. 12-5978 (2013)
“In July 2008, the Metropolitan Nashville Board of Public Education (the Board) adopted
a new student-assignment plan generally referred to as the Rezoning Plan. The Rezoning
Plan modified the student-assignment plan that had been in place since the Metropolitan
Nashville Public Schools District (the District) achieved unitary status (i.e., became
desegregated) in 1998. One of the modifications effected by the Rezoning Plan was to
eliminate the so-called mandatory noncontiguous transfer zones, meaning that the
existing system whereby students in racially isolated geographical zones were bused to
racially diverse schools in noncontiguous zones was replaced by a system in which the
same students were given a choice of either attending the schools in their own
neighborhood or being bused to schools in the same noncontiguous zone as before, but
not necessarily to the same school previously attended.”

TX, Austin Independent: Neighborhood in 1987; Neighborhood in 2000
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Price v. Austin, 945 F.2d 1307 (1991)
“In April 1987, the Board adopted a revised student assignment plan, to become effective
in the 1987-88 school year. The new plan primarily affected elementary schools, and
eliminated crosstown busing (which had been a part of the 1980 consent decree, and was
designed to further desegregation) of most students in pre-kindergarten through fifth
grade. The plan would result in sixteen elementary schools which would have
predominantly minority student populations (90% or more, according to the district
court's opinion)… The 1987 plan also included other elements. It retained the district's
policy of majority-minority transfer…”
Soria, H. M. (2006). From desegregation to resegregation: A case study of African American
parent understanding [Dissertation]. TX: The University of Texas at Austin.
For the 1987-1988 school year, the pairing of elementary schools was eliminated and
replaced by a neighborhood school policy. There was no longer to be extensive busing at
the elementary level. Only 1,300 out of 78,000 students were bused for integration
purposes. “At best, busing had been seen as a symbolic gesture of desegregation reform”
(p. 122). In Dec. 1998, the AISD decided to stop 27 years of forced busing as a means to
integrate schools. The decision to end busing came at the same time the school board had
to make important boundary decisions to open nine new schools. After completely
removing the previous busing plan, the district offered ‘diversity choice’ which was an
option to continuously attend the same school despite any boundary change.
Ward, J. (2006, Feb 23). Re-segregation and reform [in Austin, Texas]. Daily Texan. Retrieved
from http://texasedequity.blogspot.com/2006/02/re-segregation-and-reform-in-austin.html
“The Austin Independent School District Board of Trustees abandoned forced busing - a
way of integrating schools by busing students from predominantly white schools to
predominantly black and Hispanic ones - in 2000. It was replaced by neighborhood
school assignment with an optional school transfer system.”

TX, Dallas Independent: Neighborhood in 1984; Neighborhood in 1994
Tasby v. Dallas, 265 F. Supp. 2d 755 (2003)
“After an extensive hearing in spring 1981, the Court filed an Opinion rejecting
crosstown busing, keeping in place previous desegregation remedies for grades 4-8,
changing attendance zones for certain schools, and instituting programmatic remedies
designed to close achievement gap between minority students and their Anglo counter
parts. In 1984 the Court directed to open three Learning Centers in Sough Dallas for
grades 4-6. These Centers enabled previously bused minority students to return to their
neighborhood schools and instituted creative education remedies…”
Zeeble, B. (2001, Sep. 4). Dallas' history of school desegregation. KERA News. Retrieved from
http://keranews.org/post/dallas-history-school-desegregation
“The original bus order lasted four years, then the Judge added elementary students to it.
But by 1982, a few years later, busing largely went away... And in 1994, Judge Barefoot
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Sanders declared the district ‘unitary,’ meaning it was no longer considered legally
segregated. But he still maintained some oversight, pending the elimination of some
problems. For example, the court ordered Townview Magnet School needs better
technology. Facilities for talented and gifted students need upgrading.”
Tasby v. Dallas, 869 F. Supp. 454 (1994)
“In December 1992, voters passed the most ambitious bond issue in the history of the
DISD... The centerpiece of the 1992 bond program is the construction of Townview, a
centrally located ‘supermagnet’ that will house six of the District's existing magnet
programs in a state-of-the-art facility… Also included in the bond program is relief of
overcrowding at the Fannin, Bonham, and Ray elementary schools. These schools are
located in neighborhoods heavily populated with minority students, many of whom are
now being bused to other schools in the District. The District plans to build two new
schools, and to build an addition to the existing Ray facility, to relieve overcrowding.
(Dave Patton). This construction will allow students to return to their neighborhood
schools. The District will establish Learning Centers for returning students in grades 4-6
at these schools. (Chad Woolery; Dave Patton)... In December 1993, the District provided
the Court and the parties with a Bond Project Priority List that contains a schedule for the
various new buildings, additions, and renovations included in the bond program… (T)he
District was on schedule with the projects, and did not anticipate any delays. At the
request of the Plaintiffs, the District submitted a motion following the unitary status
hearing that sought Court approval of the Bond Project Priority List; the Court approved
the schedule. Order dated May 18, 1994.”
TX, Houston Independent: SES in 1998
Hendrie, C. (1998, June 10). Houston reaches for diversity without quotas. Education Week.
“(T)he district’s quota system.. aimed to achieve a ratio in every program of 65 percent
blacks and Hispanics to 35 percent students of other groups. The quotas had originally
been set as part of a desegregation case that ended in 1989… The suit prompted schools
leaders to appoint a task force to review admission procedures not just for the Vanguard
programs but also for all magnet schools in the 212,000-student district… Just days
before the case was slated for trial in federal court last fall, the school board decided to
drop the quotas… Under the new system, such children get three extra points out of a
possible 108 in a rating system that considers grades, test scores, interviews, and parent
and student questionnaires, as well as such obstacles to success as poverty, lack of
fluently in English, and disabilities.”
Zuniga, J. A. (2001, July 18). Study: Resegregation on rise, even in HISD. Houston Chronicle.
Retrieved from http://www.chron.com/news/article/Study-Resegregation-on-rise-even-in-HISD2036767.php
“School board members ended the race-based guidelines in October 1997, four days
before a federal judge was scheduled to hear a reverse discrimination case they feared
they would lose.”
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VA, Arlington: SES-Voluntary (Minor) in 1998
Tuttle v. Arlington, Civil Action No. 98-418-A (1998)
Two students whose admission to the Arlington Traditional School were denied sued the
district. The school chose students by lottery but, if white students were selected, it
skipped the selection and moved to the next lottery. In response to the lawsuit, the school
developed a weighted lottery system considering student race and family background
(family income, immigration status) and implemented the system since 1998-98 school
year. In 1998, the court ruled the weighted lottery favoring black students is
unconstitutional and ordered the use of random lottery. Later, the court ruled that, in the
previous court decision, the court abused its discretion when ordering specific admission
policy, but affirmed the unconstitutionality of weighted lottery. The district responded to
these orders by increasing choice schools’ capacity and admitting more students.
Arlington Public Schools. (n.d.). Administrative Services. Random double-blind lottery.
“The process for the random, double-blind lottery includes pulling each application and
matching it to a randomly-drawn number. This process is used to determine the order of
admittance for all applications.”

VA, Norfolk City: Neighborhood in 1986, Neighborhood in 2001
Doyle, M. C. (2005). From desegregation to resegregation: Public schools in Norfolk, Virginia
1954-2002. The Journal of African American History, 64-83.
“Norfolk would return to segregation, or experience resegregation, after the ending of the
busing policy at the elementary school level in 1986 and at the middle school level in
2001” (p. 64). “In September 2001, busing in Norfolk ended at the middle school level
(grades six to eight). At that time, similar concerns resurfaced, and whereas African
Americans were widely opposed to the end of busing, whites were generally in favor. In a
repeat of the situation in 1986, the school board voted to a plan by a 5-2 vote” (p. 78).
Watson, D. M. (2008, Oct. 3). The Norfolk 17 face a hostile reception as schools reopen. The
Virginian-Pilot. Retrieved from http://hamptonroads.com/2008/09/norfolk-17-face-hostilereception-schools-reopen
“Norfolk discontinued cross town busing in its middle schools in 2001 in hopes of
stemming the drain, and the School Board will now look at redrawing attendance zones
on the high school level.”
Eaton, S. E., & Meldrum, C. (1996). Broken Promises: Resegregation in Norfolk, Virginia. In G.
Orfield & E. Eaton (Eds.), Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of
Education, 115-141. NY: The New Press.

WA, Seattle: Choice in 1997
Hendrie, C. (1996, Dec. 4). Seattle to shelve race-based busing in shift toward neighborhood
schools. Education Week.

172

“(T)he Seattle school district has decided to phase out race-based busing to allow more
students to attend neighborhood schools. Under its existing voluntary desegregation plan,
the district buses some elementary students across town in an effort to keep schools
within racial-balance guidelines. The policy will end next fall, and elementary students
will be able to choose from among any school in the 47,000-student district, as middle
and high school students are not allowed to do. Unlike many other urban school systems,
Seattle has never been under court order to desegregation. But it voluntarily started
mandatory, race-based student assignments in 1973.”
Ware, L., & Robinson, C. (2009). Charters, Choice, and Resegregation. Delaware Law Review,
11(1), 1-21.
“In 1998, Seattle adopted an assignment plan which allowed incoming ninth graders to
choose from among any of the district’s high schools by indicating their assignment
preferences in rank order. If too many students identified the same school as their first
choice, the district used ‘tiebreakers’ to determine which students would be assigned.
First preference was given to students who had a sibling enrolled in the school. The
second tiebreaker considered the student’s race” (p. 18).
WI, Milwaukee: Magnets/Transfers/Rezoning in 1976; Choice in 1998
Russ Kava. (January, 2011). School integration (Chapter 220) aid (Informational Paper 27).
Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau. Retrieved from
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/InformationalPapers/Documents/2011/27_school%20integration%20(Chapter%20220)%20aid.pdf
“The integration aid program was enacted by Chapter 220, Laws of 1975, and first went
into effect in the 1976-77 school year. The stated purpose of Chapter 220 is "to facilitate
the transfer of students between schools and school districts to promote cultural and
racial integration in education where students and their parents desire such transfer and
where schools and school districts determine such transfers serve educational interests."
One of the major goals of Chapter 220 was to achieve racial balance on a voluntary basis
and at no cost to local taxpayers. The program provides state funds, in the form of
unrestricted aids, as an incentive to school districts to desegregate their schools... In 1979,
a settlement agreement was reached which required the Milwaukee Public Schools
(MPS) to ensure that at least 75% of all students within the district would be enrolled in
racially balanced schools. This was defined by the Court as having between 20 and 60
percent black enrollment at the high school level and between 25 and 60 percent black
enrollment at the middle and elementary school level; only 9% of MPS schools met this
standard in 1976. The settlement agreement remained in effect for five years, until July 1,
1984… In 1984, the issue of school integration in Milwaukee was again before the
federal courts. The MPS School Board filed a lawsuit against 24 suburban school districts
and the state charging that the public schools within the metropolitan Milwaukee area
were segregated. The parties… eventually reached a settlement agreement that was
approved by the federal District Court in October, 1987. This agreement was primarily
dependent on the Chapter 220 program to facilitate and finance increases in the number
of voluntary pupil transfers between MPS and suburban Milwaukee school districts.
Although the original agreement expired on June 30, 1993, MPS and the suburban
districts extended the agreement to June 30, 1995. Since the expiration of the agreement,
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MPS has negotiated individual transfer agreements with the participating suburban school
districts” (p. 1).
“In order to qualify for integration aid, a district must transfer pupils between school
attendance areas with certain concentrations of minority or nonminority pupil
populations. The statutes define "attendance area" as the geographical area within a
school district established by the school board for the purpose of designating the
elementary, middle, high, or other school which pupils residing in the area would
normally attend” (p. 2).
“Under 1999 Act 9, portions of the intradistrict transfer program were re-structured for
MPS only. Act 9 contained provisions, commonly referred to as the neighborhood
schools initiative, designed to assist MPS in the renovation and construction of school
facilities and in the delivery of educational services for children in that district. The
neighborhood schools initiative was intended to reduce the number of pupils who are
transported outside of their neighborhood under the intradistrict transfer program” (p.
3)… “A total of $98.5 million in bonds have been issued related to the neighborhood
schools initiative, excluding bonds for capitalized interest, issuance and other allowable
costs. This funding was budgeted for approximately 40 projects, including construction
of new schools, additions to schools, renovations to facilities, and leases for schools” (p.
4).
Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau. (December, 2011). Milwaukee neighborhood school
initiative [Budget Brief 99-18]. Retrieved from
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/pubs/budbriefs/99bb18.pdf
“Act 9 requires MPS to develop a Neighborhood Schools Plan, hold local hearing on the
plan, and submit it to the Joint Committee on Finance and the Senate and Assembly
Committees on Education by May 2000. The plan must include the following
information… specific plans for establishing neighborhood schools and replicating or
relocating specialty schools in order to increase the number of pupils attending
neighborhood schools”
Bonds, M., Sandy, M. G., & Farmer-Hilton, R. L. (forthcoming). The rise and fall of a voluntary
public school integration transportation program: A case study of Milwaukee’s 220 program.
Education and Urban Society, XX(X), 1-23.
“On September 15, 1987, a federal decree settlement of the lawsuit was reached. The
suburban districts agreed to increase the number of voluntary student transfers accepted
into the 220 Program, and increase the number of participating school districts from 12 to
23. Eighteen of the 24 suburban school districts agreed to make good faith efforts to
increase the number of seats in their schools for MPS minority students, and 10 suburban
districts set new goals for minority students in their schools ranging from 20% to 23%,
agreeing to reserve a specific number of seats earmarked for minority MPS students
(Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, 2007; Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau,
1997, 2005; Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, 2011). In return, MPS reserved
10% of the seats in its specialty and magnet schools for suburban students enrolling in
those schools” (p. 11).
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“Brown Deer, Glendale/River Hill, and Maple Dale-Indian Hill School Districts met the
30% racial balance as indicated in the revised 220 program objectives in 2007-2008; thus,
they no longer had to participate. Glendale River Hills graduated the last four Milwaukee
Public School resident students participating in the Chapter 220 Program in 2009-2010
(E. McDowell, personal communication, June 5, 2011; Milwaukee Public Schools
Division of Student Services, 2010)” (p. 12).
“In the 1998-99 school year, the Open Enrollment program, which was passed by
Wisconsin Legislature in 1998, was introduced in Milwaukee to further the goals of “free
choice” (Public Policy Forum, 2003b). Under this state-wide program, parents are given
an option to enroll their children in any public school district in Wisconsin outside the
student’s resident school district. This allows students and parents the freedom to seek
appropriate public schooling for their children. As noted in Table 4, the number of
students participating in the Open Enrollment Program is more than twice the number of
those in the Chapter 220 Program and had only 2,025 students participating in 2011
compared with 5,991 for Open Enrollment (Milwaukee Public Schools Division of
Student Services, 2010)... Program has no integration goals, and, in most cases,
transportation must be provided by the parents rather than the school districts” (pp. 1516).

VITA

NAME OF AUTHOR: Sun Jung Oh
PLACE OF BIRTH: Gwangju, South Korea
DATE OF BIRTH: November18th, 1981

EDUCATION:
M.A. in Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, 2012
M.P.A., Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, 2011
Bachelor in Public Administration, Chonnam National University, Gwangju, South Korea, 2003

EMPLOYMENT:
Graduate Assistant, Maxwell School, Syracuse University 2011-2015
Public Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Republic of Korea, 2008-2010
Program Coordinator, Chonnam National University, 2005-2007

